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I. INTRODUCTION
The object has been the subject of considerable attention
recently. Theorists identifying themselves as the Conference on Criti-
cal Legal Studies have announced that law is indeterminate. This is
frequently taken to mean that law has no "objective" answers to legal
questions. Legal theorists of different stripes rushed to join the
assault on "objectivity," bludgeoning it with post-modem theories
and techniques first developed in other disciplines. Literary-minded
scholars attack "objective" interpretation using hermeneutics, decon-
struction, and Continental psycho-linguistic vocabulary. Philosoph-
ically-inclined scholars challenge the very possibility of "objective"
truth, citing Kuhn, Rorty, and Peirce. Feminists have indicted objec-
tivity as the "holy grail" of masculinism, masking the reality of
oppression.' From the other side, legal scholars in the classical liberal
tradition, including those who embrace right-wing positions as well as
"liberals" in the center, argue for the possibility of "objective" inter-
pretations of law and the necessity of "objective" truth.
And yet, despite the morbid obsession with the status of the
object, liberating the subject has been a primary object of most
schools of contemporary jurisprudence.
Liberalism-in one form or another the dominant American
political and legal philosophy-is centered on the autonomous indi-
1. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 107
(1989). Variations of MacKinnon's critique of objectivity have been adopted by several other
feminists. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies
and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go To Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988);
Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373
(1986); and the discussion of feminist methodologies in Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal
Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990). As in all other areas, self-identified feminists lack
universal agreement on this issue. Ruth Colker has argued that feminists should not confuse
the critique of the oppressive use of false claims to objectivity with a demonstration that there
is no objective truth. Ruth Colker, The Female Body and the Law: On Truth and Lies, 99
YALE L.J. 1159, 1160 (1990). Drucilla Cornell, like Richard Bernstein, argues that we should
get beyond the use of the terminology of "objectivity" because it is not useful in post-modern
discourse. Yet she does argue for the possibility of a concept of justice and truth external to
the taste of any individual subject which may fit into some definitions of "objectivity."
Drucilla Cornell, Taking Hegel Seriously: Reflections on Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 7
CARDOZO L. REV. 139 (1985); see also RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND
RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS (1983).
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vidual who seeks self-assertion through positive rights and negative
freedoms. The good of the community is often reduced to the aggre-
gate instrumental good of the individual subjects comprising the soci-
ety.2 If many on the left profess a more sympathetic attitude towards
community than mere aggregation, American leftist visions of com-
munity are usually based on the liberation and self-actualization of
the individual subject.
For example, some feminists argue that masculinist society has
turned women into objects; thus, these feminists seek to transform
society so that women may become subjects.4 Neo-Hegelians seek to
reconcile the individual subject with the object of community in a way
that captures the moment of unity of the individual and the commu-
nity without sacrificing the moment of autonomy of the individual.'
2. There are, of course, many different varieties of contemporary liberalism, not all of
which embrace utilitarianism. Michel Rosenfeld identifies three other general categories of
contemporary American liberalism: libertarianism, contractarianism and egalitarianism.
MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 52-132 (1991).
3. That is not to say that all writers who identify with critical thought accept the concept
of subjectivity. As I will discuss below in the text accompanying infra notes 219-23, Stanley
Fish is well known for arguing that subjectivity is illusory. Pierre Schlag has written several
articles deconstructing the concept of the subject. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the
Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991).
4. See JUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990).
But see, e.g., MAcKINNNON, supra note 1, at 116 (criticizing those feminists who purport
to embrace subjectivity, because this assumes we already live in a world where women are free
and, therefore, can now attain the subjectivity which is an attribute of masculinity. That is,
subjectivity might be a goal of feminism, but not an existing attribute).
See also Luce Irigaray, Any Theory of the "Subject" Has Always Been Appropriated by the
"Masculine," in SPECULUM OF THE OTHER WOMAN 133 (Gillian C. Gill trans., 1985).
Many feminists, especially so-called "different voice" feminists, do not accept the liberal
conception of the self as an autonomous individual as applicable for women (and perhaps not
for men as well). Rather, they see the self in terms of characteristics which they tend to refer
to as "relational" and having a morality centered on an "ethic of care." Consequently, the
classical liberal and the different voice feminist might disagree as to how an individual would
achieve subjectivity. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI L. REV. 1,
28 (1988).
Other feminists, however, in their insistence that the goal of feminism is to enable woman
to exercise the type of free choice which they recognize as enjoyed by men, seem to adopt and
privilege the liberal ideal of freedom as autonomous individuality. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams,
Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and
the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803 (1990). In the companion piece to this article, I
argue that despite MacKinnnon's recognition of the necessary interrelationship of the
intersubjective (or objective) as well as the subjective in her methodology, in her concentration
on choice, and failure to speculate on what freedom would be after choice is achieved, she
seems to reveal an essentialist liberal core at the heart of her theory. Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 109 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Alan Brudner, The Ideality of Difference: Toward Objectivity in Legal
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The critical legal studies' identification of law with politics reflects a
concern for individual freedom and the so-called fundamental contra-
diction between the desires for individuation (subjectivity) and com-
munity (objectivity). 6
If almost all American theorists want to preserve subjectivity,
why is there such a sharp dispute about objectivity?
In the dark woods of the jurisprudential literature on objectivity,
one thing becomes clear: authors who wish to make a point about the
subject assume they must likewise take a stand "fer" or "agin" objec-
tivity. Unhappily, their usual procedure is to develop private defini-
tions epiphenominally to justify their preconceived conclusions.
Pursuant to this methodology, the word "objectivity" is given so
many different and contradictory definitions, sometimes even by the
same author in the same essay, that most discussions as to its possibil-
ity or desirability in law or philosophy are worthless.
Authors who are "agin" objectivity assign precarious definitions
to it which reliably collapse at the appropriate moment in the argu-
ment. These definitions are nothing but stage props, like Klingsor's
castle in ParsifaL Authors who are "fer" objectivity adopt soft and
formless definitions which cannot break under the strongest blow.
Under this strategy, objectivity merely slithers away and reconfigures
itself like Jell-O. Yet this very plasticity makes objectivity too weak a
foundation on which to build a jurisprudential theory.
The problem of private definitions is substantially exacerbated
when authors fail to make their definitions express, when they forget
their own definitions in the course of the same essay, or when they do
not ascertain whether the works they criticize in fact use the same
definition as they do.7 Furthermore, this dispute about objectivity has
been masked by a tendency to associate sides with a left/right theoret-
ical. The "left" generally, including many feminists, has assumed that
Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133 (1990). The Hegelian sees the individual subject as
a legal creation, not as a presupposition, but that is not to imply that subjectivity is in some
sense unreal.
6. Pierre Schlag has recently noted that it has become "conventional" for American legal
scholars "to criticize any undesirable orthodoxy as shaped by an untenable objectivism."
Schlag, supra note 3, at 1644.
7. One author has gone so far as to assert that the terms subjectivity and objectivity are so
well understood that she does not need to give definitions. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1000 (1985). I am, perhaps, being
harsh. Dalton is specifically speaking about objectivity and subjectivity in the interpretation of
contracts law. Arguably these terms have generally understood meanings when used in this
very limited manner. Michel Rosenfeld argues, however, that the definitions of these terms
even used in the limited area of contract interpretation are unworkable. Michel Rosenfeld,
Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract
Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769 (1985).
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objectivity is an aspect of classical liberalism, generally, and masculin-
ism, specifically, so that a critique of liberalism must, almost by defini-
tion, include a critique of objectivity. Theorists in the "center" or on
the "right" have accepted this leftist characterization, thus they feel
obliged to frame their defense of classical liberal theory in terms of a
defense of objectivity against unbridled subjectivity and relativityA
And yet very few, if any, contemporary liberal theorists accept
the naive views of objectivity ascribed to them by the left.9 Very few,
if any, leftists who state that they are denying objectivity are the
unbridled, solipsistic subjectivists, amoral relativists, or destructive
nihilists feared by liberals. 10
Moreover, the leftist critique of objectivity leads to a paradox
when the left simultaneously argues that the object of community can
be reconciled with the emancipation of the individual subject.'1  Con-
8. James Boyle has previously made a similar observation. James Boyle, The Politics of
Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 703 (1985)
[hereinafter Boyle, The Politics of Reason]. Very recently, a few scholars who might be
characterized as being on the critical left have begun to recognize that the leftist critique of the
1980s concerning objectivity in the law has, to date, naively assumed that the correlative
concepts of subjectivity are unproblematic. See, e.g., James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The
Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991) [hereinafter Boyle,
Subjectivity]; Schlag, supra note 3, at 1702; Steven L. Winter, Foreword: On Building Houses,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1597 (1991); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive State of the Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1989)
[hereinafter Winter, Transcendental Nonsense].
9. John Stick has made a similar criticism of Joseph Singer's rejection of rationalism and
his ostensible espousal of nihilism as attacking a straw man. John Stick, Can Nihilism Be
Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332, 400 (1986). Drucilla Cornell makes a similar critique of
MacKinnon's attack on liberalism. Cornell, who is not a classical liberal, shows how few, if
any, contemporary liberal jurisprudential theorists espouse the concepts or neutrality which
MacKinnon identifies as central to liberalism. Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Difference, The
Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,
100 YALE L.J. 2247, 2258 (1991).
10. Indeed, many self-identified critics of objectivity or objectivism do not successfully
avoid recourse to concepts which other theorists would define as objective. Robin West has
argued that objectivism is far from being the norm in American legal scholarship, with the
exception of certain schools of Constitutional law. Rather, the dominant attitude in all areas
of legal scholarship, whether on the left, the right or the middle, is in fact relativism. Robin
West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473, 1487 (1990) (reviewing BARBARA
H. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE (1988)). West also notes the tendency of those engaged
in the objectivism/relativism debate to oversimplify their opponents' views. Id. at 1477. She
specifically argues that if Smith complains that most objectivist critiques of relativist theories
are based on crude caricatures of the relativist critique, Smith's critique of objectivism and
defense of relativism is based in large part on a crude caricature of the objectivist position.
11. Schlag similarly criticizes the CLS movement.
With this account of the aims of critical legal thought, the symmetry disappears
in favor of an asymmetrical convergence on a single goal to be attained by a
single means. The single means is the intellectual and political empowerment of
the individual subject. The single goal is the liberation of the individual subject
from the constraint of oppressive reified structures.
1992]
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versely, the liberal defense of objectivity contradicts liberalism's tradi-
tional concern for the freedom of the individual subject from
oppression by the object of community.
Given the sorry state of jurisprudence on the question of subject
and object, the goals of this article are modest. It is simply a plea for
rigorous definition at this highest level of generality. It is a serious
fault, Hegel warned, to presuppose that words have a certain determi-
nate content.1 2 Writers are using terms like "subject" and "object" as
if everyone agreed with what these words mean. In fact, there is con-
siderable disagreement about the definitions of these words, of which
the writers who use these terms often seem unaware.
This Article proceeds as follows. First, I identify several possible
frequently encountered definitions of "objectivity." Second, I com-
pare these definitions to those used by a number of legal scholars who
have chosen to critique or defend the concept of "objectivity in the
law." I have appointed certain writers to serve, for the purposes of
this article, as class representatives for their "schools:" liberalism:
Kent Greenawalt and Owen Fiss; critical thought: Stanley Fish and
Joseph Singer; and feminism: Catharine MacKinnon. Of course, you
may disagree as to whether these authors epitomize their respective
schools. My defense is that my choice of writers is "subjective," in
one common usage of that term. By identifying and using consistent
definitions, I will point out commonalities between ostensibly incon-
sistent theories, diversities among ostensibly consistent theories and,
in some cases, intramural inconsistency within theories. In this arti-
cle I will argue that there is no "real" disagreement among these
scholars about the concept of objectivity nor argue that the debate is
trivial. To the contrary, profound issues of ethics, politics and justice
underlie this debate. I do believe, however, that choosing to charac-
terize differences on this issue as a debate over a word as meaningless,
or perhaps more accurately, as over-endowed with meaning, as objec-
tivity has muddied, rather than clarified, discourse.
Specifically, two interrelated questions are presupposed and yet
obscured by the debate on objectivity. First, "what constitutes a legal
argument?" Second, proceeding from the first, "who may speak and
be heard?" By defining the criterion for legal decision, one also delim-
its the domain of relevant or credible legal argument. By excluding
certain forms of argument as not relevant or credible, one effectively,
if inadvertently, silences those who make these arguments. That is,
dissidents are permitted to speak in the sense of moving their lips or
Schlag, supra note 3, at 1685.
12. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC 43, 624 (A. Miller trans., 1967).
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producing sounds, but the sounds will not have the status of legal
speech, i.e., the words can not be spoken in a court of law. From a
legal and political standpoint, such talk is considered no more speech
than the barking of dogs.' It is heard, but not listened to.'
4
I. DEFINITIONS
Post-modem interpretative theory gives pause to those who
would draft definitions. From that perspective, the task seems fool-
hardy, rather than audacious. Nevertheless, abstraction and categori-
zation are necessary modes of procedure. I cannot avoid this task,
even if I am predestined to failure. My only alternative would be to
pretend to deny that I am doing so.
For identification purposes, I have invented names for the defini-
tions which are intentionally novel and awkward. This will help iso-
late characteristics which illuminate the task at hand. This does not
mean that current definitions and my alternate definitions mutually
exclude each other. One could reformulate molecular definitions
which include several of the atomic definitional components I will
identify. Indeed, some (or perhaps most) of the atomic definitions
offered may (or perhaps must) occur in molecular form.
In many cases, the lines between certain of my definitions (partic-
ularly those analyzed as subjectivity/objectivity dyads) will blur. In
some cases it might be useful to analogize them to points on a contin-
uous spectrum. On this spectrum, there is no line that uncontrover-
sially divides subject from object, or any two definitions of objectivity,
13. The status of the barking of dogs was a central concern of medieval linguistic theorists.
Although the sounds are not produced by a human, they have meaning in that humans
interpret them (e.g., a bark at night can be interpreted as the presence of an intruder), and may
even have interspecific meaning (e.g., dogs seem to understand barks and growls of aggression
from other dogs). If we do not consider the bark of the dog to be speech, the characteristics it
lacks must be a defining characteristics of speech.
Relevant to my concern is that the answer to this question may also serve to define certain
human activity as non-speech. For example, to the medieval linguist, the cry of the afflicted
was frequently considered to fall in. the same category of "non-speech," which nevertheless,
conveys some meaning, not unlike the bark of the dog and the crow of the cock. UMBERTO
Eco, THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION 111-22 (1990). Eco ends his essay with the suggestion
that the very examples used in these dry academic discussions implicitly reveal the reality of
the Middle Ages as being filled with suffering people whose groans were defined away so as to
be more bearable. The hearer was no longer a listener.
14. I am not suggesting that all uses of the terms subjectivity and objectivity should be
avoided in all contexts. Perhaps because of the ambiguities and inferences resulting from the
plethora of potential definitions, "casual" uses of these terms in context can express concepts
which are otherwise difficult to express in English. As Richard Rorty has said concerning two
different competing definitions of objectivity which frequently are conflated, the two uses "are
largely coextensive, and for non-philosophical purposes no trouble arises from running them
together." RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 334 (1980).
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just as there is no "line" where green becomes blue. In our society it
is conventional, and therefore useful, to distinguish conceptually
between the colors green and blue, even though we recognize that
many of us would disagree as to whether a particular shade of aqua
should be characterized as green or blue (or even the notorious
"grue" which haunts the pages of analytic philosophy articles). 5  I
have tried to identify certain points on this definitional spectrum for
illustrative purposes, fully recognizing that such identification is ulti-
mately arbitrary and culture-specific and that others might find other
points more useful.
My dictionary is not intended to be exhaustive. My aspirations
are limited to covering a wide-enough portion of the universe of objec-
tivities to enable me both to illustrate my point as to the superabun-
dance of meaning and to analyze the specific writers chosen. I have
organized the definitions into four rough groups: i) standardized
objectivity; ii) two series of subjectivity/objectivity dyads, in which
objectivity is defined in opposition to its negative "subjectivity." The
first series of these dyads defines objectivity as a methodological or
epistemological category and the second uses objectivity as an honor-
ific to express a normative judgment on a theory or method. Next
comes iii) external objectivity, or that which is opposed to "relativ-
ity"; and, finally iv) the term as it is encountered in neo-Hegelian and
other forms of postmodern philosophy and psycho-linguistics.
15. However, I have been told by certain of my Japanese clients that it is not customary in
Japan to distinguish between what American English speakers call green and blue; they are
usually considered shades of the same color. I am not a linguist and have no firsthand
knowledge of whether this is "true." However, more than one native Japanese speaker has
asserted this to me on more than one occasion.
Color perception may be a bad example for my point. Steven Winter has argued that
some studies of color perception support the opposite conclusion. He suggests that there is
remarkable cross-cultural consistency in the identification of primary colors. This may reflect
the anatomy of the human eye. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 8, at 1136-42.
Winter takes analogies to biological science to an extreme in suggesting that human
anatomy may result in universal, cross-culturally recognized "true" metaphors. For example,
he suggests that metaphors which associate "up" with good, and "down" with bad are
universal in all languages because they reflect humankind's upright stance. Dennis Patterson
has criticized Winter's speculations that understanding is based on the structures of the human
mind as dabbling in science fiction. Dennis Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice &
Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 967 n. 114 (1990). I must admit that, while I do not reject out-
of-hand the possibility of some degree of biological determinism (or at least biological
limitation), I find much of Winter's assumptions about universality to be amusing examples of
the status quo viewing itself as the norm. One does not have to be Sigmund Freud (or, more
appropriately, Luce Irigaray) to suggest another reason why it is common for language (which
is deemed by psychoanalytic theory to be masculine) to judge erect things to be good and
flaccid ones to be disappointing, and to question whether this is universal to all human persons




I start with "Standardized Objectivity"-an objectivity of mun-
dane conversation, as opposed to philosophical discourse.
By Standardized Objectivity, I mean those external criteria for
decisions that by convention are considered sufficiently "clear" such
that one can predict that a sufficient percentage of the community will
agree that a decision represents an application of the standard. For
this definition, the "objective" standard is "authoritative" only in the
weak sense that the relative community agrees that it is the standard
being applied. The standard need not be "authoritative" in the
stronger senses of "just" or "true," or logically or even rationally
derivable or justifiable. It need only be recognized by a sufficient per-
centage of the relevant community as to be usable as the standard to
be applied to a certain category of situations. Probably the most
familiar example of the use of this term is when a professor describes
the multiple choice portion of an examination as the "objective" por-
tion, and the essay portion as the "subjective" portion.16 The profes-
sor means that the objective test will be graded by external criteria,
easily verifiable by other persons.' 7 The subjective portion of the test
is graded by the professor's internal criteria, not so easily verified.
Standardized Objectivity is far from trivial. Every day, we make
important decisions based on objective standards-indeed we literally
bet our lives on them. Yet neither is this use non-trivial in the sense
of implying concepts of external universal truths or value-free, neutral
decisionmaking. Many theorists who use the standardized definition
also imply transcendental definitions and see the two definitions as
inextricably linked.18  Later, I will question whether this linkage is
16. The multiple choice examination is commonly given as the epitome of objectivity.
"Objectivity is often used to mean contextually correct or authoritatively established, as when
a multiple choice examination is described as an 'objective' test because each question has one
'correct' answer." Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
445, 447 (1984).
17. As Thomas Nagel has stated in a recent book review "[o]bjectivity in any area of
thought requires some method of confirming or disconfirming the observation or judgments of
one individual by reference to those of others." Thomas Nagel, What We Have in Mind When
We Say We're Thinking, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1991, at A12. By trying to locate a common
characteristic of objectivity in different fields, Nagel is implicitly noting that there can be, and
are, different definitions of objectivity. The requirement for external confirmation is a
characteristic of my Standardized Objectivity. As will become clear, however, the standard of
external confirmation in Standardized Objectivity is often supplied by combining it with
another of my definitions, such as Community Objectivity, Observation Objectivity or External
Objectivity, to form a molecular objectivity.
18. See my discussion of Kent Greenawalt's theory of objectivity, infra text accompanying
notes 146-97.
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Standardized Objectivity is also frequently, but wrongly, identi-
fied with "neutrality." Neutrality is a normative judgment I will
include within the general category of objectivity as an honorific, and
more specifically, within the sub-category of Fairness Objectivity.2"
Once again, this linkage is unnecessary. You can follow a non-neutral
standard. For instance, a standard could be avowedly racist, such as
the standards under the Jim Crow laws of this country's past. Or a
standard could be expressly related to morality, such as the commu-
nity standards test of obscenity.2 These standards are not objective
in the honorific sense. Yet some concept of neutrality in application is
a necessary component of Standardized Objectivity. Once the stan-
dard is formulated, the very notion of applying the standard presup-
poses that the relevant community also agrees upon what constitutes
consistency between the standard and the decision. Otherwise, it is
not the standard, but some other decision process, that governs the
judgment.
To illustrate the idea of objective or neutral application of a non-
neutral standard, suppose one of my students were to complain that a
I "subjectively" graded an "objective" multiple choice test. He prob-
ably means that I did not strictly apply the answer key used to grade
other students' exams. For example the student can verify that he
answered 80% of the questions correctly (as measured by the key)
and received a B, whereas one of his classmates did the same and
19. For example, insofar as I will link "Standardized Objectivity" to standards recognized
by a community, this use has similarities to another form of objectivity I will identify:
"Community Objectivity." Many writers, however, use the standardized sense casually
without accepting the implicit normative judgments of community objectivity or implying any
stand on issues of determinacy, neutrality, or universality. One could argue that their use of
the word "objectivity" is unfortunate because of these other common normative connotations.
I would argue, on the contrary, that the casual "standardized" use of the word "objectivity" in
context to express a simple concept not easily expressed in any other English phrase is much
more defensible than the careless jurisprudential uses I will discuss in this article.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
21. Cass Sunstein argues that the community standard test of obscenity is frequently
considered "neutral," but one may alternately view it as an imposition of the majority's moral
judgments against dissident individuals who have another moral stance. Cass R. Sunstein,
Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and
Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992). In my terminology, a community standard of
obscenity might be considered "objective" under my definitions of Standardized or
Community Objectivity. But these forms of objectivity are not necessarily characterized by
value neutrality-indeed, as I will argue, Community Objectivity is always explicitly value-
laden. Other forms of objectivity, such as Observation Objectivity and External Objectivity
might be said to be characterized by claims to neutrality. The use of the same adjective
"objective" to describe these very different concepts confuses the analysis because one is
tempted to assume that the same characteristic (in this case neutrality) which describes one
form of objectivity automatically describes other, very different, forms.
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received an A-. (I might, of course, defend this accusation of unfair
subjectivity by reference to some other standard, such as adding a
class participation grade to the final grade). This aggrieved student is
not necessarily accusing me of incorrectly choosing choice C of ques-
tion 6, when choice A was the one true answer (although he may also
press this accusation). If the student combines both accusations in
the single charge of "subjective grading" then the student combines
Standardized Objectivity with another atomic definition of objectivity
such as External Objectivity, Community Objectivity, Algorithmic
Objectivity, or Argumentative Objectivity.
Thus, one may objectively apply non-neutral standards. When I
refer to a multiple choice test as an objective test, I am not necessarily
taking the naive view that there is no possible ambiguity as to the
"correct" answers or that the "correct" answers correspond to some
universal truth. I am merely saying that a sufficient number of the
students taking the examination would agree that the answer key was,
in fact, applied. Hopefully, all participants will agree to all applica-
tions, but I would probably be satisfied if a sufficiently low number of
students denied that the answer key was uniformly applied. If the
number of students is low enough, I can ignore these students as delu-
sional or hallucinatory; their protests can be reduced to the barking of
dogs. I note the noise, and wait for it to stop.
One might prefer the Standardized Objective to be authoritative
in some stronger sense: true, or just, or established by legitimate
political procedures, or logically or rationally derivable, or established
by reference to some other standard external to the whim of the deci-
sion maker. But such strong concepts of authoritativeness are
excluded from my definition at this point. It may seem unrealistic for
a professor to give an "objective" test where the professor arbitrarily
formulated model answers which were not intended to meet some
other standard of truth, such as correspondence with statements pro-
nounced in class. But this only says that an "objective" test usually
has a molecular structure of objectivity-it combines the Standard-
ized Objective with other objectivities having content.
Pure atomic Standardized Objectivity, however, is not unrealistic
in other areas where the concern is not so much that any particular
standard is chosen, but that a standard is chosen and that the stan-
dard chosen is consistently applied. An example of relatively pure
Standardized Objectivity might be the coloration and configuration of
traffic lights. In the United States, the convention is that red means
stop, green means go, and amber signals the ambivalent transition
between green and red. The choice of the three colors perhaps was
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largely random. I doubt if many people would have cared if different
colors had been chosen.22 Once these colors are chosen, though, I
suspect that most people do care that the same color standard would
be applied on all street corners against substantially all drivers.
This is hardly a "trivial" example when the potential effect is
taken into account. One risks life and limb every time one passes
through an intersection, trusting that other members of the commu-
nity will recognize and apply the standard. Most people in our soci-
ety would probably agree that if I ran a red light, in most cases I
"objectively" violated the standard.23
In summary, Standardized Objectivity means that an external
standard is considered "authoritative" in the weak sense that it is
actually applied as the standard in a specific case. The standard could
also, but need not, be "authoritative" in the stronger sense that the
standard itself is considered legitimate by reference to some other
external standard-whether external "truth" or a standard estab-
lished by a legitimate political procedure, for example.24 The multiple
choice test could be weakly Standardized Objective--idiosyncratic to
22. I say perhaps largely random because one could conceive of certain standards which
might seem appropriate in choosing colors on purely practical grounds. For example, one
would probably want the colors to be sufficiently separated on the spectrum so that a very
large percentage of the population could distinguish them: my earlier example suggests to me
that aqua blue for "stop" and teal green for "go" might be a poor choice, whereas red, amber
and green approximately correspond to the three primary colors of light. One would also want
the colors chosen to be within the humanly visible spectrum: infrared for "stop" and radio
waves for "go" also seems a poor choice.
I would also note that on these criteria the red/green choice is questionable given that
red/green color blindness is not uncommon among biologically male humans.
Furthermore, there might also have been technological reasons for the choice. Perhaps at
the time stop lights were first proposed, red, green and amber glass were easier to make than
other colors.
23. This is not the same thing as saying this result is determinate. Any of us can easily
imagine hypothetical fact situations in which arguments could be formulated so that this result
would not be appropriate. For example: the stoplight was broken and stuck on red; the driver
was transporting a pregnant passenger in labor on the way to the hospital; the car's brakes
failed; the driver had to go through the light to make way for an oncoming fire truck or to
avoid being hit by another driver; the incident occurred on a deserted street corner in the
middle of the night with no witnesses other than the driver herself.
24. Bennett identifies the concept of interpretation (with specific references to
interpretation of the United States Constitution) with what he calls "strong" and "weak"
senses of [Standardized] Objectivity. He describes the "weaker" sense of objectivity as "the
use of sources for decisionmaking external to the decider's own (or 'subjective') standards of
values, without necessarily insisting that those external sources be authoritative." Bennett,
supra note 16, at 447. Insofar as Bennett's "weak" sense requires a standard external to the
interpreting subject-such as convention of intersubjective agreement with at least one other
subject-and insofar as Bennett's "strong" sense relates to political legitimacy
(authoritativeness), no bright line exists between his weak and strong concepts. The more
legitimate the standard (or the political procedure creating the standard), the "stronger" the
sense of objectivity; the less legitimate and more arbitrary, the "weaker" the sense.
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the grading professor.25
Another example of this bifurcation is Thomas Kuhn's concept
of scientific paradigms. Kuhn, following Popper, argues that objectiv-
ity should be seen in terms of standards adopted within a community
(Community Objectivity). That is, objectivity is an appropriate con-
cept within a paradigm of normal science. Kuhn questions, however,
whether there could be any external standard of objective truth so
that we could "objectively" choose between two different
paradigms.26
Of course people might disagree as to what constitutes a suffi-
cient consensus of the community or what constitutes a sufficient
degree of predictability for a standard to be objective.27 Indeed the
"standardized" definition may better be described as a comparative,
rather than an absolute, standard. One tends to use this term as
shorthand to indicate a standard that is comparatively more conven-
tionally accepted and predictably applied than some often unstated
alternative. The same standard, labelled objective in one context,
might be considered relatively non-objective in another.28 Decisions
as to whether standards seem sufficiently more predictable than the
norm as to warrant the label "objective" are usually made on an ad
hoc or "practical" basis, rather than any absolute or acontextual
basis.29
25. Robin West has made a similar point on the various uses of objectivism. She points
out that logical objectivism and political objectivism are very different concepts that do not
necessarily presuppose each other. See, e.g., West, supra note 10, at 1476-77. For example,
one may believe that there is such a thing as ultimate truth, and yet believe that all attempts at
formulating objective standards within a political system inevitably degenerate into the
dominance/oppression cycle of false universals. Or one may be a relativist who does not
believe in any ultimate cross-cultural truth, and yet believe that there may be "objective"
standards of the good within a society. West specifically critiques Barbara Herrnstein Smith,
whose economic efficiency theory falls within the latter category of universal relativism. West
argues that Smith incorrectly assumes that adopting a theory of logical objectivism necessarily
requires the adoption of political objectivism so that a critique of political objectivism is also
necessarily a critique of logical objectivism.
26. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1978).
27. For example, in parts of New York City, one could argue whether or not the stoplight
standard is still objective even in my trivial sense. It is a familiar "witticism" among New
Yorkers (who pride ourselves on studied cynicism) that it has become conventional to consider
the beginning and end of the period in which a traffic light is red as merely a suggestion that
the driver consider the prudence of stopping. Because I do not recall ever seeing a traffic cop
pull over any of the scores of vehicles I have seen run red lights in New York, it is not clear to
me whether the police department even recognizes the standard consistently enough for the
test to be considered standardized objective in even the weakest and most trivial manner.
28. See David G. Carlson, Contradiction and Critical Legal Studies, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
1833, 1838 (1989) (attacking the "standard-in-itself").
29. Umberto Eco gives another example of what I am calling a standardized objective
standard. In his discussion of the meaning of "forgeries," "fakes," and proof of
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B. Subjectivity/Objectivity Dyads
The following is a series of definitions in which objectivity is
defined by what it negates. These definitions are necessarily bound to
their corresponding definitions of subjectivity. The first group seeks
to identify valid methodology or epistemology. The second group
uses "objectivity" as a complement. While the definitions found in
the first group arguably serve useful analytical functions, the defini-
tions in the second group tend to be colloquially convenient but ana-
lytically sterile.
One might initially object that all definitions of "objectivity" are
negatives of "subjectivity." In fact, this is not the case. There are also
definitions in which the opposite of objectivity is not subjectivity, but
relativity. 0 Although one might recombine my definitional atoms
into molecular definitions in which objectivity is the negative of both
subjectivity and relativity, this is not required. In these cases it might
be more accurate to say that subjectivity and relativity are separate
negative moments of objectivity. Each reacts to a different property
of objectivity.
One could also object that Standardized Objectivity was nothing
but half of a dyad-the negation of Non-standardized Subjectivity.
To some extent this is correct. I decided not to dualize Standardized
Objectivity because I was emphasizing a distinction based on degree.
Again, it is more common to recognize objectivity and subjectivity in
the "standardized" sense as comparatives similar to the way one uses
"authenticity," he states that, today, using "recognized physical or chemical techniques for
determining the age and the nature of a medium (parchment, paper, linen, wood, and so on)"
would be "considered fairly 'objective' " tests to determine whether a purported autographic
writing is in fact authentic. Eco, supra note 13, at 193. His use of the term "objective" does
not imply that the criteria is totally determinative or "right" in some sort of acultural way.
Eco very carefully refers to the fact that the tests are "recognized" "[n]owadays." He points
out that in different cultures different criteria would be used, including some that we would
consider bizarre (as an example, Eco notes the evidentiary rules of medieval Europe when
"fame" and notoriety were not merely considered relevant evidence, but were considered so
controlling that physical evidence would not be consulted). Id. at 187. Consequently, what we
modems might call an outrageous forgery, such as the Donation of Constantine, medievals
might have considered an appropriate copy of a lost original which must have once existed.
Note that, insofar as Eco is discussing standards adopted by different communities, the
standards might also be deemed Community Objectivity within my definitional schema. Note
also his comparative use of the term. Eco asserts that the criteria are "fairly" objective and the
context indicates that these criteria are only being characterized as "objective" as compared to
other criteria he discusses.
30. To make this distinction clear, some writers adopt a variation on the term objectivity
by referring to objectivism versus relativism. For example, Richard Bernstein has chosen to
critique the usual assumption of philosophers (which he terms "Cartesian anxiety") that
objectivism and relativism are mutually exclusive, either/or categories that one must choose
between. BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2-3, 30; see also Cornell, supra note 1, at 158-60.
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"taller" and "shorter." As such, objective and subjective are not
negatives of each other, but are self-serving qualities related to each
other according to some implicit quantitative criterion.
In contrast, the definitions identified in this section tend to be
expressed as rigid oppositions rather than comparatives-something
is either objective or subjective. These oppositions, though, are not
immune from the gradualness of Standardized Objectivity, but such
an introduction of quantitative gradualness tends to result from its
use in a molecular definition-a combination of a rigid opposition
with the conventional qualities of Standardized Objectivity.
Writers who adopt a subjectivity/objectivity opposition tend to
privilege one pole over the other. Although this point is perhaps obvi-
ous in those definitions which use objectivity as an honorific, it is also
true when objectivity is used to describe a methodology. I would even
go so far as to suggest that one primary reason writers identify subjec-
tivity/objectivity oppositions is to create an analytical tool by which
ideas can be privileged over their opponents and, therefore, to deter-
mine what forms of speech and what speakers will be incorporated
into legal discourse.
Isolating the negativity in oppositional definitions avoids a com-
mon logical error that occurs when definitions are conflated. As I
have previously noted, most writers use molecular definitions of objec-
tivity/subjectivity. For example, a writer might adopt AB subjectiv-
ity, a combination of A subjectivity and B subjectivity. The
corresponding negative definitions of objectivity would be non-A and
non-B objectivity, respectively. The writer argues that A subjectivity
is unacceptable and then concludes that this necessarily constitutes an
argument in favor of non-B objectivity. 3I This does not follow unless
the writer establishes a link between non-A and non-B objectivity
(and/or between A and B subjectivity), such that an argument in
favor of non-A objectivity also constitutes an argument in favor of
non-B objectivity. Or, to put it another way, an argument against A
subjectivity must also constitute an argument against B subjectivity,
which, in turn, supports a finding of non-B objectivity. Frequently,
the writer does not attempt to establish this link. I suspect that this is
because the writer has unconsciously conflated the different elements
in their definition. 32 Alternatively, the writer might have surrendered
31. See infra note 32.
32. The tendency to make this error previously has been pointed out by Thomas Kuhn in
defense of the "subjective" aspect of his theory of scientific revolutions. THOMAS S. KUHN,
ESSENTIAL TENSION 336 (1977). Kuhn accuses some of his critics of conflating two
definitions of subjectivity. One is the sense that a position is judgmental, based on personal
taste, emotion, fantasy, or irrelevant considerations (i.e., similar to what I will refer to as
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to what Wesley Hohfeld referred to as the "principle of linguistic con-
tamination," the unwarranted conclusion that two concepts are neces-
sarily connected merely from the fact that the same word is used for
both.3
Another reason for grouping definitions of objectivity into dyads
is to emphasize that, insofar as these concepts are defined negatively,
the dyads are mutually constituted. Consequently, although one may
privilege or deprivilege a pole of the dyad, any argument against the
possibility or potentiality of the deprivileged pole also inevitably
threatens the privileged pole. In other words, if subjectivity and
objectivity mutually constitute each other and also simply negate each
other, the moment of privilege must be supplied from an external
source; this external origin of privilege turns back to destabilize the
privileged pole as well as the unprivileged pole.
Irrational or Idiosyncratic Subjectivity). The other is the negative of objective truth (what I
will call External Objectivity). In other words, these critics are said to conflate subjectivity
with relativity. Because the first definition of subjectivity is scientifically unacceptable, they
assume that relativity is also unacceptable. Therefore, these critics believe they are forced to
accept External Objectivity. Kuhn notes that External Objectivity is not the negative of
Idiosyncratic Subjectivity; an argument against Idiosyncratic Subjectivity does not establish
the possibility of External Objectivity.
Drucilla Cornell makes a similar critique of Stanley Fish's rejection of objectivity in
interpretation. According to Cornell, Fish starts by assuming, without argument, that the
only definition of objectivity is what I would call an Algorithmic/External Objectivity
molecule. He tries to demonstrate that the concept of rationality implicit in Algorithmic
Objectivity is unworkable. He assumes that by doing this he also demonstrates the
incoherence of External and, what I will call, Philosophical Objectivity. This leads, in turn, to
a concept of unrestricted relativity, or the solipsism of a molecule of Idiosyncratic/Individual
and Philosophical Subjectivity. As Cornell explains, Fish does not end his argument with the
rejection of External Objectivity. Fish moves from the post, modern insight that our selves are
social constructs to what Cornell condemns as "the myth of the framework" which totally
constrains subjectivity. That is, our sense of unrestrained Philosophical Subjectivity is illusory.
Cornell, supra note 1, at 140-41, 152; see also Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization of
Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1139 (1988). Once again, this argument depends on a
synchronization of the various atoms in his molecular definition which, Cornell implicitly
suggests, is not forthcoming in Fish's work. The myth of the framework told by Fish serves to
function as a post-modern version of External Objectivity.
John Stick critiques Joseph Singer on this ground as part of his broader critique of
Singer's private definition of rationality. Unlike Fish, Singer takes subjectivity to almost a
libertarian extreme of autonomy. Stick, supra note 9, at 377. I make a similar, but more
detailed, critique of Singer's use of objectivity. See infra text accompanying notes 228-94.
33. Hohfeld notes the "psychological and linguistic principle" that "the identity of terms
seems irresistibly to suggest an identity between the ideas which are expressed by them."
WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING 70 (Walter W. Cook trans., 1919).
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1. METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DYADS
a. Community Objectivity v. Individualistic Subjectivity
The first dyadic definition I offer identifies "subjectivity" with the
knowledge or beliefs attributable to a unique individual subject.
"Objectivity," therefore, is simply the negative of this. This negativ-
ity, though, has a communitarian spin. Modem and post-modem
thought have rendered problematic the proposition that we can have
reliable knowledge of "truth" outside of human convention. To navi-
gate between the Scylla of individualistic solipsism and the Charybdis
of false universals, objectivity is defined as the Odysseus of intersub-
jective agreement. The intersubjective agreement is not merely con-
cerned with the content of any particular theory, but is concerned
with the methodology and the criteria for acceptance of theories in
general.34 Some varieties of Community Objectivity theory are some-
times called, usually disparagingly, "conventionalism." 35
This community definition of objectivity has been widely adopted
in the philosophy of science. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery,
Karl Popper defined objectivity as that which is intersubjectively test-
able pursuant to criteria conventionally adopted by an identifiable
community of subjects.3 6  Although Kuhn rarely uses the term
34. I have argued elsewhere that the intersubjective agreement also has similarities with
the concept of "feminist consciousness" reached through "consciousness raising," as promoted
by MacKinnon, among others, despite the fact that she claims to reject objectivism.
Schroeder, supra note 4, at 157-79.
35. See, e.g., KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 78-81 (1968); Imre
Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodologies of Scientific Research Programmes, in CRITICISM
AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds., 1987) 91, 105-06;
Schlag, supra note 3, at 1668 (where Schlag refers to Owen Fiss, who adopts a standard of
Community Objectivity, as a "conventionalist"). See generally David Millon, Objectivity and
Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1992).
36. POPPER, supra note 35, at 31. Popper was not the first philosopher of science to adopt
an intersubjective definition of objectivity. Charles Sanders Peirce, for example, also adopted a
concept of objective reality which was limited to that which survives repetitive intersubjective
testing. Peirce's concept of objectivity as community agreement has been described as follows:
"The thought or opinion that defines reality must ... belong to a community of knowers, and
this community must be structured and disciplined in accordance with super-individual
principles." John E. Smith, Community and Reality, in PERSPECTIVES ON PEIRCE 92, 103
(Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1965). In connection with Peirce's concept of reality, Bernstein
notes Peirce's ". . . emphasis on the social or communicative nature or men [which] reflects
Peirce's anti-subjectivistic and anti-individualistic bias." Richard J. Bernstein, Action,
Conduct, and Self-Control, in PERSPECTIVES ON PIERCE 82-83 (Richard J. Bernstein ed.,
1965).
Unlike Kuhn and his intellectual progeny who developed a theory of paradigms from this
insight, Peirce would not have included in his definition of objective reality any conclusion
reached by any empirical community of scientists. Rather, he believed that, although any
specific subject of community might be in error, in the long run every one would eventually
come to the same conclusion. The necessary intersubjective agreement must be universal. See
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"objectivity," the community definition is implicit is his theory of par-
adigms, normal science, and scientific revolutions.37 The very concept
of scientific paradigms presupposes that "scientific knowledge" does
not exist outside of the theories produced by the methodology
adopted by the members of the scientific community. Paradigms3"
can be thought of as agreements within a community as to the stan-
dards or the methodology of objective scientific knowledge. Conse-
quently, Jiirgen Habermas has characterized the philosophy of
science from the time of Charles Sanders Peirce's writings on as con-
centrating on "the method of arriving at uncompelled and permanent
consensus," as opposed to traditional categories of being or know-
ing.39 In post-modem science, methodology replaces ontology and
epistemology. 40
JORGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 91-108 (J. Shapiro trans., 1968);
Schroeder, supra note 4, at 163 n. 149. Cornell argues that, despite Peirce's theory of eventual
unanimous agreement, his concept of "secondness" will prevent this ever leading to "closure"
in the sense of Hegelian totality. Instead, "thirdness" will forever lead us toward the future.
See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 32, at 1196-286 (in which Cornell relies heavily on Peirce's
concept of ethics in reason yet rejects the postulation of eventual closure).
37. In his most famous work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, supra note 26, Kuhn
generally avoids the term "objectivity," although he does discuss the various meanings of
subjectivity in later works.
38. In his later writings, Kuhn agrees with his critics that his uses of this term are circular,
if not inconsistent. I am concentrating only on one aspect of the way he uses the term.
39. HABERMAS, supra note 36, at 91. Rorty and Feyerabend critique the concept of
scientific methodology as epistemology in practice. In Rorty's critique, traditional Western
thought is based on an attempt to find the correct methodology to mirror an external truth
about the material world which exists "out there." RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF
PRAGMATISM 195 (1986). "The idea that in science or philosophy we can substitute 'method'
for deliberation between alternate results of speculation is just wishful thinking." Id. at 164.
Rorty, it appears, sees traditional thought as confusing methodology and epistemology. Rorty,
who relies heavily on Kuhn speaks about pre-Kuhnian scientific theory. His work, therefore,
does not necessarily validly critique contemporary scientific theories. Arguably, his work does
not even validly critique many of the pre-Kuhnian theories such as those of Peirce and Popper.
However, most scientists may think that they are mirroring nature. My friend, Gabriel
Motznik, a philosopher at Hebrew University in Tel Aviv and the son of a mathematician, has
told me that he believes that most natural scientists probably accept an epistemology of
mirroring nature, and most mathematicians are Platonic realists (who believe that they are
reflecting an ideal reality which is beyond the merely physical and contingent). Consequently,
Rorty has been heavily influenced by Kuhn, whose concept of paradigms emphasizes the
methodology of science as itself being science, rather than as a means of approaching reality.
Feyerabend similarly lambastes attempts to identify correct scientific methodology. This
does not mean that different methods are not relatively superior or inferior to other methods
for specific tasks. The method of inquiry is, however, developed and modified simultaneously
with, and as part of, the very act of developing and testing the theory to which the method is
applied. PAUL FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY 13-16, 98-99, 187-91 (1982). To
put it another way, insofar as Feyerabend sees method and result as inextricably linked, to
assume prior to its application that one has identified the correct scientific methodology to
solve a problem is to presuppose the solution.
40. Popper also tries to distinguish scientific methodology from traditional epistemology
1992] SUBJECT- OBJECT
It is not necessary to bestow such honorifics as "logical" or
"rational" upon Community Objectivity. Decisions made by
augury" would be Community Objective in a community which
believed in sorcery, although they may not be logical or "rational" in
the transcendental sense. Moreover, Community Objectivity need not
which concentrates the theory of knowledge of individual subjects. KARL POPPER,
OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 111 (1986). Popper's theory of
worlds 1, 2, and 3 is an interesting variation on Community Objectivity. Popper's world 1 is
the external physical world. World 2 is the world of psychological states. This is the
subjective world of what we experience as thinking, feeling, and believing; individual
knowledge in the sense of the psychological sense of certainty. World 3 is the world of the
content of our thoughts: this is the objective world of our ideas, the collective knowledge of
humanity incorporated in writings, conversations, etc. Id. at 106-08, 152-65. (Sometimes
Popper uses the terminology first, second, and third worlds. Usually he uses the 1, 2, and 3
terminology to avoid potential political implications.) World 3, the social world, and world 1,
the material world, cannot directly interact, requiring the mediation of world 2, our individual
psychology. Id. at 155. Although world 3 is a human creation, it has an autonomous
existence in that the ideas created by any one individual can survive independently of that
individual. In addition, our creations have characteristics and are able to grow in ways which
we individually, and collectively, can not predict or totally control. Examples include number
systems, which are human inventions. Nevertheless, we are always discovering new and
unexpected things about numbers. Id. at 115-22, 158-61. Popper's theory of the logic of
scientific discovery is a theory of the development of the Community Objective world of world
3 and, therefore, of Community Objective methods shared by humanity. Popper argues that a
study of the subjective world of world 2 is irrelevant to this enterprise, a position I do not
share. Id. at 111-12, 163-64; see Schroeder, supra note 4, at 162.
I have included Popper's world 3 social objectivity within the definition of Community
Objectivity both because it develops from his earlier concept of Community Objectivity and
because it retains the basic concept that a community creates objectivity. Popper's definition
differs from many accounts of Community Objectivity in that Popper emphasizes the
autonomy of the community standard once that standard is created, and because, unlike
Kuhn, Popper insists on the necessity of there being only one correct methodology. Rather
than seeing the history of science as a series of periodic revolutions in paradigms, he sees one
paradigm consisting of an unending and constant string of tiny mini-revolutions as individual
scientific theories are tested and rejected through a methodology which is constantly being
improved. Consequently, Popper's concept of Community Objectivity, like certain other
Community Objectivist theories I will discuss below, might be described as functioning as
what I will call External Objectivity. Arguably, Popper can be justly accused by Rorty of
treating methodology as epistemology.
41. Feyerabend, in his attack on the pretense of scientific claims to correct method and
objectivity, refers to a study of Zande sorcery. He argues that sorcery is justifiable under its
own criteria of acceptability. Moreover, standard scientific critiques are incompetent to
persuade a Zande because they are based on criteria which would be irrelevant to someone
who accepted the tenets of sorcery.
Feyerabend does not pretend, however, that there may not be good reasons for one to
accept modern medicine over sorcery; e.g., the former may be more efficient than the latter in
curing people. PAUL FEYERABEND, FAREWELL TO REASON 6-8 (1987). Feyerabend's
primary concerns are to reveal the arrogance of the scientific community and its claims to have
identified one, and only one, appropriate methodology. Not only does Feyerabend believe that
traditions other than science have their own validity, but that "science" does not have any one
method. Id.; see also FEYERABEND, supra note 39, at 9-10, 13-16, 27-30, 98-100, 106, 189-93,
205-07.
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be "value free." Indeed, most thoughtful proponents of Community
Objectivity emphasize how thoroughly value-laden Community
Objective standards are.42 Community Objectivity cannot purport to
be aperspectival or universal, 3 because it starts from the presupposi-
tion that a specific historical community adopts the standard." The
only way in which Community Objective methods purport to be
"value free" or aperspectival is in the sense that they are not depen-
dent on the idiosyncratically held opinions or the viewpoint of any
one member of the community but are chosen by, and shared within,
the community. This is a subtle, but very important, point which is
frequently forgotten by many proponents of Community
Objectivity.45
42. See, e.g., POPPER, supra note 35, at 31.
43. A noted exception to this generality is Peirce's Community Objectivity which, he
posits, will theoretically eventually become universal. See supra note 36.
44. Thus, Popper believes that every idea consequently contains an "irrational element" or
a "creative intuition." POPPER, supra note 35, at 32. Popper is using a very narrow definition
of rationality as strict deductive logic and falsification, which he believes is the definition that
is or should be adopted by the scientific community. However, as I discuss below, this
definition is rarely used by self-identified rationalists. Rather, this narrow definition of
rationality is frequently used by self-identified irrationalist as a straw man to attack.
Consequently, unlike paradigmists such as Kuhn, Popper comes to the surprising conclusion
that although it is inevitable that subjective (personal, individual, value laden, intuitive,
psychological, etc.) considerations are a necessary part of all scientific investigation (for
example, the decision as to what questions to explore in what order is inherently value laden),
the "correct" scientific method of falsification renders the source of our theories irrelevant Id.
at 31. "Objective" method renders science "subjectless" in the sense that the resulting theory
is not individual to a particular subject but is intersubjective within the community. Id. at 57.
Kuhn, a rationalist on a different standard of rationality, agrees with objectivity's value-
laden aspect, but disagrees with Popper that this aspect can, or should be, eliminated by
scientific method. According to Drucilla Cornell, "When Kuhn suggests that, without neutral
procedural rules, the standards developed within the scientific community achieve a status as
values, he is not suggesting that these standards are irrational. He is suggesting that
community choice contains not only a descriptive moment, but a normative moment that
cannot be ignored." Cornell, supra note 1, at 159.
45. One of the most insightful aspects of feminist legal theory has been to remind the legal
community not only are the standards of behavior adopted by our community not "value
neutral", but they are based on those contemporary, American, middle class, white, Protestant
values which our society identifies as masculine, which the law cannot, and should not,
separate from ethics. MacKinnon is one of the most eloquent, but hardly the only, proponents
of this view. Of course, feminists are not the only legalists who have made this argument. See,
for example, feminist fellow traveler Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1-3.
Ernest Nagel makes a point concerning theories of subjective scientific methodologies,
that some purported rejections of "objectivity" arguably degenerate into semantics. Some
theorists reject the concept of the possibility of any universal concept of objectivity and instead
adopt a "local" concept of truth limited to a specific community-what Nagel calls "relational
objectivity." Yet if one accepts this concept of truth at a local level, then one is only trying to
avoid the problem of truth by shifting it to a different linguistic level, because within the local
community-the only relevant universe-local Community Objectivity serves the same
function as universal truth. The possibility that other communities not being discussed adopt
other definitions of Community Objectivity dissolves into an uninteresting theoretical
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One of the perplexing aspects of Community Objectivity/Indi-
vidualistic Subjectivity dyads is that the judgment as to which pole to
privilege, or whether either pole is possible, is inevitably tied to a the-
ory of community and the self. If the subject is perceived as an auton-
omous individual, so that moral judgments lack universality, on what
grounds does the aggregate thought of the community of subjects, as
congealed in law, have normative legitimacy? Does Community
Objectivity in liberalism inevitably reduce to positivism? If not, and
the decision of the community is somehow true or just (for example,
reflective of natural law), then why can it not be intuited by an indi-
vidual standing alone? If the individual can do this, then moral
thought no longer is individual but universal." On the other hand, if
one conceives of the community itself as being the basic categorical
unit, so that the self (the subject) is a social construct, how can there
ever be Individualistic Subjectivity to serve as the defining other of
Community Objectivity? If one is a dissident who rejects the particu-
lar standards of her community, yet adopts the post-modem theory
that the self is a social construct, then how can her own "subjective"
critique survive her critique of the community which formed her, let
alone have any superior normative claim over the status quo?4 7
Many who adopt a Community Objectivity definition, such as
Popper, consider Community Objectivity as the privileged pole of the
objectivity/subjectivity dyad. Subjectivity is associated with negative
aspects of individuality, such as idiosyncracy, solipsistry, or imagi-
nary. I will call this corresponding definition Individualistic Subjec-
possibility; and the "false universals" problem which these critics are trying to avoid (i.e. the
imperialistic imposition of local norms on other persons in the name of objectivity) remains at
the local level (i.e., it is just as oppressive for "the community" to impose its values of truth on
any individual.). ERNEST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURES OF SCIENCE 501-02 (1979).
A variation on the Nagelian critique has been taken up by West in her critique on Smith's
purported relativism, which allows for a concept of local right and wrong within a community
even as Smith condemns the concept of universal right and wrong. West points out the
possible inherent conservatism of such an approach in which, in my terminology, Community
Objectivity functions as External Objectivity despite protests to the contrary. West, supra note
10, at 1491-99.
Of course, both Nagel and West make this point as part of a defense of the concept of a
more universal non-relativistic Externally Objective truth. However, they ignore the fact that
this point does not go to the heart of the relativists attack on External Objectivity, but merely
to the failure of relativists to find a way to implement fully the relativist insight. Consequently,
I make the point not to defend External Objectivity against relatively, but to argue that the
terms are not very useful ways of dealing with a very difficult philosophical problem.
46. This, of course, is natural law theory. See, e.g., Arthur J. Jacobson, Autopoietic Law:
The New Science ofNiklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1655-56 (1989).
47. This is the fundamental epistemological question of the feminist theory of
consciousness raising. Some feminists, notably MacKinnon, believe they have solved this
problem.
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tivity. For example, Popper freely admits that we all experience the
subjective feeling of certainty that causes us to believe things which
cannot be "objectively" demonstrated, and we have no choice but to
act on such feelings. He argues, though, that there is no reason for
anyone else to consider our subjective feelings as evidence of the truth
of the things we believe." The privileging of Community Objectivity
often seems related to the writer's identification with, and inclusion
in, the community that sets the relevant standards, such as Popper's
community of dispassionate and benevolent truth seeking scientists,49
or Owen Fiss' interpretative community of tweedy gentlemen sipping
sherry in the faculty lounge while having important conversations.50
It is possible, however, to adopt the community definition of
objectivity but make Individualistic Subjectivity the privileged pole.
This approach attributes to Individualistic Subjectivity the positive
virtues of individuality, emphasizes the necessity for individualistic
moral choice, and associates Community Objectivity with oppression
of an unjust society. Such an approach is attractive when the relevant
community is, for example, Nazi Germany.51 Even communities such
as Popper and Fiss' may not seem very attractive to women, minori-
ties, and others who are excluded from these communities on the
express grounds that these groups objectively do not meet Popper and
Fiss' standards.5
2
Significantly, those feminists who privilege community and seek
48. POPPER, supra note 35, at 46.
49. Kuhn emphasizes that the communities of scientists that establish what he identifies as
paradigms are very small and elitist groups of specialists. Thomas Kuhn, Reflections on My
Critics, in GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 35, at 231, 253-54. The fact that most of the
public is excluded from the elitist community of "science" underlies much of Feyerabend's
objection to claims of the superiority of scientific method in a supposedly democratic society.
FEYERABEND, supra note 39, at 86-90, 96-100.
50. This is the same chummy and civil group, of course, which engages in delightfully
edifying conversational philosophy with Richard Rorty.
51. Michel Rosenfeld warns, in critiquing Owen Fiss' concept of the interpretative legal
community, that "the claim that an adequate standard of legal interpretation can be fashioned
by reference to the intersubjective perspective of an 'interpretative community,' [i.e., what I am
calling Community Objectivity] can only prevail through the suppression of difference and the
subordination of the dissenting other." Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal
Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 1213 (1990). Cornell makes the same point that an appeal to
community as a standard can not serve as a defense to a critique aimed at the legitimacy, or
even existence, of a community. Cornell, supra note 32, at 1139.
Joseph Singer presents the possibility that any specific community might adopt morally
reprehensible positions, such as slavery, as an argument for the incoherence of what I call
Community Objectivity.
52. An example is Harvard Law School's continuing inability to identify an African
American woman law professor who meets their "high standards." Fox Butterfield, Harvard
Law Professor Quits Until Black Woman Is Named, N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 1990, at Al; Fox
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to create collective knowledge through "feminist methods" such as
consciousness-raising use concepts that come very close to Commu-
nity Objectivity even while they claim to deny or deprivilege objectiv-
ity.3 3 For example, Ann Scales contrasts feminist ways of knowing
with masculinist ways that she associates with objectivity (which is
described as "abstract," "universal" and "impersonal"). She calls for
"concrete," "interpersonal," and "interrelational" concepts of knowl-
edge. These concepts are remarkably similar to the concept of Com-
munity Objectivity accepted by many masculinist theorists. Later in
this article, I will argue that Joseph Singer's deprivileging of Commu-
nity Objectivity ultimately will lead him to privilege a solipsistic form
of Idiosyncratic Subjectivity that is potentially inconsistent with his
leftist political position.54
It is possible to take a more balanced view on Community Objec-
tivity-neither accepting nor rejecting it for all purposes, but recog-
nizing where and when it is useful. As I have said, Kuhn and Rorty
limit objectivity to the normal science/discourse within a paradigm.
Thus, there cannot be any objective way of choosing between para-
digms." At first blush, one could interpret Kuhn and Rorty as dis-
paraging objectivity, and, therefore, exclusively privileging some form
of subjectivity. 6 After a second look, however, one realizes that they
argue that the concept of objectivity is absolutely acceptable and use-
ful (if not inevitable) within a discourse. Kuhn and Rorty do not,
Butterfield, Harvard Law School Torn by Race Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, April 26, 1990, at A20; Fox
Butterfield, At Rally, Jackson Assails Harard Law School, N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 1990, at A14.
53. Schroeder, supra note 4, at 117-18, 120, 172-79. Consequently, I believe that many
feminist legalist critiques of objectivity do not serve as critiques of Community Objectivity but
in many cases are "false universals" critiques of specific claims to External Objectivity, or
defenses of Psychological and Individualistic Subjective methodologies. Unfortunately, as I
will argue in my discussion of MacKinnon's work, the failure of many feminists accurately to
identify how liberal legalists in fact purport to define objectivity substantially weakens the
force of their important arguments.
54. See infra notes 228-94 and accompanying text.
55. In Kuhn's theory, revolutions occur when the community accepts a new set of criteria
for the determination of scientific truths. Incommensurability of paradigms exists because the
two different communities adopt different standards of objectivity-by definition there can not
be a single objective criteria for deciding between the two standards of objectivity. Richard
Rorty, who, in formulating his concepts of normal discourse and edifying discourse, relies
heavily on Kuhn's scientific paradigms of normal science and revolutionary science while
stating "the only usable category of 'objectivity' is 'agreement' [i.e. Community Objectivity]
rather than 'mirroring.'" RORTY, supra note 14, at 337. As I will discuss below, theories of
interpretation that make reference to "interpretative communities" accept Community
Objectivity as at least one element in the molecular definition of objectivity they accept. In
other words, Community Objectivity is the standard that operates within a normal discourse,
but there can be no [Community] Objectivity between discourses.
56. Joseph Singer so misinterprets Rorty's work. See infra notes 254-71 and
accompanying text.
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therefore, totally disparage the concept of objectivity when used for
the appropriate analytical purpose. They merely emphasize that it is
limited in its uses. Consequently, they do not argue in favor of Indi-
vidualistic Subjective methods.5 They argue for the possibility and
necessity of discussion and persuasion between paradigms-intersub-
jective, rather than subjective methods. Moreover, Kuhn, at least,
believes that science is evolutionary and progressive and that there are
good and perhaps rational reasons to make a paradigm shift, although
he believes that this process cannot meaningfully be called objective."8
He, therefore, denies that he is a subjectivist or a relativist.59
Some legal writers who wish to critique objectivity generally
object to the use of the definition as inept because it is not "real"
objectivity but only "intersubjectivity. ' 6° Such a critique is a pecu-
liarly essentialist approach to definitions. Whether or not Commu-
nity Objectivity is synonymous with intersubjectivity, it is also a very
common and well-accepted definition of the term. To reject this use
and insist upon another definition that is easier to defeat is to avoid,
rather than join, the debate.
57. Kuhn argues that it is the very conflation of this one pejorative meaning of subjectivity
with other possible definitions of subjectivity which causes some of his critics to reject the
relativistic aspect of his theory. See infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
58. Examples he gives of potential "good reasons" include "accuracy, scope, simplicity,
fruitfulness, and the like." KUHN, supra note 26, at 261.
59. That is to say, he denies that he is subjectivist, in the sense of judgmental or
idiosyncratic and relativist in the sense of believing that any theory is as good as another.
KUHN, supra note 26, at 263-65. On the other hand Kuhn freely admits that he might be
considered a relativist in other senses of the term.
60. "Western culture teaches us that the patriarchal description of reality is not biased but
neutral; that our knowledge and truths are not subjective, intersubjective, relative or
constructed from narrow perspectives, but objective, scientifically based and universal .... "
Bender, supra note 1, at 9. Bender fails to recognize that much post-modern masculinist
thought, and in particular, post-modern scientific theory, expressly identifies objective reality
with value judgments, intersubjectivity, and locality.
Boyle also distinguishes subjectivity and objectivity from intersubjectivity. "How can we
imagine that there is an objective set of descriptive/prescriptive historical laws that act on the
subjects of those laws, if 'object' and 'subject' are both socially, that is 'intersubjectively'
produced categories?" Boyle, supra note 8, at 730. However, in context it can be seen that
Boyle is not arguing that all theorists adopt a concept of objectivity inconsistent with
intersubjectivity. Rather, he is contrasting certain uses of objectivity (such as Algorithmic or
Argumentative Objectivity), which he associates with specific conceptions of rationality with
intersubjectivity, and is not attempting to address the issues of what objectivity could, or
should, mean.
Other legal scholars, however, accept that validity of a Community Objectivity definition
of objectivity. "Because I seek a source of objective judgments about property for personhood,
but do not wish to rely on natural law or simple moral realism, consensus must be a sufficient
source of objective moral criteria-and I believe it can be, sometimes, without destroying the
meaning of objectivity." (citations omitted) Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REV. 957, 969 (1982).
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b. Algorithmic Objectivity v. Irrational Subjectivity
The next definition of objectivity restricts objective truth to those
propositions mandated by the application of logic or rationality as
narrowly defined. Its opposite-"Irrational" Subjectivity-includes
all other criterion.61
In a sense, the Algorithmic Objectivity/Irrational Subjectivity
dyad might be better seen as a subset of the next dyad I will discuss,
the Argumentative Objectivity/Idiosyncratic Subjectivity dyad. I
identify it first and discuss it separately because it reflects a very lim-
ited concept of rationality which self-identified irrationalists often
incorrectly assume is either the only possible definition of rationality
or the definition adopted by self-identified rationalists. Certain femi-
nist critiques of objectivity emphasize these aspects of objectivity
which I associate here with Algorithmic Objectivity and will associate
below with Observation Objectivity. 62 However, few contemporary
legal scholars would argue that all legal problems can be solved
through the application of mathematical logic. 63 Consequently,
Algorithmic Objectivity is rarely adopted by defenders of objectivity,
61. Despite my statement to the contrary, this definition of objectivity at first blush seems
to be easily stated without reference to the corresponding definition of subjectivity. I have
placed it within this section, however, because I believe that this definition is almost always
used in contrast with its corresponding negative (even if the contrast is not made expressly).
Indeed, what is meant by logic and rationality can probably not be expressed without reference
to what those concepts are not.
62. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 1, at 1378 (rejecting "objective methodology [as] a myth").
In her article, she identifies objectivity with "abstract universality" of masculinism, which she
contrast with the "concrete universality" of feminism. She identifies "objectivity" with a
specific type of abstract mechanistic thought processes which she believes is inadequate
because it ignores other valid "subjective" "concrete" factors.
Bender makes a similar argument. "A system with feminist underpinnings would value
emotion and instinct, as well as reason and intellect, and reject a dualistic either-or, self-other
approach to understanding." Bender, supra note 1, at 12. "They [masculinist legalists] take a
distanced, objective posture informed by liberalism's concerns for autonomy and liberty, many
come to accept the legal rule that intuitively seemed so wrong to them. They are taught to
reject their emotions, instincts and ethics, and to view accidents and tragedies abstractly,
removed from their social and particularized contexts, and to apply instead rationally-derived,
universal principles, and a vision of human nature as atomistic, self-interested and as free from
constraint as possible." Id. at 33.
In both cases, these arguments are weakened by their failure to recognize that they
identified only one limited definition of objectivity which many liberal legalists ostensibly
reject. Liberal legalists can easily counter the argument by pointing to their writings in which
they adopt alternate definitions of objectivity, such as Community Objectivity or a broader
concept of Argumentative Objectivity, which incorporates many of the thought processes that
these feminists champion. Consequently, this feminist critique of objectivity in liberal legalism
could much more strongly be presented by contrasting precisely how "liberals" purport to use
the concept of objectivity with the legitimizing function served by this use.
63. Even Ronald Dworkin, who believes there are demonstrably right and wrong answers
in law, does not rely on the identification of rationality with logic and algorithmic objectivity,
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but more often is set up as a "straw man" for irrationalists, nihilists
and some feminists to attack.6 As a result, Algorithmic Objectivity is
a definition of objectivity encountered mostly in irrationalist
rhetoric.65
but relies on coherence theories of knowledge, emphasizing "integrity" and "fit". RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-58 (1986).
An important exception to my general statement in the area of Constitutional law is
originalist theory. Originalists such as Robert Bork believe that definitive answers to legal
questions can be rationally derived from reading the literal language of the U.S. Constitution
in order to determine the objective intent of the framers. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA (1990).
64. See infra notes 230-48, 313-14 and accompanying text.
65. In other words, paradoxically, self-proclaimed irrationalists are the staunchest
proponents of the identification of rationality with logic because they believe this position is the
least defensible. Furthermore, despite the unassailable logic of the irrationalist position, self-
proclaimed rationalists are no different from the irrationalists, except that rationalists
sentimentally cling to the notion that successful thought must be characterized as rational.
Kuhn, for example, rejects Feyerabend's defense of "irrationality" as well as Feyerabend's
identification of Kuhn as an irrationalist, on the grounds that this presupposes a definition of
rationality which is so narrow as to be useless. If we so narrow our definitions of rationality
then:
existing theories of rationality are not quite right and . . .we must readjust or
change them to explain why science works as it does. To suppose, instead, that
we possess criteria of rationality which are independent of our understanding of
the essentials of the scientific process is to open the door to cloud-cuckoo land.
Kuhn, supra note 49, at 264.
Similarly, Cornell argues that the irrationalist view of rationality is impossibly narrow:
Many objections can be raised against the irrationalist position. But to my mind,
the most important objection is that it shares with the positions it purports to
delegitimate a very limited notion of reason and a corresponding restricted vision
of which discourses can be crowned with cognitive status. Both sides of the
debate over interpretation in legal scholarship are caught in a dilemma: either
objectivism or relativism, or put somewhat differently, either neutral standards of
rationality or the irrationality of the will to power.
Cornell, supra note 1, at 142-43. Richard Bernstein also makes a similar rationalist defense of
broadly based rationality. Cornell and Bernstein argue that even the theories of arch-irratio-
nalist Feyerabend are within the definition of rationalism adopted by most rationalists. Id. at
152-55; BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 62-63.
Feyerabend states that at times he realizes that his irrationalist position risks sounding
like a defense of "stammering and absurdity." PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD:
OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 218-19 (1978). Insofar as he is not
an absurd stammerer, he probably acts "rationally" in the broad definition of the word. Else-
where, Feyerabend admits that he is a contrarian and has chosen to structure his argument as
an attack of "rationality" precisely because we live in a society which unthinkingly privileges
scientific rationality. More accurately, Feyerabend does not attack reason as invalid, but
merely as limited. He proposes that other traditions might have equal validity. FEYERABEND,
supra note 39, at 189 ("I also favour imagination and emotion but I don't want them to replace
reason, I want them to limit it, and to supplement it.").
On the other side of the spectrum from Feyerabend, arch-rationalist Popper emphasizes
the necessity of non-logical modes of thinking in day-to-day life. Although he would argue
that decisions which are not based on his algorithmic scientific method can not be considered
"scientific fact" (defined precisely as conclusions with especial claim to validity because they
are reached through these methods), Popper recognizes the necessity and reliability of "our
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I do not mean to imply, however, that all disagreements between
rationalists and irrationalists are illusory. Some extreme irrationalists
accept, or at least do not reject, the validity of some ways of knowl-
edge, such as religious mysticism or magic, which strict rationalists
might not include in even a broad definition of rationality. Feyer-
abend, for example, defends the possibility of valid sorcery and astrol-
ogy against a standard "scientific" assault.66  Less radical
irrationalists would merely grant a more central role to non-logical
modes of thought-such as empathy and intuition-than do rational-
knowledge" based primarily on conclusions reached through other modes of thought. For
example, Popper insists that the first "objective" world of ideas can only have contact with the
third physical world (which is the subject of science) through the intervention of the second
"subjective" world of our knowledge. POPPER, supra note 40, at 155-56.
Despite this, Popper perhaps comes the closest of any contemporary philosopher to
adopting and privileging a concept of Algorithmic Objectivity (combined with Community
Objectivity), although even his approach is more complex. First, as stated above, Popper
defines objective to mean "intersubjectively testable." He then identifies the criteria for testing
that he believes has most successfully been adopted by the scientific community in the past and
which should be accepted by the scientific community in the future as the only appropriate
criteria to be considered objective. Within the realm of science, Popper pronounces the prob-
lem of the affirmative use of induction to be insolvable and limits scientific objectivity to deduc-
tive logic which mandates results. Consequently, he limits scientific method to falsification.
But even Popper admits the necessity for many different rational thought processes in
daily life (and even in connection with science, which inevitably includes psychological and
intuitive aspects), but his insistence that only falsification (i.e. deduction) rises to the level of
scientific method reveals his hierarchization. This hierarchization results from the way Popper
has structured his philosophical task. Because he believes that science has been the most suc-
cessful mode of inquiry, he tries to identify what is unique about scientific method compared to
other modes of thought. This task is both descriptive (what has been most successful in the
past) and prescriptive of what scientists should do in the future based on our past experience
and logic. Popper argues that scientific method requires an algorithmic standard which con-
clusively determines whether a theory is to be accepted or rejected. Because he concludes that
only deduction meets this standard (or, more accurately, that the problem of induction can be
solved by only using it negatively, which is functionally equivalent to limiting logic to deduc-
tion), he limits scientific method to falsification. Indeed, he might be said to argue that within
the scientific community, Algorithmic Objectivity is the standard which should be adopted as
that community's Community Objectivity. Popper does not argue, however, that "objectivity"
is the only standard or judgment, nor that any "objective" scientific method can ever be used
except in conjunction with subjective methods. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 162.
In essence, our reliance that the sun will rise tomorrow is not based on the fact that some
scientist has "proved" that this will happen, but on our practical experience: it has happened
each and every day of our lives and we feel justified in relying on the presumption that it will
happen tomorrow, even though we know that this is a non sequitur, logically speaking. Pop-
PER, supra note 40,.at 1-31. Popper argues against David Hume's assumption that since induc-
tion is a "logical" problem, it is also a psychological problem. The fact that induction is
irrational in the sense of not logical does not mean that it is irrational in the sense of crazy or
stupid.
66. FEYERABEND, supra note 41, at 7-8; FEYERABEND, supra note 39, at 91-96. Read in
context, Feyerabend does not accept the validity of sorcery and astrology. Rather, he critiques
the arrogance of the practitioners of Western "rationalism" who confuse imperialistic ethno-
centrism with truth. See, e.g., FEYERABEND, supra note 39, at 191.
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ists, despite the fact that rationalists might include "empathy" and
"intuition" within the definition of rationality. Many feminists refer
to feminist methods as either subjective or, at least, non-objective, not
because they reject logical or rational thought. Rather, they try to
create or restore a more balanced, full, and human way of knowing. 67
If Algorithmic Objectivity, in its pure form, arguably exists only
in the rhetoric of its opponents, Algorithmic Objectivity does com-
monly appear in molecular form combined with either Community or
External Objectivity. When combined with Community Objectivity,
Algorithmic Objectivity is not presented as value-free or aperspectival
in the sense that it is expressly considered to reflect the values and
perspective of the specified community. When used in reference to
"universal" human standards of logic, Algorithmic Objective facts
might purport to be aperspectival as conclusions not dependent on
any individual or community act of will. Yet these facts are not
"value-free" because the adoption or rejection of algorithmic reason-
ing as a standard depends on the prior judgment that algorithmic rea-
soning is a superior or inferior mode of reaching truth or of making
judgments than other alternate modes of knowing.
Consequently, those who adopt Algorithmic Objectivity-as a
part of a more complicated molecular definition-may make either
objectivity or subjectivity the privileged pole. Those who privilege
Algorithmic Objectivity associate Irrational Subjectivity with the neg-
ative aspects of non-logical thought. Irrationality, from this perspec-
tive, is emotional, unreliable, solipsistic, prejudiced, delusional, and
perhaps crazy. Those who privilege Irrational Subjectivity-associat-
ing it with intuition, pragmatism, empathy, authenticity, etc.-dis-
miss Algorithmic Objectivity as a lie.
c. Argumentative Objectivity v. Idiosyncratic Subjectivity
"Argumentative" Objectivity presupposes a broader definition of
rationality than that which underlies Algorithmic Objectivity. Conse-
quently, Argumentative Objectivity is closer to the "rationalist" posi-
tion that philosophers actually take. An Argumentatively Objective
conclusion is one with which almost all reasonable persons would
agree after a good faith, rational argument. Reflecting a broad defini-
tion of rationality, rational argument could include not merely logi-
67. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 1, at 11-12; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculation on Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 49 (1985);
Scales, supra note 1, at 1389. This common feminist approach also relates to the dispute




cally (algorithmically) conclusive arguments, but also those that are
so reliable or persuasive that there would be general agreement that
one conclusion is more probably correct than any alternate. James
Boyle, for example, suggests that the form of rationality embodied in
Argumentative Objectivity more nearly reflects the Enlightenment
concept of rationality that underlies liberal theory than does the
Algorithmic Objective-reasoning frequently ascribed to liberalism by
its critics:
The lack of ultimate rational grounding for our ideas is compatible
with the Enlightenment vision of reason: a reason that is used to
break down the illusion of necessity and that is thus "tilted"
towards a love of freedom. The ideas are compatible because you
can break down a claim to correctness, naturalness, or neutrality
without asserting that you have the pure truth yourself. Put more
simply, you can claim that someone else is wrong without claiming
that you, yourself, are right.6"
In other words, while the "necessity" required by the algorithmic rea-
soning process is incompatible with the Enlightenment concept of
freedom of the individual, the Enlightenment concept of rationality
allows for free choice and consensus.69
I call the negation of Argumentative Objectivity "Idiosyncratic
68. Boyle, supra note 8, at 738-39.
69. An example of what I might call Argumentative Objectivity in contemporary liberal
thought is Ronald Dworkin's coherence theory of interpretation. Dworkin believes that there
are "right" answers to questions of legal interpretation. See generally DWORKIN, supra note
63. Cornell questions whether Dworkin's is truly a coherence theory. She suggests that
Dworkin adopts consistency (integrity) for normative, rather than epistemological, reasons.
Cornell, supra note 32, at 1140. Dworkin does not argue that these answers are "objective" in
the algorithmic sense in that they are supported by arguments that would persuade everyone.
Ronald Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk
About Objectivity Any More, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 287, 295 (W. J. T.
Mitchell, ed. 1983) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity]. Nor does it make any sense to describe
moral judgments as objective. Consequently, Dworkin admirably concludes that the
objectivity/subjectivity terminology is confusing--or "a fake"-and is both unhelpful and
should be avoided. Id. at 298. Dworkin states:
Objectivity is another matter. It is an open question, I think, whether the main
judgments we make about art can properly be said to be true or false, valid or
invalid. This question is part of the more general philosophical issue of
objectivity.... Of course no important aesthetic claim can be "demonstrated" to
be true or false; no argument can be produced for any interpretation that we can
be sure will commend itself to everyone, or even everyone with experience and
training .... If this is what it means to say that aesthetic ideas are subjective-
that they are not demonstrable-then of course they are subjective.
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 249, 256
(W.J.T. Mitchell, ed. 1983) [hereinafer Dworkin, Interpretation]. Dworkin further argues that
to conclude from the impossibility of this type of objectivity that the alternative is total relativ-
ism is a non sequitur. Id. at 256-57.
Although I usually agree with very little of what Dworkin has to say, as will become
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Subjectivity." The idiosyncratic subject is one who stubbornly main-
tains her ideas despite good arguments and evidence to the contrary.
In a pejorative sense, Idiosyncratic Subjectivity is identified with igno-
rance, prejudice, bad faith, and closed-mindedness. 70
We frequently hear this usage in casual conversation. For
instance, if I were to say that I was going to "try to be objective"
when reading a law review article written by a certain legal scholar, I
might mean that I have personal feelings of affection or dislike for the
author that I will try to disregard because I do not deem such feelings
relevant to judging the quality of the scholarship. Objectivity in this
sense means ruling out ideas which are deemed not relevant to the
argument, such as personal taste.7'
One occasionally finds positive views of Idiosyncratic Subjectiv-
ity. For example, Umberto Eco has described how Renaissance
Hermetics and Kabbalists believed that God is infinite and beyond all
human thought. Consequently, these believers did not consider a
proof that X existed as evidence that non-X did not exist; logically
contradictory truths could exist simultaneously. As God was con-
ceived as the infinite transcendent subject, the universe reflected infi-
nite Idiosyncratic Subjectivity. 2
Like Algorithmic Objectivity, Argumentative Objectivity is fre-
quently, or perhaps always necessarily, found in molecular form. For
example, Argumentative Objectivity is sometimes combined with
Community Objectivity. A methodology based on algorithmic logic
may be promoted on the grounds that it is the methodology that has
been adopted by a community.73 John Stick describes this form of
Argumentative/Community Objectivity (which he calls Group Objec-
tivity) as follows:
The claim that law is objective can mean many things.... [I]t can
mean that the judge announcing the law has used accepted proce-
dures for reasoning to his decision rather than reaching his deci-
sion as a result of extraneous factors. The notions of bias or
prejudice in decision-making refer to a failure in this ... sense of
objectivity .... [O]bjectivity can mean that a legal decision has
clear, I completely agree with his overall sentiment that claims to subjectivity frequently, or
usually, serve an "honorific" function and do not further argument.
70. Kuhn identifies this as one common pejorative meaning of subjectivity which many
writers incorrectly use as an argument in favor of an unrelated definition of objectivity. See
supra notes 57, 59.
71. Greenawalt includes other elements within his definition as well. See infra text
accompanying notes 146-47.
72. Eco, supra note 13, at 18-20.




been made according to the agreed rules of rationality of the legal
system itself. ... It is not to imply, however, that these standards
of rationality have any necessary relationship to reality, truth, jus-
tice, symbolic logic, revealed religion, or any party line.74
Another possibility is a combination of Argumentative Objectivity
with a form of what I will call External Objectivity,75 a belief either in
a rationally organized and/or rationally knowable external truth, or a
belief that it is externally true that human subjects share a logical
facility which must serve as the basis of intersubjective argument and
agreement.
7 6
The first type of Algorithmic Objectivity/External Objectivity
molecule relates to what Rorty identifies as the philosophical error of
attempting to mirror nature, and of assuming that agreement among
thinkers, that is, Community Objectivity, is only possible if there is an
external reality to agree about:
Kuhn's critics have helped perpetuate the dogma that only where
there is correspondence to reality is there the possibility of rational
agreement, in a special sense of "rational" of which science is the
paradigm. This confusion is aided by the use of "objective" to
mean both "characterizing the view which would be agreed upon
as a result of argument unreflected by irrelevant considerations"
and "representing these things as they really are."7 7
Dworkin, for example, combines Argumentative Objectivity with
Community Objectivity (although he avoids the confusing terminol-
ogy of objectivity).
d. Reasonable Person Objectivity v. Mental State Subjectivity
One of the most common objectivity/subjectivity dyads in Amer-
ican law is the dichotomy between what I will call "Reasonable Per-
son Objectivity" and "Mental State Subjectivity. '78  In Reasonable
Person Objectivity, the behavior of a legal subject is given legal char-
acterization not by reference to the subject's actual mental state, or by
74. Stick, supra note 9, at 369-70.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 114-15.
76. Peirce might be said to have adopted the latter approach. Peirce thought that
objectivity could only be defined intersubjectively, and did not think that the external world
could be known (and therefore could exist meaningfully) outside of human consciousness.
Thus, he did not base his philosophy on a concept of external universal truth. He proposed,
however, that in the long run all humans applying the appropriate method will come to
agreement because of a shared rationality. Consequently, objective reality is independent of
the beliefs of any specific community.
77. RORTY, supra note 14, at 333-34. Rorty goes on to say that these two meanings so
greatly overlap that, for everyday conversation, the two can be treated as the same, but that
conflating them in philosophical analysis is mischievous.
78. I use these terms because the "reasonable person" test of tort law is one of the most
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reference to any other characteristic individual to the sujbect, but by
comparison to a standard based on a hypothetical person or industry
having certain ideal characteristics.79
Reasonable Person Objectivity may be seen as a variation of
Standardized Objectivity. The difference I am emphasizing is the pos-
itive/negative polarity of this dichotomy. Standardized Objectivity
does not necessarily imply privileging of objectivity or subjectivity. It
is a comparative, rather than an oppositional, standard. Reasonable
Person Objectivity usually has normative implications, insofar as it
refers to some idealized characteristics or behavior, and, therefore,
serves as the goal to which mental state subjectivity ought to aspire.
This dyad differs from other oppositional dyads, however, in that
the subjective mental state .of an individual legal actor in a specific
situation may, in fact, meet or exceed the objective standard. That is,
the opposition and privileging of the two poles of this dyad exist in
theory, but not necessarily in fact, in any specific application. In
other words, Reasonable Person Objectivity is usually a minimum
standard of behavior (as in negligence law) to which an actual mental
state can be compared.
Reasonable Person Objectivity often presupposes that the stan-
dards chosen for the hypothetical standard are valuable based on
some other type of objectivity. For example, a "reasonable" person
may be thought of as having the characteristics which a specific com-
munity has decided are appropriate for its members (i.e., Community
Objectivity) or having characteristics which meet standards for good-
ness established by God (i.e., External Objectivity). It has become
almost a clich6 to recognize that the reasonable man standard of torts,
despite the recent cosmetic change to the reasonable "person" stan-
dard, incorporates as the standard for behavior an able-bodied indi-
vidualistic and autonomous adult male.80 I have been unable to find
familiar examples. However, the standard need not necessarily be hypothesized reasonability.
Another example is the "prudent person" standard applicable to fiduciaries.
Federal securities law is replete with Reasonable Person Objective and Mental State
Subjective standards. For example, in Backman v. Polaroid, 893 F.2d 1405 (1st Cir. 1990), the
First Circuit Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff in a private right of action under Rule lOb-5
must establish that the defendant acted with "scienter" defined as a [Reasonable Person]
objective standard of recklessness, although a defendant is permitted to raise a [Mental State]
subjective good faith defense.
The Uniform Commercial Code also generally recognizes a Mental State Subjective
standard of good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990). However, the UCC sometimes imposes
a potentially higher Reasonable Person Objective Standard. See U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (with
respect to merchants); § 3-103(a)(4) (1990).
79. This is similar to certain of the definitions of objectivity identified by Greenawalt. See
infra text accompanying notes 177-78.
80. "Today we are taught to consider women reasonable when they act as men would
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an example of Reasonable Person Objectivity which relates to pur-
portedly random standards for the sake of consistency, as in the Stan-
dardized Objectivity example of traffic lights. Although theoretically
possible, it probably would never be expected as a practical or polit-
ical matter.
e. Observation Objectivity v. Psychological Subjectivity
Another use of the term "objectivity" occurs primarily in the
social sciences, but is also found in feminist legal writings on method-
ology as well as some jurisprudential writing. "Observation Objectiv-
ity" describes empiricism, that is, an emphasis on phenomena that are
observable by a person other than the subject experiencing the mental
state or participating in the social system. The opposite form of sub-
jectivity, "Psychological Subjectivity," refers to the subject's own
account of her psychological or mental state or social world.
Either pole of this dyad can be privileged. Early behaviorists
argued that only the external behavior of subjects-that is, Observa-
tion Objective facts, and not their statements of their psychological
state-constitute the only reliable, and therefore appropriate, study
for social scientists."' Later behaviorists modified this position to
include consideration of subjective statements (i.e., the subject's state-
under the same circumstance, and unreasonable when they act more as they themselves or as
other women act" (footnote omitted). Bender, supra note 1, at 25; see Leslie Bender, Feminist
(Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 848 (1990); Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38
J. LEGAL EDuc. 101, 108 (1988). Courts have recently begun to adopt a "reasonable woman"
standard in sexual harassment cases, finally recognizing that the very theory behind making
sexual harassment actionable is that men and women are socially situated differently. For a
useful survey of the development of "reasonable" man, woman or person objective standards,
see Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual
and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 95 (1992).
Some explicit reminders of the gender assumptions behind legal standards can still be
found. For example, official comment 7 to the pre-1990 version of § 3-305 of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides that among the factors to be considered in determining whether an
obligor under a negotiable instrument had "reasonable opportunity" to obtain certain
knowledge are the obligor's "age and sex." The implication seems to be that females are
generally more ignorant than males in commercial matters and should be held to a lower
standard. The parallel comment to the 1990 version of Article 3 drops this overt reference to
sex.
81. Ernest Nagel argues that this description is a caricature of early behaviorist theories.
He implicitly admits that some people who characterized themselves as behaviorists may have
adopted a crude theory not differing much from the caricature. NAGEL, supra note 45, at 473-
85 (discussing the debate between subjectivists and objectivists in social science). Nagel's
discussion of behaviorism forms part of his argument that social scientists who adopt a
psychological subjective methodology erroneously assume that their methodology differs in
kind from the methodologies of the physical sciences. Nagel, therefore, anxiously concentrates
on the similarities among various branches of science and methodologies, and anxiously de-
emphasizes the differences. See also David M. Trubeck, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal
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ment as to her perception of her mental state) as observable objective
events, but not necessarily as reliable, let alone conclusive evidence of
the actual psychological state of the subject.
8 2
Other theorists of social science methodologies posit that Obser-
vation Objective methods, standing alone, are inadequate. They insist
on understanding mental states that others not merely observe, but
which we experience and know individually as subjects. This knowl-
edge demands development of Psychologically Subjective methodolo-
gies for the social sciences.8 3 Many social scientists who characterize
themselves and their methodology as feminist, 4 as well as some femi-
nist legalists, take this approach.85
Some left-leaning legalists assail an Observation Objective stance
as based on the unworkable positivist fact/opinion dichotomy. For
example, Gary Peller criticizes Bruce Ackerman of making this famil-
iar error: "[Ackerman] adopts the traditional positivist distinction
between questions of fact (which he assumes can be verified through
real, observable data) and questions of value (which are inherently
Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575, 603 (1984) (discussing of the behaviorist
concept of objectivity and other approaches to empirical information).
Another Nagel, Thomas, has critiqued Daniel Dennett's theory of consciousness on the
express grounds that Dennett mistakenly thinks that the Observation Objective methodology
of the physical sciences is also the appropriate "objective" methodology for all purposes. In
particular, Thomas Nagel argues that the study of human consciousness must also include
what I call Psychologically Subjective data. "A theory of consciousness that doesn't include
mental events among the data is like a book about Picasso that doesn't mention his painting."
Nagel, supra note 17, at A12.
82. NAGEL, supra note 45, at 479-80.
83. Ernest Nagel, in describing the subjectivist view, states that: The subjective nature of
social science is based on the "familiar claim that objectively warranted explanations of social
phenomena are difficult if not impossible to achieve, because those phenomena have an
essentially 'subjective' or 'value-impregnated' aspect." Id. at 473. "In short, the categories of
description and explanation in the social sciences are held to be radically 'subjective,' so that
these disciplines are forced to rely on 'nonobjective' techniques of inquiry." Id. at 474. "The
social scientist is able to do these things only because he is himself an active agent in social
processes, and can therefore understand in the light of his own 'subjective' experiences the
'internal meanings' of social actions. A purely 'objective' or 'behavioristic' social science is in
consequence held to be a vain hope." Id. at 475. Nagel argues that the theoretical distinction
between behaviorism and Weberian subjective social science is largely one of semantics.
84. See, e.g., JOYCE M. NIELSEN, INTRODUCTION, FEMINIST RESEARCH METHODS 1, 7-9
(Joyce M. Nielsen ed., 1990); Marcia Millman & Rosabeth M. Kantor, Introduction to Another
Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, in FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY
29, 30 (SANDRA HARDING ed., 1987).
85. MacKinnon's account of consciousness-raising as a feminist methodology in which she
emphasizes the importance of interpersonal transformation of the women both analyzing and
being analyzed, as opposed to dispassionate observation by outsiders, may be seen as working
within this tradition. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 83-105. See generally Schroeder, supra
note 4; Bartlett, supra note 1 (discussing various methodological theories adopted by feminist
legalists).
SUBJECT- OBJECT
subjective) ... ."86 Peller notes that "[Ackerman's] ideological vision
revolves around an image of an objective reality uncontaminated by
subjectivity."87
David Trubek also recognizes that many on the left reject empiri-
cism because they confuse it with positivism, behaviorism and deter-
minism. "Social science, in [the deterministic] view, reveals the
objective conditions which determine our fate."8" Trubek observes
that "behaviorism sees social knowledge as objective because it is
knowledge about facts that are neutral and external to the observer.
(This is the weak sense of objectivism)."' 9 Trubek also argues that
this identification is erroneous and that empiricism--Observation
Objectivity-has an important role to play in leftist social theory.9
Others defend Observation Objectivity against those who would
reject it in favor of Psychological Subjectivity by pointing out that the
same analysis that makes Observation Objectivity suspect, by neces-
sity, equally applies to Psychological Subjectivity. If Observation
Objectivity is illusory because our society is socially constructed, the
same can be said for our psychological selves. As I have argued
extensively elsewhere, 91 the sense of self varies widely among different
cultures.
9 2
86. Gary Peller, The Politics of Reconstruction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 863, 876 (1985)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984)).
87. Id. at 879.
88. Trubeck, supra note 81, at 579.
89. Id. at 603.
90. Id.
91. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in
Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1135 (1990).
92. Lacanian theory, for example, locates the subject (i.e., the Ego) in the linguistic realm
of the symbolic. The subject is, therefore, always intersubjective, and the atomistic individual
of liberalism is, consequently, illusory.
A related concept recurs in a work of James Boyle's. He asks "[h]ow can we imagine that
there is an objective set of descriptive/prescriptive historical laws that act on the subjects of
those laws, if 'object' and 'subject' are both socially, that is 'intersubjectively' produced
categories?" Boyle, supra note 8, at 730. Boyle proposes, as a useful tool for analyzing
disputes among certain members of the critical legal studies movement that one look to the
degree with which the writer emphasizes the role of the individual in shaping society (the
subjectivist approach) or the role of society in shaping individuals (the structuralist approach).
And so one can also ask "how can we imagine that there is a subjective way of viewing the
object, society?":
If we cannot "get to" objectivity, we must fall back onto our subjectivity and its
collective constructs. But if there has been one dominant strain in recent
philosophical thought, it is that the "subject" is by no means as natural, as
obvious, or as basic a term as it appears. The subject can appear to be the
crossroads of time and culture. The "self" can appear to be the artificial
construct necessitated by a particular way of viewing the world.
Id. at 777.
The deconstruction of the subject as the express or implicit focus of nearly all legal schol-
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Paradoxically, those feminists who reject objective claims to
knowledge on the grounds that reality is socially constituted (and,
thereafter, there can be no unsituated observer), by framing their
argument in favor of "subjectivist" modes of thought, risk reinstating
the liberal concept of the autonomous self as the only criterion of
knowledge.
9 3
Yet not all theorists who recognize Psychologically Subjective
methodologies entirely reject the use of Observation Objectivity. For
example, the feminist "positionality" critique of External Objectivity
(as aperspectivity) promoted by Katherine Bartlett and Sandra Har-
ding is similar to the feminist critique of objectivity as Observation
Objectivity.94 The positionality critique challenges the assumption
that arguably underlies the concept of Observation Objectivity-that
any specific observer's perspective should be considered so privileged
as to be deemed aperspectival. The positionality approach empha-
sizes the aggregation of multiple perspectives, including, but not
privileging, the perspective of the observed. Consequently, as Har-
ding recognizes, positionality--often framed as a rejection of objectiv-
ity-is better seen as a defense of a form of External Objectivity. 5
Similarly, some schools of social science theory emphasize that
Psychological Subjective methodologies, while necessary, may not
suffice for an adequate understanding. An example of this approach is
Max Weber's concept of the necessity of subjective methodologies in
the social sciences. Arthur Jacobson's succinct paraphrase of Weber
avoids Weber's use of the potentially ambiguous terms "objectivity"
and "subjectivity" in favor of a more precise description:
The test [of a social science theory] ... is whether it helps disinter-
ested observers "understand" the world in which people think they
live, so that decisions they make, together or separately, appear
arship is also a recurring theme in Pierre Schlag's scholarship. See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 3;
Pierre Schlag, Normativity and Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991); Pierre Schlag,
"Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi:" The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction,
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631 (1990).
Curiously, during a seminar I attended, Jacques Derrida, one of the founders of decon-
struction, expressly stated, in response to a participant's question, that he is not interested in
getting beyond the subject. He argued that the concept of the subject has been one of the great
achievements of Western civilization. This does not mean that we can forget that subjectivity
is "artificial" in the sense that it is man-made. Being a human creation does not imply
unreality.
93. As does the insistence of many feminists on "choice" as being the goal of feminism.
See supra note 4.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 122-28.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 126-28. Ernest Nagel also forcefully argues that so-
called subjectivists in the social sciences are really adopting a position which is
indistinguishable from the objectivist position.
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meaningful or rational to the observers. The observers' under-
standing must, in turn, be comprehensible to the people observed,
but may not simply restate their self-understanding. The under-
standing must be on an observation that the observed receive with
their own understanding. (Here social science mimics natural sci-
ence, where the test of validity is universal agreement on the basis
of common observations. The difference is that the universal
agreement in social science includes agreement of the object being
observed.) The observed's understanding of the observers' under-
standing will have fresh insights (about observers too!), requiring
fresh efforts of understanding. Also, the self-knowledge the
observed obtain in cooperation with the observers may lead to
changes in the way the observed carry on their lives, requiring fur-
ther cooperative efforts of understanding .... "
This is a point of view which defers both to the observations and
empathy of the observer, as well as the psychological experience of
the observed. Feyerabend similarly suggests that there are at least
two perspectives on social reality: the observer's perspective (Obser-
vation Objectivity) and the participant's perspective (Psychological
Subjectivity). Feyerabend asserts that neither is adequate without the
other.9" The combination of the Observable Objective and the Psy-
chological Subjective also appears in the theory of the hermeneutic
circle of interpretation.9"
Although framed in the form of a critique of objectivity, MacK-
innon's theory of consciousness raising arguably falls within this tra-
dition. Consciousness raising, while necessarily including the
accounts by women of their individual experiences (Psychological
Subjective testimony), is not limited to these accounts. MacKinnon
believes that a theory recognizing society as a social construct must
also recognize the self as a social construct. Subjective and objective
observations are, therefore, equally suspect. Consequently, she argues
that those who engage in consciousness-raising must intersubjectively
mediate, analyze, and compare individual subjective accounts (Psy-
96. Arthur J. Jacobson, supra note 47, at 1679-80 (footnotes omitted).
97. FEYERABEND, supra note 39, at 18-19. Thomas Nagel presents another example of
this mode of thought in arguing that the strictly Observation Objective method of the physical
sciences is not the correct method for the study of human consciousness which must account
for our own experiences of our mental states. He does not argue, however, that Psychological
Subjective methods are sufficient for the study of psychology merely because they are
necessary. "It means only that we need to use objective standards that combine the first- and
third-person points of view as they are in fact combined in the ordinary concepts for
attribution of conscious states that we all employ without difficulty, and that we use to correct
experiential descriptions and others." Nagel, supra note 17, at A12.
98. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 1989).
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chological Subjective analysis) to determine what has not been said
(Observation Objective analysis) in order to come to a more complete
understanding than that which mere psychological or observed data
alone could give.99 Thus, MacKinnon insists that her conception of
consciousness-raising is not "subjective" and feminism must not cele-
brate subjectivism. °
All of these approaches recognize that the observer may inade-
quately interpret the other and must consult with the other as to her
own perceptions. However, these approaches also recognize that the
observed self's own interpretation of her behavior may not be ade-
quate, and that the observed may learn from the observations of
others. The inter-subjective encounter enriches both the observer and
the observed.
A version of the Observation Objectivity/Psychological Subjec-
tivity dyad appears in discussions of intent in contract law. In decid-
ing the intent of the parties to a contract, some have questioned
whether a judge should limit the finder of fact to considerations of
observable objective intent. Clare Dalton argues that for a court to
try to apply both the subjective and objective approach, the court
must engage in "entirely circular" reasoning.10' However, by analo-
gizing these approaches to the social sciences, they do not appear
mutually exclusive. It is possible, but not necessary, for one to con-
sider both the Observation Objective and the Psychological Subjec-
tive.' 02 The process, while circular, is not hopeless. Rather, it relates
to the process of communication and understanding known as the
hermeneutic circle.
2. CONCLUSORY OR HONORIFIC DEFINITIONS
I now move to another separate set of dyads which may be dis-
tinguished from those relating to the above methodological dyads.
The following definitions use objectivity as a label that attests to the
validity of a statement. I would argue that these honorifics are at
99. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 151-61, 172-79, 181-83 (analyzing MacKinnon's
methodological theory).
100. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 83-84, 115-16, 120-21.
101. Dalton, supra note 7, at 1046.
102. Insofar as this process is similar to the hermeneutic circle, many would argue that the
circularity is an indicia of coherence, not circularity.
Hermeneutic theory assures us, however, that while its understanding is indeed
circular, the circle is not vicious. On the contrary, it claims, the circularity of its
understanding is just the certificate of its validity. That is so because the circle
reflects the necessary circularity of understanding itself, the ground of which is
the mutual presupposition of the subject and object.
Brudner, supra note 5, at 150.
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best, not useful; and at worst, malignant. Merely labeling a decision
"objective" does not validate the process leading to the decision.
10 3
Several writers, including Dworkin, °4 Rorty,105 and Feyerabend, °6
argue against the use of the word "objective" largely because honor-
ific usage neither adds to, nor detracts, from the validity of an
argument.
a. Factual Objectivity v. Opinion Subjectivity
What I am calling "Factual" Objectivity and its negative, "Opin-
ion" Subjectivity, are primarily colloquial, rather than philosophical
or jurisprudential, terms. I include this term here because, despite its
mixed nature, it is a very common and casual use of the term. In
addition, many writers assume, without analysis, that the normativity
associated with this colloquial use of the term "objectivity" automati-
cally applies to the other methodological uses of the term
103. Commercial lawyers might recognize this reasoning as that underlying the
deconstruction of the concept of "title" under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. As
every teacher of commercial law knows, one of the great innovations of the drafters of the code
was the diminution of the significance of "title" of goods. Yet, as continually confuses
generations of commercial law students, Article 2 of the UCC frequently refers to "title." I
find it helpful to suggest to my students that they think of the "title" that survives in the Code
as short-hand for a legal conclusion after analysis, rather than a tool of analysis. If one
determines, through application of the substantive provisions of the UCC, that a party has
certain rights in an item of goods, it may be convenient to say that the person has "title" in the
goods. However, one can no longer follow the common law approach whereby a person could
first determine which party has "title" in the goods and conclude from that alone that such
party has particular rights or responsibilities in the goods (such as risk of loss, the ability to
defeat subsequent purchaser's claims in the good, etc.).
104. Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 69, at 297-300.
105. Since Kant, the principle employment of such theories has been to support
intuitions concerning the subjective-objective distinction-either attempts to
show that nothing outside natural science counts as 'objective' or attempts to
apply this honorific term to morals, or politics, or poems. Metaphysics . . .
attempts to find out what we can be objective about .... I am recommending
[that], we might in an imaginary age in which consensus in these areas was
almost complete, view morality physics and psychology as equally 'objective'....
The application of such honorifics as 'objective' ... is never anything more than
an expression of the presence of, or the hope for, agreement among inquirers.
RORTY, supra note 14, at 335.
106. Feyerabend views claims to objectivity as merely an attempt to hide the source of one's
ideas and, thereby, give these ideas special status. This is similar to the "false universals"
critique which many feminists make of specific claims to objectivity. "But that does not make
them 'objective' and independent of traditions. To infer from the absence of terms concerning
subjects or groups in 'there ought to be...' that the demand made is 'objective' would be just
as erroneous as to claim 'objectivity" i.e. independence from personal or group idiosyncracies
for optical illusions and mass hallucinations on the grounds that the subject, or the group,
nowhere occurs in them.... [These are] statements which are formulated 'objectively'...."
FEYERABEND, supra note 39, at 23. Feyerabend is obviously using the word "objectivity" not
to mean Community Objectivity, but to mean External Objectivity.
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Factual Objectivity refers to facts in the sense of what is really
true, while opinion subjectivity refers to mere "opinion" or personal
taste. On the one hand, the definition of Opinion Subjectivity is a
variation on Idiosyncratic Subjectivity. On the other hand, the defini-
tion of Factual Objectivity can be, but is not necessarily the same as,
Argumentative Objectivity. Alternatively, Factual Objectivity can
mean nothing more than what the parties to a conversation are will-
ing to stipulate are the facts in order for the discussion to continue
(i.e., Community Objectivity). Frequently, Factual Objectivity
implies some form of External Objectivity. Some might regard cer-
tain objective "facts" such as religious truths (which are also Exter-
nally Objective) as knowable only through Individualistically or
Idiosyncratically Subjective means such as divine inspiration. For the
mystic, such objective facts cannot be known through Algorithmic or
even Argumentative Objective means. Consequently, although Fac-
tual Objectivity and Opinion Subjectivity are often assumed to form
an oppositional dyad, each is not necessarily defined as the other's
simple negative.
Nevertheless, despite the dubiousness of the fact/opinion distinc-
tion on a philosophical level, and despite the judgmental nature of this
use of terms, I consider the Factual Objectivity/Opinion Subjectivity
dyad to be perfectly acceptable in everyday conversation. Indeed,
there is probably no other English expression which adequately
expresses the useful distinction between recognized conclusions and
opinion. I find this usage too ambiguous to be of much use in juris-
prudential analysis, however.
b. Fairness Objectivity v. Biased Subjectivity
A statement that a decision is objective may be equivalent to the
speaker's judgment that the decision was fair, just, or ethical. A state-
ment that a decision is subjective may be equivalent to the speaker's
condemnation that the judgment is unfair, unjust, or immoral. I call
this contrast the Fairness Objectivity/Biased Subjectivity dyad. In
this use, fairness is frequently identified with neutrality, either in the
standard to be applied or in the application of the standard.
Fairness Objectivity can be combined with any number of the
other definitions of objectivity. For example, if one adopts Argumen-
tative Objectivity, a statement that a decision is (Biased) Subjective
would accuse the decision maker of having considered factors which
107. See, for example, my analysis of Greenawalt, infra text accompanying notes 159, 185-
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are not considered relevant to reasonable argument-that is, Idiosyn-
cratic Subjective reasons. In my earlier example, if I had rejected the
conclusions of a certain scholar because he snubbed me at the most
recent AALS annual meeting, one would probably chide me for being
(Biased) Subjective.
Fairness Objectivity is also frequently used with Standardized
Objectivity. For example, if I were to announce to my class that
grades would be based on the answer key to a multiple choice test, one
might criticize me for grading subjectively and unfairly if I failed a
student whose answers "objectively" corresponded to the answers on
the key.
Some writers identify unfairness (i.e., Biased Subjectivity) with
arbitrariness and identify fairness with the predictable and consistent
application of an announced standard. 0 8 Fairness Objectivity, there-
fore, may be seen as a normative judgment on Standardized
Objectivity.
Ronald Dworkin's concept of law as integrity is similar to this
approach, although he avoids calling his "right answers" objective.
Dworkin argues that justice requires that we prefer the consistent
application of standards across the board, as opposed to what he calls
a "checkerboard" approach, even if we disagree with the standards. 109
Critics of the status quo who question the current legal regime,
however, might find such a checkerboard attractive. One may disa-
gree with Dworkin's judgment that an unjust standard consistently
applied is better than the sporadic and inconsistent application of an
unjust standard. In the context of criminal law, for example, if one
believed that execution constituted cruel and unusual punishment,
then one might understandably prefer that individual convicted
criminals occasionally be spared rather than all convicted criminals
die in the name of consistency. James Boyle has suggested that the
post-modern sensibility celebrates diversity, experimentation, and dis-
junction as liberating, and may, therefore, affirmatively prefer
checkerboards. "10
The feminist critique of liberal legalism, which purports to be
108. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OwEcIvrry 121 (1992).
109. "Checkerboard statutes are the most dramatic violations of the ideal of integrity."
DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 184; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 108, at 175-86, 217-18.
110. James D.A. Boyle, Legal Fiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1013 (1987) (reviewing RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)). Another critique of Dworkin's integrity concept is that it
risks begging the question. The concept of integrity requires treating similar situations in
similar ways-treating like as like. Yet insofar as no two fact situations are identical by
definition, most legal questions (and many questions of gender and racial equality) revolve
around which characteristics are most relevant in determining what the situation is most like.
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"aperspectival" and "neutral," relates to this honorific use of the
word. Feminists argue that masculinism seeks to give the status quo
the appearance of External Objectivity (thereby insulating it from
attack) by labeling the male perspective as the only (i.e., no) perspec-
tive. Feminists also advocate rules that favor men as "objective."
Claims to objectivity are seen as a rhetorical device: by avoiding ref-
erence to the traditions on which a conclusion depends, the writer
hopes to convince his audience that the conclusion is independent of
that tradition."' Although this form of the feminist critique is fre-
quently worded in terms of an attack on External Objectivity, in its
positionalist form this critique is more precisely a false universals cri-
tique of particular claims to External Objectivity.
c. Really, Really True Objectivity v. Wishy-Washy Subjectivity
Perhaps most frequently, "Objectivity" is used as a means of
emphasizing one's emphatic insistence upon a proposition. In this
sense, when a writer chooses to word her assessment not merely as
"this is true," but as "this is objectively true," she tries to convey the
idea that the reader should take the statement particulary seriously
and had better not dispute it. Really, Really True Objectivity fre-
quently boils down to little more than "I wish you to acknowledge
that this is not merely my opinion, it has some support." In contrast,
"Wishy-Washy Subjectivity" expresses the writer's lack of confidence
in a proposition. An assertion of Really, Really True Objective truth
might be implicitly based on a variety of other types of objectivity.
The writer may believe that the assessment should not be disputed
because it is Externally Objective, Algorithmically Objective, Argu-
mentatively Objective, or Community Objective. The corresponding
reasons for believing that the assessment is arguable (subjective) may,
similarly, be based on any of a number of concepts of subjectivity.
Really, Really True Objectivity is an honorific in that it is an
attempt to support one's assertion by praise, as opposed to argu-
ment." 2 As Dworkin rhetorically asks, if an argument in favor of
one's conclusion is good, does it add anything to assert that the result
is objective? Or if the argument is faulty, will you convince anyone by
111. This is one of Feyerabend's arguments against "objectivity." See supra note 106.
112. Dworkin calls for the end of discussing claims in terms of objectivity on the grounds
that labeling an assertion as objectively true rarely adds anything to an argument other than
rhetorical emphasis. "So Hercules [Dworkin's hypothetical model judge] might agree never to
use the redundant words "objective" or "really" to decorate his judgments ...... DWORKIN,
supra note 63, at 267; see also Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note 69, at 300. Using my
vocabulary, Dworkin states that many attempts to demonstrate various forms of objectivity are
really confusing claims of Really, Really True Objectivity.
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adding such an assertion? The word "objective," consequently, does
little itself to further the argument. Rather, the word invites the
reader to make one of two responses: either to stipulate the facticity
of the assertion or to request that the writer provide the underlying
support for the assertion. If, as Rorty suggests, the only usable defini-
tion of objectivity is "agreement among inquirers," a claim to objec-
tivity can be no more than a request for agreement.'
3
C. External Objectivity
"External Objectivity" reflects a belief that there is truth "out
there." External Objectivity refers to knowledge of truth external
from mere human invention or opinion, or, at least, from the inven-
tion of any specific individual or group of individuals. The negative of
External Objectivity is not necessarily subjectivity, but relativity.
Objectivism is a term used occasionally to describe a belief in external,
objective truth. The proponents of objectivism see any rejection of
External Objectivity as necessarily equivalent to an acceptance of its
exclusive oppositional negative, relativism. Relativism in this pejora-
tive view might be described as a theory that any belief is as good as
any others.
There are many different ways to conceive of what Externally
Objective truth might be, whether it can be known, and how it could
be known. Many writers assume that those who espouse External
Objectivity assume that the external world is rationally ordered and
that humans can distinguish External Objective truth through ration-
ality (either narrowly or broadly defined). These writers presume that
External Objectivity must be half of an oppositional dichotomy of
which the other pole is Individualistic or Idiosyncratic Subjectivity." 4
As John Stick has correctly pointed out, however, the standard of
External Objectivity need not be based on rationality:
[The claim to objectivity] can mean that law is established accord-
ing to the correct and fundamental principles of human rationality.
It can also mean that law accurately reflects some extralegal real-
ity: the natural law, whether construed as the law of God or of our
own essential natures .... [A] legal decision, or the legal system as
a whole, might be considered objective only if faithful to some
extralegal norm, such as natural law. A variation of this type of
objectivity would require that the legal system operate under the
correct rational decision procedure as determined by philosophy,
113. See supra note 55.
114. Singer, for instance, makes this assumption. See infra text accompanying notes 249-
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mathematics or the natural sciences."'
The presumed identity of External Objectivity and rationality
may be a legacy of the Enlightenment in American political theory,
which emphasizes reason as well as recent scientific theory which
replaced ontology and epistemology with methodology. Presuming
this relationship, however, forgets that the privileging of reason over
revelation was largely a reaction of the Enlightenment against Christi-
anity, while the methodological approach was an innovation of the
philosophy of science and is not necessarily a part of all philosophical
systems. That is, while many External Objectivists, including some in
jurisprudence, do espouse such views, they are not a necessary part of
all forms of External Objectivism. Many who believe in external
truth believe that it can be recognized only through the evidence of
one's own heart.
Perhaps the best examples of non-rational External Objectivity
can be found in the most significant intellectual trend in American
culture to be ignored in law reviews--Christianity.'1 6 There are, of
course, many different varieties of Christianity, but I understand that
they all accept the existence of God as an objective truth and the
source of the good, the right, and the just. It is probably this concept
of an external source of justice which, either explicitly or implicitly
underlies the commitment to justice of most jurisprudential theorists
educated in the Christian tradition." 7
I believe that I can safely say that most (if not all) variations of
Christianity hold that External Objective religious truth cannot be
known fully through rational methods. Whether or not God chose to
create the universe in a way we would describe as rational, God is
beyond mere human rationality. Faith, not logical argument, justifies
the Christian's belief. Even such arch-rationalists as Thomas Aqui-
nas, who tried to prove logically the existence of God, and who
115. Stick, supra note 9, at 369. Stick calls these types of objectivity Fundamental or
Foundational Objectivity. In my terminology, the first form of Fundamental Objectivity is a
molecule of External Objectivity combined with either Algorithmic or Argumentative
Objectivity, while the second is External Objectivity.
116. Enlightenment rationality, however, never succeeded in replacing Christianity as the
dominant intellectual tradition in the United States. At most, Enlightenment rationality was
overlayed upon Protestant Christianity as an uncomfortable and unstable veneer.
117. Similar statements could, of course, be made of other religious traditions in the United
States and elsewhere. I chose to use Christianity as an example because it is the tradition in
which I was raised and, therefore, the only tradition about which I believe I have any right to
make glib pronouncements.
Ruth Colker, for example, has recently defended a form of External Objectivity within
feminism based in large part on a religious concept of truth. Colker has emphasized the
influence of Buddhism, as well as Roman Catholic mysticism, on her thought.
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believed not only that the knowledge achievable through human
rationality is not inconsistent with Divine knowledge but that rational
argument can'lead one to faith, did not hold that human rational
knowledge is a substitute for the knowledge achieved through faith.I1 8
Other Christian theologians, emphasizing the infinite subjectivity
of God beyond human understanding, do not think merely that
human rationality is incompetent to understand God fully, they do
not even believe that human rationality is necessarily consistent with
God or the universe God created. I have already mentioned Hermet-
ics, but admittedly they never represented a mainstream Christian
sect." 9 Nevertheless, this belief is also found in mainstream theolo-
gies. Tertullian, an early Christian theologian, is remembered for his
rhetorical question "What does Athens [i.e., philosophy] have to do
with Jerusalem [i.e., religious truth]?" as well as the statement "I
believe, because it is impossible."' 20 I interpret Tertullian's statement
as meaning that religious faith is required for salvation (i.e., "I
believe," not "I am convinced by logical argument") because certain
doctrines that have been revealed to us cannot be logically proven,
and may even seem to contradict that which can be logically proven
(i.e., they are "impossible" by the standards of human logic). 2' I am
118. For a short and elegant discussion about the development of the relative valorization
of logical and non-logical modes of knowing in Christian theology through the high middle
ages, see ETIENNE GILSON, REASON AND REVELATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1966).
119. See supra text accompanying note 72.
120. GILSON, supra note 118, at 9. This phrase is often misquoted as "I believe because it is
absurd." For a recent example in the popular press, see Adam Gopnik, WILSON'S VERSION
[book review of A.N. Wilson's JESus (1992)], NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 1992, at 135, 137. A
variation of this was used in an episode of the old television show All in the Family, in which
Archie Bunker explains to his atheist "meathead" son-in-law that "[flaith is something you
believe that nobody in his right mind would believe." John J. O'Connor, Critic's Notebook.
Fast Forwarding Into TV's Past, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, at Cl. Of course, by putting this
phrase in the mouth of the bigoted Archie, the scriptwriters meant to hold it up to the scorn of
the audience. The phrase is, however, a very accurate description of the concept of Christian
religious faith.
121. I have frequently heard this statement of Tertullian regarding the importance of
individually or idiosyncratically subjective paths to knowledge misinterpreted to mean that
Tertullian thought that absurdity itself was an argument for accepting a proposition. See, e.g.,
Gopnik, supra note 120. This assumes that Tertullian was a very silly man, and it ignores the
context in which the statement was made: in answer to philosophical arguments made against
Christianity. Ancient rationalist critics of Christianity argued that many of the doctrines of
Christianity, such as creation and the teleological conception of historical time, were
inconsistent with "truths" which had been logically proven by classical philosophy, such as the
necessity of an eternal world and cyclical time. Tertullian denied the assumptions underlying
the argument that the universe was ordered in accordance with human rationality, and that
human rationality could, consequently, determine external truth. Using my terminology,
Tertullian denied that External Objectivity was synonymous with Algorithmic or
Argumentative Objectivity.
Feyerabend defends Galileo's prosecutors on the grounds that they adopted a similar
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also reminded of the American fundamentalist Protestants persistent
rejection of theories, such as evolution, that are overwhelmingly
accepted as demonstrated by science, precisely because these theories
conflict with revelation.
Within the Christian tradition, External Objectivity is far from
being the negative of Individualistic or Idiosyncratic Subjectivity.
Rather, External Objectivity may only be fully understandable at least
partly, by means which we associate with Individualistic or Idiosyn-
cratic Subjectivity: faith, intuition, ecstasy, or revelation. Even
though Christians theology teaches that the truth of faith is univer-
sally applicable, and that salvation is potentially available to all per-
sons, making it "objective" (i.e., not limited to an individual),
Christians also believe that each person must be saved individually
through conversion, the Sacraments, or grace, etc. and is, therefore,
subjective.
The feminist critique of objectivity, which Katherine Bartlett
calls positionality, might be reinterpreted as a defense of External
Objectivity. Bartlett makes the familiar feminist (and post-modernist)
critique that all claims to an aperspectival, universal, and permanent
"objective" truth (what I call External Objectivity) are false univer-
sals because all human knowledge is necessarily situated and perspec-
tival. However, insofar as she proposes that we may see more
adequately if we both acknowledge our individual perspectives while
trying to acknowledge the perspectives of others, she could be inter-
preted as implying that there is an external truth, even though we can
never completely grasp it.122 Bartlett describes her concept of posi-
tionality as:
impos[ing] a twin obligation to make commitments based on the
current truths and values that have emerged from methods of femi-
nism, and to be open to previously unseen perspectives that might
come to alter these commitments .... Positionality, however, sets
an ideal of self-critical commitment whereby I act, but consider the
truths upon which I act subject to further refinement, amendment
and correction.
123
She further states: "I can improve my perspective by stretching my
approach. Feyerabend explains that the prosecutors had no objection to Galileo using his
theories as heuristics, models to be used for predicting and measuring planetary movements.
They objected to Galileo's arrogance in presuming that that which is arguable or observable is
also externally real, particularly in light of more reliable proof to the contrary (i.e., religious
revelation in the Bible and the tradition of the Catholic Church). Feyerabend charges that
modern science continues in this unsupported arrogance. FEYERABEND, supra note 39, at 247-
64.
122. Bartlett, supra note 1, at 880-87.
123. Id. at 883.
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imagination to identify and understand the perspectives of others."' 24
"There can be no universal, final, or objective truth; there can only be
'partial, locatable, critical knowledges', no aperspectivity-only
improved perspectives. ' 25 These assertions imply an External Objec-
tivity, as the concept of a perceiver necessarily implies an object to be
perceived.
In contradistinction, Harding, a feminist philosopher of science
who also adopts a perspectivist approach, recognizes that she cannot
reject objectivity while adopting positionalism. Consequently, while
she critiques many scientific claims of objectivity and value-neutrality
as being claims to false universals, she also defends objectivity.
We need to avoid the "objectivist" stance that attempts to make
the researcher's cultural beliefs and practices invisible while simul-
taneously skewering the research object's beliefs and practices to
the display board .... Introducing th[e] "subjective" element into
the analysis in fact increases the objectivity of the research and
decreases the "objectivism"....
Harding understands that it does not follow from the observation that
claims to objectivity are frequently used as a strategy to legitimate the
status quo (i.e., false universals), that one must necessarily reject the
possibility of "objectivity." "From the perspective of feminist theory
and research, it is traditional thought that is subjective in its distor-
tion by androcentrism-a claim that feminists are willing to defend on
124. Id. at 882.
125. Id. at 885. Bender and Rhode make similar false universals criticisms of claims to
External Objectivity while simultaneously proposing that the truth may be better grasped
through multiple perspectives. "Feminists value a collective and dialectical creation of
knowledge through sharings of multiple perspectives and reject the false notion of neutral,
objective, unsituated knowledge." Bender, supra note 1, at 11. "Our objective should be
multiple accounts and avoid privileging any single universalist or essentialist standpoint."
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 628 (1990).
In feminist scientific theory, Millman and Kantor, in their defense of what I have referred
to as Psychological Subjectivity, also seem to make a similar defense of multi-perspectivity:
"reality is subjective, or rather subject to social definition.... Collective delusions can be
undone by introducing fresh perspectives." Millman & Kantor, supra note 84, at 30. The
reference to multiple perspectives itself suggests that the possibility of External Objective truth
despite their denials of the possibility of objective truth.
An alternate interpretation is that the aggregation of the perspectives of many individual
subjects will eventually lead to the formation of a community through consensus. The process
creates a Community Objective standard. Indeed, Harding relies heavily on Kuhn. See infra
note 132. The insistence in this literature on a progressive improvement of perspective, rather
than merely the formation of perspective, arguably belies this approach.
126. SANDRA HARDING, FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY 9 (1987) [hereinafter HARDING,
FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY]. "Objectivity never has been and could not be increased by
value-neutrality." SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMININISM 27 (1986)
[hereinafter HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION].
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traditional objectivist grounds." 12 7 "[W]hat feminism should distrust
is not objectivity or epistemology's policing of thought per se but the
particular distorted and ineffectual form of objectivity and
epistemology."
28
Harding further recognizes that a feminist response which rejects
objectivity and celebrates subjectivity must accept the very mascu-
linist definition of the feminine which feminism is trying to move
beyond. 129 She recognizes that conscious awareness of perspectives
and values--concepts sometimes associated with subjectivity and fem-
ininity-are actually more, not less, objectivity-enhancing in the sci-
entific sense. Post-modem science's goal of objectivity is to achieve a
type of knowledge that is shared, as opposed to knowledge comprised
of idiosyncratic individual views that mask themselves as universals.
Similarly, the feminist critique seeks knowledge and ways of making
value judgments beyond the false universals of the masculine status
quo.
To elaborate, twentieth-century philosophy of science recognizes
that each scientist makes observations from a perspective, and that
scientific research is necessarily permeated by value judgments.
Mainstream scientific theory, as exemplified by Popper, tries to get
beyond idiosyncracy and solipsism by intersubjective criticism. Pop-
per argues that through idiosyncratic criticism-having other scien-
tists add their perspectives-science can be made "subjectless. 1' 30
Scientific theory is, consequently, ruthlessly communitarian and anti-
individualist. 13
1
While she does not disagree with the goal of mainstream science,
Harding argues that the methodology of mainstream science is inade-
quate to accomplish its goal. Popper's very terminology gives a false
sense that science has reached the goal of getting beyond solipsism
and achieving universality, leading to hubris and non-critical think-
ing. It also totally devalues the subject in pursuit of the object.
127. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 126, at 138.
128. Id. at 158.
129. "Objectivity vs. subjectivity, the scientist as knowing subject vs. the objects of his
inquiry, reason vs. the emotions, mind vs. body-in each case the former has been associated
with masculinity and the latter with femininity." Id. at 23. Many feminist theories run the
risk of reinstating masculine theory by reacting to the analytical categories of masculinism.
Schroeder, supra note 4, at 125.
130. See supra note 65.
131. Anti-individualism is one of the hallmarks of Peirce's thought as well. See Bernstein,
supra note 36, at 66; Cornell, supra, note 32. An interesting comparison can be made between
Harding-Bartlett perspectivity and Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics. Gadamer insists that
in interpretation we cannot, and indeed should not, try to get past our perspective (what he
call our "prejudices"). We understand and interpret through and by means of, not despite of,
our prejudices. GADAMER, supra note 98, at 277, 288-92.
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Harding's feminist approach recognizes that objectivity-in the
sense of External Objectivity-might never be reached, but must be
constantly strived for. Indeed, External Objectivity may be a human
creation which is produced by this process. Achieving or creating
objectivity in this affirmative sense requires not only that the subject
critique the perspectives of others but that the subject attempt to
remain critically aware of her perspective, even though a perfect
understanding of one's own perspective may never be fully possible.
Moreover, the subject must empathize with and explore, as well as
critique, the perspectives of others. That is, Popper views subjectivity
as invalid; Harding views subjectivity as necessary, but insufficient.
In this context, Bartlett's use of objectivity has implications of
correspondence with External Objectivity and acts as the opposite of
Idiosyncratic Subjectivity. Harding recognizes that this common ver-
sion of the feminist critique of objectivity relates to the use of certain
claims to objectivity as a justificatory strategy, rather than serving as
an effective attack on the possibility of objectivity.
132
Friedrich Nietzsche, one of the founders of modern perspectiv-
ism, was well aware that a positionalist view is implicitly and essen-
tially External Objectivist as well. His propositions that no individual
subject can have a complete view of the world-that knowledge and
morals are contingent--do not imply that there is no external truth
being viewed from our individual perspectives:
Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against
the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a 'pure, will-less,
painless, timeless knowing subject": these always demand that we
should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye
turned in no particular direction, in which the active and interpret-
ing forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something,
are supposed to be lacking; there are always demand of the eye an
absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a
perspective 'knowing'; and the more affects we allow to speak about
one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one
thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our
'objectivity' be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend
each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this-what
would that mean but to castrate the intellect? 133
132. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 126, at 23-27, 37-38, 157-58;
HARDING, FEMINISM & METHODOLOGY, supra note 126, at 9. A detailed description of
Harding's more sophisticated approach is beyond the scope of this article. Harding's concept
of objectivity is also heavily influenced by Kuhn's insight that our understanding of physical
phenomena is largely a matter of humanly created paradigms. However, Harding understands
that Kuhnian theory, while not totally relativistic, is progressive.
133. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE 555 (W. Kaufmann ed. &
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If nothing else, Nietzsche thought he had something "true" to say
about the impossibility that we could ever have full assurance of the
"truth" of our knowledge and the necessity, therefore, of creating our
own truths.
Of course, Nietzsche's conception of a limited, perspectival,
interpretative, and, to some extent, self-created (and subjective) Exter-
nally Objective truth is radically different from the Externally Objec-
tive truths of religion or science. This again illustrates how the
simultaneously impoverished and over-endowed terminology of objec-
tivity/subjectivity dichotomies is inept to capture many profound
philosophical and jurisprudential distinctions.
D. Philosophical Objectivity
The last conception of objectivity I will consider is perhaps better
described as a different way of considering some of the foregoing con-
cepts of objectivity. I have not been able to avoid using this concept
in the foregoing definitions either implicitly or expressly. I was refer-
ring to this use of objectivity when I emphasized the concern of
American jurisprudences for the emancipation of the subject.
This terminology reflects the notion that each of us is a subject
confronting the outside world, other persons, the community, and
texts as objects.134 The concepts of Philosophical Subjectivity and
trans., 1968). A full, coherent analysis of Nietzsche's thought is beyond the scope of this essay.
Nietzsche uses the word "truth" in many different and seemingly contradictory ways, and the
meaning in any given sentence can only be divined by reading it in the context of the entire
work. Consequently, statements in some sentences denying the possibility of "truth" in the
sense of "human truth" and "human knowledge" do not necessarily imply that Nietzsche has
no criteria for truth.
It is common to characterize (or more accurately, caricature) Nietzsche as a "nihilist"
who denies all meaning and validity of morals. "A good example is Friedrich Nietzsche, who
argued that once God was dead, morality came tumbling after, leaving only the raw exercise of
power." Joan L. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Game, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 131, 132 (1992). A better reading is that Nietzsche argued for a necessary
nihilist moment in which we tear down the lies of the past, so that the overman can then
proceed with the positive task of constructing a life-affirming morality. Once one realizes that
"God is dead," the foundations are knocked out from under Western Christianity morality.
Yet this is not the end of morality:
"What are you really doing, erecting an ideal or knocking one down?" I
may perhaps be asked. "But have you ever asked yourselves sufficiently how
much the erection of every ideal on earth has cost? How much reality has had to
be misunderstood and slandered, how many lies have had to be sanctified, how
many consciences disturbed, how much "God" sacrificed every time? If a temple
is to be erected a temple must be destroyed: that is the law-let anyone who can
show me a case in which it is not fulfilled!"
NIETZSCHE, supra, at 531. The concept of the "will to power" is very different from that of a
"raw exercise of power".
134. By necessity, I am being overly simplistic. As many concepts of the subject and object
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Philosophical Objectivity in the law can be seen in the issue of
whether the text constrains interpretation or whether the interpreter
is free to engage in unlimited interpretation. Philosophical Objectiv-
ity and Subjectivity have much in common with Observation Objec-
tivity and Psychological Subjectivity. The use of these terms differs in
that the former concentrates on the status of the observer and the
observed, while the latter is limited specifically to methodological
questions (although one's stance on the methodological questions
arguably requires an implicit stance on the philosophical question).
The neo-Hegelian philosophical concept (or the "Concept")
posits, among other things, that the subject and the object mutually
constitute each other. In one moment of the Concept the subject and
the object are opposed, but because the subject can only exist in oppo-
sition with the object, in the other moment of the Concept, the subject
and the object are unified.135
One of the questions posed by neo-Hegelian thought is how can
the subject and the object can be reconciled in a way which recognizes
both the separateness and the unity of the subject and object without
subjecting the object to the subject, or the subject to the object? In
other words, how can Philosophical Subjectivity and Objectivity be
reconciled? In such a conception, Philosophical Subjectivity and
Objectivity are simultaneously contradictory and complementary. At
one moment of the Concept, Philosophical Objective truth is external
to the subject and has much in common with External Objectivity in
that it constrains the subjectivity of the subject. Yet at the other
moment of the Concept, the object is only understood through the
exist as there are philosophers, psychoanalysts, linguists and other theorists. Those who use
this terminology disagree as to whether the subject is inherent, constructed, created, actual, or
illusory.
The subject/object (self/other) distinction can take on various meanings depending on the
context:
The concepts of self and the other should not be understood as referring to fixed
entities, but instead as designating relationships respectively of identify and of
difference or alterity. Thus, depending on the particular context, both 'self' and
'other' may refer to an individual or a group, to an economic class or an ethnic
minority, to tribes or nations, and to temporary as well as to permanent groups.
Also, two (individual or collective) actors may concurrently be part of the same
self for some purpose, while standing vis-a-vis one another in a relation of self to
other for some other purpose. For example, white men and women may
constitute a single self in the context of racism against blacks-that is, such men
and women identify with one another as being white and relate to blacks as "the
other"-and self and other in the context of the relationship between the sexes,
where difference is defined along gender lines.
Rosenfeld, supra note 51, at 1228-29.
135. The Concept is described as "[t]he identity of identity and difference." CHARLES
TAYLOR, HEGEL 103 (1975).
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subject and, in common with any number of definitions of subjectivity
I have outlined, there is no external truth. Truth can only be under-
stood in terms of subjectivity. In this system, objectivity does not
exist as a static and fixed eternal category.' 36
Note that although many feminists word their theories in terms
of the rejection of objectivity, the concept of Philosophical Objectivity
is appealing to certain forms of feminism because the concept is con-
cerned with the possibility of reconciliation of the subject-object dis-
tinction. Many feminists, particularly those who identify with the
"different voice" approach, privilege relationality, responsibility, and
the ethical call of the other over the liberal values of autonomous indi-
viduality and rights analysis. Traditional western thought has envi-
sioned the self (the subject) as male and the other (the object) as
female. Continental psycho-linguistic theory suggests that, at least as
society and families are currently structured, psycho-linguistically,
the subject can only be imagined as the masculine. 137 Feminism seeks
recognition of woman as subject, or more accurately, the creation of a
society in.which a woman can be a subject and in which their speech
is recognized as speech. If women were to be recognized as Philo-
sophical Subjects, they would be selves, and others would be their
objects. If, as philosophical subjects, women refused to respond to
Philosophical Objectivity, they would not be responding to the ethical
call of the other, and would not be acting interrelationally or respon-
sibly. Rather, they would be acting as autonomous individuals
demanding rights against others and reinstating the violence of hierar-
chy which women seek to critique. In other words, while feminism
may argue correctly that a concept of objectivity which does not rec-
ognize or permit the subjectivity of women is oppressive, a feminine
136. Brudner, supra note 5; Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1687 (1990). Much of the so-called "post-modern" thought is characterized by the critique of
the concept of the subject. Hegel, of course, recognized that the individual subject is a human
creation. Michel Foucault, however, is generally recognized for his theory of social
construction of the subject and sexuality, which maintains that power in modern society is
subjectless-there are victims but no perpetrators. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR, FOUCAULT
ON FREEDOM AND TRUTH; FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER (D. Hoy ed., 1986).
The neo-Freudian psychoanalytical theory of Jacques Lacan emphasizes that the subject
(the ego) is a intersubjective symbolic concept and is only one element in human psychology.
JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK I FREUD'S PAPERS ON
TECHNIQUE 1953 (J. Miller ed., 1988). Boyle, Schlag, and Winter have critiqued
contemporary American legal leftists for the unquestioning reliance on the concept of the
subject. See supra note 8.
137. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE AND UTOPIAN POSSIBILITY (1991) [hereinafter CORNELL, BEYOND
ACCOMMODATION]; Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the
Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644 (1990) [hereinafter Cornell, Doubly-Prized World];
ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION (1990).
[Vol. 47:1
SUBJECT- OBJECT
subjectivity which does not recognize the subjectivity of others (i.e.,
Philosophical Objectivity when viewed by woman as subject) would
be equally inadequate to a feminist concept of personhood.
E. Objectivity and Determinacy
Many legal scholars, both liberal and leftist, presume that "objec-
tivity" (particularly Argumentative and Algorithmic Objective) is
inextricably related to determinacy.138 This presumption is so widely
held that it is very rarely explained, let alone defended. Nevertheless
all philosophical systems accept this proposition.
An alternate view is reflected in the rabbinic tradition of Jewish
law. Jewish law recognizes that many legal questions are
(Algorithmically, Argumentatively, and perhaps even Externally)
objectively indeterminate. Such questions are indicated in the Babylo-
nian Talmud by the device "TEYKU. ' ' 139 The concept is that there is
a right answer to the question established by the external truth of the
Lord, but that rational persons, making rational arguments based on
the legal system, will disagree. The indeterminacy of these laws is
(argumentatively) objective.14° Yet another type of objective indeter-
minacy is Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem, which mathematically
proves that all statements within a fixed number system cannot be
mathematically proved.141
The neo-Hegelian concept of Philosophical Objectivity is also not
138. Both Greenawalt, who purports to be a defender of the concept of objectivity in the
law, and Singer, who purports to deny the possibility of objectivity in the law, make this
identification. See infra text accompanying notes 150-52, 237-38. See generally Millon, supra
note 35.
139. The etymology of this device is uncertain but it is probably derived from the Hebrew
word teykum or "let is stand [undecided]." Louis JACOBS, TEYKU: THE UNSOLVED
PROBLEM IN THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD; A STUDY IN THE LITERARY ANALYSIS AND FORM
OF THE TALMUDIC ARGUMENT 14 (1981). Other popular interpretations, such as the theory
that TEYKU is an acronym for a phrase denoting that the problem will eventually be provided
by Elijah in the Messianic age, are probably folk etymologies. Id. at 295.
140. I have chosen to call this Argumentative Objectivity because rabbinical reasoning,
although quite formal, is not limited to the syllogistic logic recognized by the Christian-
Hellenic tradition. SUSAN A. HANDELMAN, THE SLAYERS OF MOSES: THE EMERGENCE OF
RABBINIC INTERPRETATION IN MODERN LITERARY THEORY (1982). Within the Christian-
Hellenic tradition, many rabbinical arguments would not be deemed algorithmic, but merely
rational. Within the rabbinical tradition itself, however, this form of objectivity might more
accurately be called "Algorithmic Objectivity."
141. Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem is fairly well known among legal scholars because
of Douglass Hofstadter's popularization of Goedel's work and the theory of recursize systems.
DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, GOEDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1980).
Hofstadter paraphrases Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem into colloquial English as: "All
consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions." Id. at
17.
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determinate. In a dialectic system, objective reality, along with per-
sons as subjects is constantly in a state of change. 42 It does not fol-
low that because we can anticipate the direction of change, because
we as subjects create, and are created by, the change, and because the
result of change is eventually determined, Philosophical Objective
reality is totally determinate in advance. In fact, if it were determi-
nate in advance, it would contradict the dialectic concept that we, and
our physical reality, change together. 143
A complete analysis of the indeterminacy controversy is beyond
the scope of this article. Nevertheless, I believe that given the pri-
macy of determinacy to Greenawalt's and Singer's concepts of objec-
tivity (to which I will soon turn), it impossible for me not to digress
and comment.
Greenawalt makes the extraordinary statement that determinacy
in the law is so self-evident that he wonders if the indeterminacy argu-
ment is a straw man. He asks "Does anyone really think the law
usually fails to provide answers to legal questions, in a sense of 'fails'
that has practical significance? I am not sure."'" Has this man ever
practiced law? That law is indeterminate is so "obvious" to practi-
tioners (although they tend not to use such high-fallutin' academic
terms). I am constantly surprised this idea is even a subject of discus-
sion among academics. I do not think I have ever encountered,
researched, advised on, negotiated, or been involved in litigating a
legal issue in practice in which there were not multiple ways of inter-
preting and applying the law to the particular fact pattern. On a sim-
plistic level, the fact that issues are negotiated and litigated means
that competing interpretations not only can be articulated, but that
the eventual outcome is questionable. On a cynical level, indetermi-
nacy keeps lawyers in business-if the law were clear clients would
not have to hire us. On a more flattering level, reinterpreting and
rewriting the law to enable our clients to achieve their goals is "what
lawyers do." The most successful lawyers are often the ones who are
most creative and audacious in their reinterpretations. 4  Anyone
142. See supra note 136.
143. Cornell, supra note 32, at 1195. A similar concept is found in Peirce's notion of
"thirdness" and his theory of the communitarian nature of scientific truth, although Peirce
held out the theoretical possibility of eventual determination, but not determinacy.
144. Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1990).
Greenawalt later declares that the claim that "no or few legal questions have determinate
answers" is "ridiculous." Id. at 31. Far from disproving the indeterminacy thesis, Greenawalt
inadvertently restates the CLS argument for indeterminacy.
145. Charles Yablon has made a similar point previously in the area of corporate and
securities law. He takes issue with the presupposition of many legal academics that, with time,
the development through case law of standards to be applied to the corporations and their
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who has structured a deal or negotiated a contract knows that both
lawyers and lay people experience American law as being so radically
indeterminate that they wish to ensure that they never encounter the
court system. Instead, clients spend tens or hundreds of thousands
(and occasionally millions) of dollars to negotiate and draft elaborate
contracts and to devise elaborate private alternate dispute mecha-
nisms in order to avoid formal arbitration, let alone the courts.
On the other hand, one experiences moments of predictability as
well. Contracts get signed, deals get done, litigation gets settled-all
on the strength of shared experiences of predictability. There is no
sense in making empirical claims about which moment predominates
over the other.
III. APPLICATIONS
I shall apply the definitions developed in this article to the work
of five writers who expressly confront law's objectivity. I will show
that Kent Greenawalt, Owen Fiss (both on the liberal center) and
Stanley Fish and Joseph Singer (on the critical left) all use their own
private definitions of objectivity either to defend the status quo and to
silence deviant voices or otherwise to limit the universe of acceptable
legal arguments. By concentrating on their own private definitions
they also avoid, rather than join in debate with each other. I will
further show that, although Catharine MacKinnon makes a powerful
critique of how claims to objectivity function to exclude women from
the law, her failure to recognize in her writings how the masculinist
writers actually purport to define their terms weakens the force of her
argument.
A. Greenawalt
I have chosen to analyze the theories of Kent Greenawalt pri-
marily because he has embarked on an ambitious program of defend-
ing objectivity in the law. Greenawalt can be identified as working
within the classical liberal tradition of mainstream legal
scholarship.
146
I have also chosen Greenawalt because I believe his use of the
officers and directors in adopting so-called "poison pills" will become more precise and more
determinate. Yablon argues that attorneys and clients attempt to make the law increasingly
more indeterminate as they intentionally try to invent new legal devices, new ways of acting,
and new ways of characterizing their actions to avoid the strictures of previous case law.
Charles M. Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE L.J. 54 (1989).
146. See Greenawalt, supra note 144. Greenwalt has subsequently further developed his
ideas in this article into a book. GREENAWALT, supra note 108.
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term "objectivity" epitomizes the danger that arises from choosing to
frame jurisprudential debate within such ambiguous terminology.
Greenawalt attempts to formulate possible defensible definitions of
objectivity, but he fails to recognize the definitions or objectivity used
by critics of legal liberalism to which he tries to respond. As a result,
Greenawalt and his opponents pass like ships in the night. More
important for this article, his own use of the word "objectivity" in his
analysis betrays his own specified definitions.
1. DEFINITIONS
In his article How Law Can Be Determinate, Kent Greenawalt
states that:
[L]aw might be objective in: 1) addressing external acts, not
thoughts and emotions; 2) taking acts as they reasonably appear,
rather than examining intents, motives, and understandings;
3) viewing acts in light of what "reasonable people" would be
expected to do, not in light of what the particular individuals
might do; and 4) establishing criteria of liability and designing
remedies and punishments with regard to general classes of people
rather than individuals. 147
Under my definitional structure, the first and second definitions
are forms of Observation Objectivity (perhaps, combined with a form
of Reasonable Person Objectivity) and the third, a form of Reasonable
Person Objectivity. Classification of the fourth definition is somewhat
difficult because Greenawalt does not state the source of the criteria to
be used in judging. In fact, the fourth definition does not describe
something uniquely, or even commonly, associated with the word
"objectivity." Arguably, all categorization, judgments, and even lan-
guage itself consist of characterizing individual cases (whether per-
sons or acts) in light of criteria that abstract some aspect(s) of the
cases as relevant or controlling. Thus, Greenawalt's fourth definition
of objectivity is consistent with a number of this article's elemental
categories of objectivity standards (such as Standardized Objectivity,
147. Id. In this article, I do not attempt to deal with all possible defintions of objectivity
identified by Greenawalt. In Law and Objectivity, supra note 108, Greenawalt tries to clarify
his definitions of objectivity by identifying their negatives, or what he would call oppositions;
(1) Objective (external) versus subjective (internal); (2) objective (criteria based
on reasonable persons) versus subjective (personalized criteria); (3) objective
(dealing with many situations similarly) versus contextualized (using
individualized approaches); (4) objective (dictating results) versus discretionary
(leaving much to the judgment of officials); (5) objective (fair) versus arbitrary (or
unfair).
GREENAWALT, supra note 108, at 93. Greenawalt believes that "[t]he simple idea that the law
is 'objective' usually has a flavor of all of these senses." Id. at 93.
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Community Objectivity, Algorithmic Objectivity, Argumentative
Objectivity, or External Objectivity). At the same time, Greenawalt's
fourth definition is also consistent with many categories of subjectivity.
For example, one may judge individuals pursuant to criteria estab-
lished by Individualistic Subjective means. One may suspect, how-
ever, that in context, the fourth definition supposedly refers to a
Standardized Objectivity in which the standard itself is a form of Rea-
sonable Person Objectivity. Greenawalt also raises the possibility that
law can be "'objective' because it is anchored in correct political
morality, economic efficiency, cultural morality, or some other crite-
rion," which seems to concern External Objectivity.14
Elsewhere, Greenawalt identifies another definition of objectivity
when he attempts to address the feminist critique: "the sense that a
legal category is not arbitrary or unfair." '149 This is "Fairness Objec-
tivity," the negative of "Biased Subjectivity." This portion of Greena-
walt's argument dealing with the feminist challenge will be revisited
after I introduce MacKinnon's feminist political theory.
Although a later version of How Law Can Be Determinate serves
as the first section of Greenawalt's defense of objectivity in the law,
Law and Objectivity, the article, as indicated by its name, is more
accurately a defense of the concept of determinacy of the law.150 He
does this because he expressly equates (and, arguably, conflates)
determinacy with objectivity.' He makes no argument for this iden-
tification; he merely asserts it. However none of the four definitions
of objectivity which he identifies in his article has, on its face, any
necessary relationship with determinacy. For example, if tort liability
is based on a determination of whether an accused tortfeasor met the
148. Id. As Greenawalt refers in the sentence immediately following to correct answers
reached through legal reasoning, this may, instead, refer to Algorithmic or Argumentative
Objectivity, Community Objectivity or an Algorithmic/External Objective molecule, or even
something else.
149. GREENAWALT, supra note 108, at 121.
150. Greenawalt believes that the "possibility that the law provides one correct answer is
closely tied to the law's relationship" to broader standards (i.e., probably Algorithmic or
External Objective standards, or a combination of them). Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 1 n. 1.
He identifies determinacy with the "rule of law" and defines a determinate answer as one
which "virtually any intelligent person familiar with the legal system would conclude, after
careful study, that the law provides this answer." Id. at 3. Greenawalt identifies this as a
"fairly strict interpretation of a determinate answer." Id. at 2.
Greenawalt states that he wishes to develop an even higher standard than mere
predictability of agreement. He therefore adds an additional criterion "that no powerful
argument consonant with the broad premises of a legal system exists for a contrary answer."
Id. at 3.
151. See, e.g., id. at 12, 45, 70. Because Greenawalt usually uses objectivity and
determinacy in sequence, it is difficult to tell from his context whether he thinks that the ideas
are identical or merely that they substantially overlap. Perhaps one is a subset of the other.
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standards of a reasonable person (Greenawalt's third type of objectiv-
ity), it does not follow that tort law will be determinate either in prac-
tice or in theory. Nevertheless, based on his identification of
objectivity and determinacy, Greenawalt concludes that in order to
show that objectivity in the law is possible, he must first show that
determinacy in the law is possible.
Having identified objectivity with determinacy, Greenawalt tries
to develop hypotheticals which will be unarguably determinate and,
therefore, unarguably objective. As a theoretical matter, the identifi-
cation of objectivity with determinacy is doubtful at best. But even if
one accepts that determinacy and objectivity are necessarily interre-
lated, Greenawalt's examples are not determinate. In fact, he unwit-
tingly illustrates one of the primary CLS arguments in favor of
indeterminacy-i.e., the "law" alone does not determine results.
Rather, results are determined, and may in fact be predictable,
because of many factors in addition to the law, such as social conven-
tions, political and ethical choices, and brute power.
Let me explain the structure of Greenawalt's arguments more
fully before turning to the details of his hypotheticals. As I have
stated, Greenawalt initially equates, or arguably conflates, objectivity
with determinacy. He then conflates a number of different concepts
of objectivity. He tries to illustrate the possibility of one form of
objectivity, argues that this is evidence of a different form of objectiv-
ity, and finally argues that the existence of this second form of objec-
tivity is proof of determinacy. Greenawalt specifically makes the
error of thinking that if he can show an example of Standardized
Objectivity (and perhaps Argumentative Objectivity), which itself has
no internal normative content, the result can be given the honorific
label of either Fairness or Really, Really True Objective. He confuses
the application of this honorific to the result with proof that the result
was achieved through some methodologically objective method which
does, in fact, carry normative significance, such as Community Objec-
tivity or Algorithmic Objectivity. He assumes that this "demonstra-
tion" of the possibility of Algorithmic Objectivity also demonstrates
determinacy. He then presents the fact that law can at least theoreti-
cally be determinate in some circumstances as proof that objectivity in
the law is a realizable goal.
This argument is a rich mixture of the non sequitur and the cir-
cular. 1 52 At best, his argument dissolves into a bald declaration that
his argument is Really, Really True Objective, with the goal of depriv-
152. I do not condemn all circular arguments. Proponents of the hermeneutic circle of
interpretation expressly adopt a special form of circular reasoning which they believe can be
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ing contrary arguments of power-by definition, a justificatory strat-
egy for silencing voices that dissent.
2. LAW AS BASKETBALL
Let us examine Greenawalt's use of the term "objectivity" in
context. In this section I will limit myself primarily to examining, in
excruciating detail, one of the first hypotheticals he devises of a pur-
portedly "easy" case of objectivity and determinacy. If we decon-
struct the case Greenawalt identifies as "easy," we will have saved a
great deal of time and effort required to grasp the rest of his thesis. 5 '
Greenawalt raises a question dealing with the interpretation of
the rules of half-court basketball by a player he identifies as Kate.154
justified. See supra note 102. I criticize Greenawalt not for accepting the hermeneutic circle,
but for making a circular argument when he is instead trying to make a linear argument.
153. Greenawalt's style consists largely of presenting examples which he believes illustrate
the conclusions he proposes, working from the simplest through supposedly more complex
problems of interpretation (including the interpretation of dog leash laws and the Holy Bible!).
His basketball hypothetical is one of the shortest, taking up only 3 pages in the 86 page article.
I have chosen to discuss it because its very brevity enables me to deconstruct it in full and
because it epitomizes the non sequitur aspect of his presentation.
154. Greenawalt apologizes for the potential sexism of the use of a sports metaphor, but
justifies it on the basis of the usefulness of the analogy between the rules of team sports and
arbitrary laws. Greenawalt misses the primary point of the feminist critique. If the writer
assumes knowledge by his reading audience which is typically known by one class of persons
(in this case men) but is typically less familiar to another class of persons (in this case women),
he implicitly excludes the second group from the conversation. This exclusion has an
oppressive political effect when, as in this case, the excluded class is also the socially
subordinate class. Consequently, given the gendered nature of the analogy, the writer then has
an obligation to make sure that his use of the analogy does not serve to exclude. This requires
explanation, not assumption of knowledge, of the rules. In Law and Objectivity, Greenawalt
goes far to remedy this problem by including a diagram of a basketball court. GREENAWALT,
supra note 108, at 93.
As is probably more typical of women than men, I have virtually no interest in, and
virtually no familiarity with, the rules of basketball (which Red Smith accurately derided as
one of the "back and forth sports"). I was totally mystified by Greenawalt's specific analogy.
Another feminist point, which Greenawalt seems to recognize, is that the assumption that
law and society is, or should be, organized on the model of the competitive battles of sport
which may reflect unexamined masculinist views of human nature. He tries to ameliorate this
by giving feminine names to the protagonists in his hypothetical. However, as the protagonists
are engaging in the stereotypically masculine behavior of playing half-court basketball, (which,
unlike regular basketball which has become a major women's college sport, is almost
exclusively played by men), this is little more than having the men play in drag. I am willing
to assume for argument sake, that the sports-rules analogy is appropriate in this case. Indeed,
sports rules strike me as a good example of a certain type of relatively Standardized Objective
and arbitrary standards--sports may be socially masculine, but most feminists would agree
that law is also socially masculine. However, not all would agree. For example, although Max
Weber initially begins his discussion of law with an analogy to the rules of a card game, he
eventually rejects this approach, and decides that the arbitrary, voluntary, and limited nature
of games has little to tell us about law. MAX WEBER, CRITIQUE OF STAMMLER (G. Oakes
trans. & ed, 1977) at 137.
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The specific interpretative question is: "what does the rule that a
player must 'take the ball as far back as the foul line' mean?" He
concludes that the answer is both determinate as well as objectively
correct.
Based upon Greenawalt's description, I assume that two of the
principles of half-court basketball are: i) that a team is ordinarily
awarded points when a member of that team throws the basketball
through the hoop guarded by the rival team; but ii) under certain
circumstances (as a penalty, perhaps?), the team will not be awarded a
point unless the player was standing a minimum distance away from
the basket (i.e., behind a certain line painted on the floor of the court
called the foul line) when the shot was made. We are told that in all
previously similar occasions, the player's team was not awarded
points even though the player successfully shot a basket when the
player was standing on the same side of the foul line as the basket.15
On one occasion, Kate makes a basket while standing one-half step in
front of the foul line, and in another, she makes a basket while stand-
ing in the corner of the court on the same side of the foul line as the
basket, but at a distance from the basket further than the distance
from the basket to the middle of the foul line. In each occasion she
claims that her team should be awarded a point.
Greenawalt concludes that Kate's interpretations of the rule are
"objectively wrong." '156 He states that because her interpretations
contest "a clear shared understanding among all relevant participants
(including herself up to the time she proposes a change)." 157 This is
so, he continues, even if the rules themselves are arbitrary. In addi-
tion, he states that "[o]ur culture shares a basic understanding that
sharp changes in rules of informal competitive games are not made
after the fact when urged by a team that would benefit." 58
Greenawalt's hypothetical is not persuasive, let alone convincing.
Perhaps he realizes this, as he makes no attempt to persuade or argue
155. After I finished the first draft of this article, I was informed by my husband that these
are not the rules of half-court basketball. According to him, the player must walk or run with
the ball to a place behind the foul line, but, after having done so, the player may then return to
the front of the foul line before shooting the basket. I did not understand this from
Greenawalt's description and, indeed, even after rereading, I still cannot derive this rule
merely from his description. The diagram contained in the later version of the hypothetical in
Law and Determinacy did not help me much. See supra note 153. Because my husband
dislikes basketball as much as I do, I do not know which of our interpretations is "right." I
decided not to change my description because it illustrates both Greenawalt's unthinking
masculinist assumptions about the common knowledge of law professors and the difficulty of
interpreting language out of context.
156. Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 26.




his case. Greenawalt merely asserts repeatedly that Kate is objec-
tively wrong in the hope that by constant repetition the inattentive
reader might confuse his assertion with an argument. Greenawalt's
assertion that Kate's interpretation is objectively wrong is an example
of Really, Really True Objectivity. He wishes us to respond by stipu-
lating that his interpretation is correct. Unfortunately, my response
is: "What is the implicit use of the term 'objectivity' which justifies
his bestowal of this honorific?"
First, the definition of objectivity which Greenawalt uses in this
hypothetical does not relate to any of the four definitions which
Greenawalt specified at the beginning of the article, or to the fifth
definition he identified elsewhere. Greenawalt does not question
which standard should be adopted-the purpose of several of my
methodological definitions of objectivity and the concern of his third
and fourth definitions. Thus, we are told to assume that the rules of
basketball are arbitrary, the standard has already been chosen, and
that we are not debating whether the standard should be based upon
the characteristics of a hypothetically reasonable basketball player or
of some other defined class of persons.
Nor does Kate argue that because of her special physical condi-
tion or Psychologically Subjective mental state, she should not have to
go as far back as the average player does. Greenawalt does not deal
with a possible disparity between externally observable events (i.e.,
Observation Objectivity or Reasonable Person Objectivity) and Kate's
actual psychology or physiology (i.e., Psychological Subjectivity or
Mental State Subjectivity), which is the concern of his first definition.
Kate does not argue that she should get the point because she thought
in good faith that she went far enough back, even though other evi-
dence shows that she was mistaken. Rather, Kate proposes an inter-
pretation of an existing standard which applies to all players
regardless of their mental state or idiosyncratic characteristics.
Finally, because the rules of basketball are arbitrary, they do not
relate to correct political, moral, economic, or other external criteria.
This question implicates none of Greenawalt's definitions of
objectivity.
At first blush, the definition used in the basketball hypothetical
relates to the easy and consistent interpretation of an arbitrary stan-
dard. Consequently, Greenawalt's use of the word "objectivity" in
this instance seems to resemble my concept of Standardized Objectiv-
ity. The difference (as I will explain) is that Greenawalt requires his
concept of objectivity to bear a normative weight which Standardized
Objectivity is too weak to bear, unless it is combined with another
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form of objectivity, or another justificatory strategy is pursued. He
does this, in this hypothetical, as well as elsewhere in the article, in
two ways. First, and most defensibly, he justifies Standardized Objec-
tivity not by its content (which is arbitrary and normatively empty),
but by the legitimacy of the procedure used to adopt it-i.e., consent
theory. This is the traditional approach of positivist legal theory
which locates politics (normativity) outside of law. 159 However, no
sooner had Greenawalt done this then he moves this externalized
normativity back into the standard itself. He assumes that Standard-
ized Objectivity necessarily relates to other normative forms of objec-
tivity. These concepts are not theoretically inconsistent with
Standardized Objectivity, but neither are they necessarily related.
Greenawalt assumes that demonstrating Standardized Objectivity will
automatically invoke other forms of objectivity, which will supply the
normativity required by his argument. In short, Greenawalt is guilty
of metaphorical error.
By this error, Greenawalt assigns Standardized Objectivity a
normativity it cannot bear. Remember, Greenawalt has also told us
that his analysis of the basketball hypothetical would be the same
even if we assume that the rules of half-court basketball are arbitrary.
What are we to make of the pure coincidence that this case of "arbi-
trary" (i.e., non-normative) Standardized Objectivity results in the
same conclusions as non-arbitrary (i.e., normative) standards reached
through Algorithmic or Argumentative Objective methodologies?
Even as Greenawalt smuggles an unjustified normativity into
Standardized Objectivity, his example also fails to prove that determi-
nacy is required by Standardized Objectivity requires determinacy.
Greenawalt's conclusion that Kate wrongly interprets the rules is a
mere presupposition. He stacks the deck by implying that Kate knew
she was wrong and that she argued in bad faith, if not dishonestly.
Consequently, the hypothetical does not illustrate how to choose
between different interpretations of law because no alternate interpre-
tations are asserted in the article. This assumption is implicit in
Greenawalt's statement that Kate proposes a "sharp change"'160 in the
rules after the fact."''" Greenawalt uses conclusional language pre-
supposing, rather than arguing, that Kate's proposal is not a legiti-
mate reinterpretation of the rules.
Greenawalt later states in his article that the basketball hypothet-
ical was "easy" because he assumed that the team's agreement as to
159. See infra discussion at notes 244-45.
160. Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 27.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
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the interpretation was unanimous. Assuming that Greenawalt does
not intend to make the facetious argument that the hypothetical dem-
onstrates determinacy because he has hypothesized that it is, in fact,
determinate, one may assume he means that every player (including
Kate), by agreeing to play the game, implicitly consented to be bound
by the rules in the rule book and to certain shared understandings of
how the rules have been interpreted in the past. Moreover, every
member of both teams (presumably excluding Kate) '62 agreed to a
particular statement of the rule after the judgment was made. It is a
logical flaw to assume that the second event was necessarily deter-
mined by the first event merely because the second event followed in
time.
That is, Greenawalt conflates the concept of determinacy with
determinability. Determinacy does not relate to the observation, after
the fact, that a determination was eventually made. It relates to the
process by which that ruling was actually made-a process that
Greenawalt skips. The fact that the dispute was eventually deter-
mined does not demonstrate that any specific determination was nec-
essary or that it could have been logically derived prior to the ruling
(i.e., that it was determinate). 63
Analyzing Greenawalt's discussion in greater detail helps to
determine what is really going on here. To repeat, Greenawalt states
that Kate is objectively wrong because we share a culture which
agrees that such "changes" may not be made "in rules of informal
competitive games.., after the fact when urged by a team that would
benefit."'' 61 Note that this is a hint that Kate acted in narrow self-
interest, that her argument should be discounted, and that her inter-
pretation is absurd (and dishonest).
These assumptions, however, are inconsistent with other details
given in the hypothetical which raise real interpretative questions.
Greenawalt does not tell us what argument Kate made to support her
position that she could stand immediately before the foul line.
Instead, Greenawalt offers one that she did not make: "Kate might
argue that she went back far enough to serve the purpose of the rule,
but games would be plagued if highly contextual decisions had to be
162. Note that there is unanimity afterwards only if we assume that either i) Kate herself
thought her argument was spurious, i.e., that there was, in fact, no legal dispute; or ii) Kate, as
a dissident, has been expelled from the relevant community so that her vote does not count.
163. See Charles M. Yablon, Law & Metaphysics, 96 YALE L.J. 613 (1987) (explaining
Wittgenstein's point that you cannot deduce what procedure was followed from a determined,
fixed result).
164. Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 27 (emphasis added).
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made about how far is far enough."' 65 This argument (which was not
made) is disqualified as an argument assertorily. Greenawalt damns
the mere possibility of contextual disputes during a game as a
"plague." But, as any baseball fan can tell you, there are sports where
the existence of legalistic disputes on the interpretation of complex
rules plays an essential and, to some, one of the most enjoyable parts
of the game.' 66 It may very well be that the players and fans might
eventually determine that the degree of contextual complexity urged
by this argument would not be "fun" in such a fast moving game as
basketball, but this determination does not imply that it was determi-
nate at the time the argument was first asserted.
Regardless, Greenawalt disposes of this argument by informing
us that it is never asserted. Let us now consider other arguments that
were, or could have been, asserted.
With respect to the shot from the corner of the room, Kate's
interpretation, although never applied before, is within the literal lan-
guage of the rules. It may be the case that no other player in the
history of basketball had ever considered this interpretation before.
This does not mean, however, that all other players would not be con-
vinced by this argument, so that this interpretation would become the
common understanding of the new rule.
A litigator could certainly imagine potential fact situations and
potential arguments to support Kate's proposed interpretation that
she could stand before the foul line. Perhaps someone had been vide-
otaping the game with a camcorder which allows for "instant
replays." The videotape shows that, unnoticed by any of the other
players (and perhaps by accident of the player who was in total good
faith), Mary, a player on the other team, stood one foot in front of the
foul line while making a shot in a similar situation. Mary did not
score a point but put the ball into play so that one of her team mem-
bers was able to make a basket a few seconds later. The usual remedy
of deleting a point from the score would be arguably inappropriate
since the causal link between Mary's "infraction" and her teammate's
scoring of the point is problematic. Rather, Kate might suggest that
165. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
166. My husband is a rabid baseball fan. Arguing about the rules (and comparing obscure
statistics) is often as much a part of the game as the outcome. As child psychologist Carol
Gilligan, among others, has noted, formulating and arguing about rules seems to be an
essential part of play and seems to be enjoyed as much or more than the physical aspects of the
game. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 9-10 (1982). Gilligan believes this concern
with argument is characteristic of boys, but other psychologists and linguists argue that this is
a misconception based on gender stereotyping. Empirical studies tend to show that girls at
play tend to engage in more frequent, longer, and more complex arguments than boys of
similar age. Schroeder, supra note 4, at 131-32.
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the simplest way of evening out the play is to allow one member of
her team to make one shot from the same position as Mary. This may
be an argument no one ever thought of before, but this may be
because it is designed to confront a problem which none of the players
had ever encountered.
And yet, Greenawalt makes novelty itself the standard of right
and wrong. He states that the "decisive" answer to Kate is that "all
of the other players have understood the rule differently" in the
past. 167 No one, not even Kate, ever had considered this new inter-
pretation of the rule before.1 68  Rules in sport must be "agreed upon
before the game, or during the game to cover plays that have not yet
taken place [emphasis added]." 169 Greenawalt admits that the reason
he believes this hypothetical is easy is because he has assumed una-
nimity of opinion among the team as to the interpretation of the
rules. 170
These conclusions and presumptions ignore the very point of the
argument in favor of a novel interpretation. The issue of how to inter-
pret the rules covering this fact situation have not been decided before.
Greenawalt proposes that novelty, creativity, and dissent from the
majority are in and of themselves not merely evidence of the incor-
rectness of Kate's views, but are the deciding factors. He confuses the
fact that there may have been unanimity as to interpretation until the
novel argument was made with the proposition that there must be
unanimity after the argument has been made-that no one can be
convinced to change her mind. Kate does not merely lose the argu-
ment-the fact that she did lose is offered as proof that she should
have lost. And this extraordinary view of right and wrong comes
from a writer who thinks he is working within the liberal and com-
mon law tradition!1
167. Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 27.
168. Kate was "contesting a clear shared understanding among all relevant participants
(including herself up to the time she proposes a change)." Id. Later in his article, Greenawalt
does confront the problem of overruling precedents and other developments in the law. In this
hypothetical, however, he merely states that Kate can not rely on an argument that "rules...
need a capacity to grow" because her interpretation is a "sharp change." Id. Once again, he
assumes the very conclusion he is trying to support.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 50; see supra discussion at note 162. Actually, the only possible "ease" the prior
unanimity gives to the hypothetical goes to the question of the legitimization of the judgment
through consent theory. See infra discussion at notes 184-86. Unanimous prior consent does
not make the argument for determinacy easier, however, because it only goes to the question of
whether the eventual outcome was probable, not to whether it was necessary.
171. Greenawalt might try to argue that the hypothetical does not deal with the application
of laws, but with the rules of sport. This argument does not suffice. The reason Greenawalt
presents the hypothetical is to argue by analogy how legal decisions can be determinate. If he
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What of arguments relating to the literal language of the rules?
Greenawalt wants to have it both ways. He first declares that Kate's
assertion that she should be able to stand in front of the foul line fails
because it is not within the literal language of the rule.1 72 Greenawalt
then takes the opposite approach with respect to Kate's assertion that
she should be able to shoot from the sidelines so long as she stands at
a distance greater than the distance from the basket to the foul line.
He asserts that the rule has never been applied by these players in the
way Kate suggests and, therefore, the literal language of the rule "is
not to be taken as a definitive formulation of the content of the
rule." 173 That is, Kate loses because her argument is novel. First we
are told that one of Kate's potential arguments fails because it violates
the literal language of the rule, and yet now we are told that the literal
language does not control. Why? Because the others outvoted Kate
each time.'
74
Greenawalt might respond that "agreeing to play in the game"
means implicitly agreeing "to accept the rules that governed it,"'175
and that rules of sport are not just the literal meaning of the rules but
"what participants accept as the rules."' 176 Once again this begs the
question. One might say that the question of legal interpretation is
"what did the participants agree to when they adopted certain lan-
guage?" To say that they agreed to the rules of the game is not
enough, especially when there is a dispute as to how to interpret those
rules. The written rules on their face do not seem to deal with this
argues that his sports-rules hypothetical is determinate because sports disputes lack essential
aspects of legal disputes, then the analogy does not work as an argument in favor of
determinacy in the law.
For example, Michel Rosenfeld, after hearing Greenawalt present a version of How Law
Can Be Determinate, argued that the example was not useful because, arguably, the only
purpose of a game is to follow the rules mechanically and unquestioningly. We intuitively
believe that this purpose is somehow different than the purpose of law. For example, many
laws are instrumental and are designed to further some purpose beyond the law itself.
Consequently, the issues raised in interpreting the rules of a game might be considered
fundamentally different from the issues raised by interpreting a law; the analysis of the first
tells us little or nothing about the latter.
172. "All the players have understood the rule to require one to go back to the foul line, not
that close to it .... In any event, all of the players have accepted an interpretation of the rule
that is literal in this respect." Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 26.
173. Id. at 27.
174. Imagine if the half-court basketball game was being played by a group of off-duty
Supreme Court clerks and that Justice Antonin Scalia had graciously offered to serve as
referee. Would the literal language of the law still not control? Justice Scalia is, of course,
known for his theory of literalist interpretation of statutory language. See generally
Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1583 (1991).
Would Kate now be objectively justified?
175. Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 28.
176. Id. at 27.
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precise fact situation, and there is no evidence that the participants
ever expressly considered this fact situation when promulgating the
rules. We are engaging in a counterfactual: given the language of the
rules and the way disputes have been decided in the past, what would
the participants have agreed to had they discussed this novel fact situ-
ation prior to the game? Or if the situation had been discussed before,
would there be a new interpretation if the novel argument offered by
Kate had been made? Or if this argument had been made, would a
different result occur if it had been so forcefully and convincingly
argued by anyone as charismatic as Mary or with as brilliant rhetoric
as that offered by Kate?
Let us remove for a moment Greenawalt's snide implication that
Kate did not honestly propose a novel interpretation of the law and
that Kate cynically lied for her own self-interest. What if Mary urged
this same interpretation rather than Kate? After having viewed the
videotaped instant replay, what if Mary suddenly realized that there
are possible alternative interpretations of the rules which no one ever
thought of before but which are consistent in this case with the literal
language of the rules and would remedy a wrong which she inadver-
tently committed in the other case. Mary understands that these
interpretations would give her rival, Kate, an extra point, but she nev-
ertheless advances these interpretations in the name of good
sports(wo)manship. Would these reinterpretations, this "sharp
change," be rehabilitated because they are not "urged by a team
which would benefit?" If so-if the identity of the individual subject
proposing an interpretation is relevant to the outcome-in what way
is the determination that Kate was wrong "objective?" Is not depen-
dence on an individual subject or idiosyncratic fact-situation the hall-
mark of all definitions of subjectivity, and, consequently, the
antithesis of many definitions of objectivity?
Ironically, Greenawalt's rule of law is almost precisely the same
as Joseph Singer's facetious proposal for a truly determinate legal sys-
tem: one with the rule that the plaintiff always loses. 17 7 Singer's
point, of course, is that such determinacy is so morally bankrupt and
empty of all concepts of justice that it cannot serve as the basis of a
legal system. Anthony D'Amato has cleverly remarked that such a
rule is not even determinate because it would quickly drive all dis-
putes out of the courtroom into that most indeterminate of decision-
making arenas: self help.1
7 8
177. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1, 11 (1984).
178. Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting Indeterminacy with One Bold
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Even if one accepts Singer's facetious, and Greenawalt's serious,
contention that a legal system in which plaintiffs always lose is deter-
minative and objective, this hypothetical legal system would seem to
have little in common with our adversary legal system. The adversary
system does not reject a novel legal interpretation as objectively
wrong merely because the proponent would benefit from it. Indeed,
one justification for our adversary system is precisely that the party
who would benefit from an interpretation of the law will develop the
strongest argument in favor of that interpretation, which will be com-
pared by the trier of law to the strongest argument against that inter-
pretation made by the party who would be detrimented. 79 If
Greenawalt is arguing that half-court basketball is a determinate sys-
tem because it adopts a rule that plaintiffs always lose, he is basing his
determinacy argument on a hypothetical that cannot serve as a useful
argument by analogy for determinacy in American law.18 0
Perhaps we can revive Greenawalt's defense of determinacy (and
objectivity) if we return to his definition of determinacy. His defini-
tion of a determinate legal answer includes not merely the main crite-
rion that "virtually any intelligent person familiar with the legal
system would conclude, after careful study, that the law provides that
answer"'81 (this seems to be similar to my concept of Argumentative
Thought, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 148 (1990). I had exactly same reaction as D'Amato to Singer's
statement. The only way I could think that a court system could survive as a legal system in
such a world is if litigants developed a jurisprudence of who is to be deemed the "true"
plaintiff, regardless of who filed papers first (e.g., the party who really "started" the dispute
might have tricked or provoked the "true" defendant into filing first). This hardly suggests
determinacy.
179. Not everyone agrees that the adversary system's view of law as combat is a good thing.
Precisely this oppositional presupposition is critiqued as masculinist by many feminists. I do
not think that Greenawalt, in his attempt to defend the current legal regime, is very subtly
trying to sneak in an argument against such a fundamental aspect of that regime.
180. If he does not make this argument, then Greenawalt confuses the fact that the
adjudicator (the members of the teams in the hypothetical or the judge in a courtroom) did not
accept a particular interpretation of a rule with the conclusion that the adjudicator could not
have accepted the alternate interpretation, as well as with the normative judgment that the
argument in favor of the new interpretation was objectively wrong. He also confuses the issue
of whether the novel interpretation should be adopted with the question as to how the novel
interpretation should be applied in the case being tried. A decision not to apply the novel
interpretation in a case of first impression, but to apply it prospectively, does not necessarily
reflect a decision that the prospective reinterpretation is "objectively wrong." Greenawalt
admits as much when he says that rules in sports can be agreed to "during the game" if they
are prospectively applied. Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 27. The reinterpretation is made
because the adjudicator has decided that the old interpretation was less adequate than the new
interpretation. The adjudicator may decide to make the change prospectively because of
concerns of notice and fairness to people who (in retrospect incorrectly, but not unreasonably)
acted on reliance or assumed that the old interpretation was right merely because it was old.
181. Id. at 3.
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Objectivity), but also includes the additional criterion that "no power-
ful argument consonant with the broad premises of a legal system
exists for a contrary answer."' 2 This seems to be an extremely con-
strained version of Argumentative Objectivity, which might be
equivalent to its subset, Algorithmic Objectivity, insofar as Greena-
walt requires the absence of any powerful alternate argument. This
suggests the winning argument must compel the result.
In the hypothetical, the reason Kate's argument is not considered
"powerful" stems not from the sense that these words imply-the
power of the argument to convince reasonable persons-but from the
debased sense of political power frequently encountered in legal schol-
arship---in other words, she was outvoted.' Greenawalt does not
argue why Kate's interpretation is incorrect or unpowerful. He
asserts that it is incorrect because it deviates from the status quo.
Decisions made on Standardized Objective grounds may be deter-
mined in fact. The applier of the standard (in this case, the majority
of the players) has the power to impose its will upon the dissident, but
this does not make the rules determinate in theory. That is, by defini-
tion there can be no powerful opposing argument to Greenawalt's
objectivity because success is the sole criterion of power. The fact
that Kate lost is conclusive evidence of her relative lack of power. To
say that her arguments are not powerful justifies not merely the deci-
sion, but also the normative conclusion that the judgment was objec-
tive and causally driven by the rules. Her voice is defined as silence,
or mere barking. Consequently, one needs a political theory to justify
the implicit violence of this imposition of power by the trier of law.
Greenawalt's implicit justificatory system is majority rule. Given
a commitment to this principle, what does Greenawalt add in honor-
ing the outcome of a vote with titles like "determinate" and "objec-
tive?" Indeed, the use of these honorifics conflicts with one of the
fundamental principles of liberalism, that voting (politics) is inher-
ently and essentially arbitrary as well as non-objective.8 4
Greenawalt's basketball hypothetical is, at best, an example of
the application of a Standardized Objective test. An adjudicator
182. Id.
183. In other words, Greenawalt confuses "powerful" with "outcome determinative." By
definition, there can be no "powerful" losing argument. The fact that a certain outcome
occurred then becomes conclusive proof that an argument against the outcome was not as
powerful. One should contrast Greenawalt's concept or "powerful" with the concept of
"material" in federal securities law.
184. David G. Carlson, In Defense of the Rule of Law, 62 U. Toronto L.J. - (forthcoming
1993) (reviewing ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE
(1990)).
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imposes a Standardized Objective because a substantial proportion of
the community agrees with it. Kate's deviation is by definition (Stan-
dardized) objectively wrong-a trivial truism. Yet "Standardized
Objectivity," i.e., the choice of an easily applied standard, neither con-
tains any internal normativity nor is it necessarily perfectly determi-
nate,185 as Greenawalt's example unintentionally demonstrates. The
truism ceases to be trivial if one tries to smuggle the external norma-
tive conclusion into the use of the word "objective," in which case the
terminology becomes a justificatory technique for masking an exercise
of brute power by the majority over the dissenter.
Greenawalt expressly adds this normative judgment. He states
that if Kate had bet on the game and had lost because her controver-
sial baskets were not scored, she would have a moral duty to pay the
winner of the bet because the rules were applied and enforced objec-
tively, though only in the standardized non-normative sense.' 8 6 By
calling it "objective," Greenawalt believes this result is justified by the
fact that in other contexts the word "objective" does have normative
bite. In other words, Standardized Objectivity is combined with hon-
orific uses such as Fairness Objectivity, or Really, Really True Objec-
tivity. Standardized Objectivity started as a recognition of a
determination in fact, in the trivial sense that all opposing arguments
turned out not to have been as powerful as the winning argument.
When one equates Standardized Objectivity with normative objectiv-
ity, however, Standardized Objectivity becomes a way of condemning
the losing argument as non-powerful in theory. So used, objectivity
becomes a legitimization tactic for silencing the minority.
3. THE FIRING LINE
The importance of raw power in Greenawalt's theory can be seen
in his discussion of a different hypothetical used to illustrate why one
is required to accept certain interpretations of law. A boss tells her
subordinate to come into the boss' office and shut the door behind the
subordinate. Greenawalt goes through, in excruciating detail, any
number of exceptions which might be implied in the request and dem-
onstrates the various perspectives which could be taken in interpret-
ing the order. 187 Nevertheless, Greenawalt eventually concludes that
185. It is one thing to say that an answer to a question on an LSAT exam is Standardized
Objectively wrong in the sense that it does not match the official key. It is quite another to say
that those who are given a higher score on this "objective" test should be preferred in law
school admissions. One must justify this use of the exam by reference to something other than
the test's mere ease of grading.
186. Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 27-28.
187. Greenawalt discusses the possible permutations of the meaning of the mediated
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the employee will not only understand what he should do, but under-
stand that it was his duty as an employee to understand and obey."' s
This makes the "right" interpretation "objectively" correct.
In what way is this interpretation "objective"? It does not seem
to be Algorithmic Objective or Argumentative Objective because the
boss makes no attempt to come to an agreement with or to persuade
her employee through the application of any methodology. It does
not seem to be Externally Objective because Greenawalt is not dis-
cussing truth or reality, but communication and linguistic and social
conventions. It does not even seem to be Fairness Objective because
Greenawalt does not try to argue that the boss' interpretation is fair,
just, or ethical, except in the sense that in our economic system we
recognize the right of bosses to fire employees at will in many cases.1 89
Arguably, this is a form of Community Objectivity in that
Greenawalt does speak of the subordinate's agreement, although not
to the particular interpretation. "By accepting the job, Sam may have
promised implicitly to act as employees are generally expected to
act."1 90 One could argue that by accepting employment, Sam has
joined a community having understood the criterion for determining
correct answers-the boss is always right. Unlike the "easy" basket-
ball case, Greenawalt cannot, however, fall back on the support of
constructive, unanimous consent to playing by the rules ahead of time
and to a specific interpretation of the rules after the determination.
At most, Greenawalt presents a half-hearted pseudo-consent theory.
The employee may have agreed to certain standards. But this begs
the quesiton as to what standards might the employee have
consented?
We are told that a boss, a person with power over another per-
son, has given an instruction to her subordinate. The subordinate
must determine how the boss interprets her own statement or must
face punishment.1 9' The deviant is "required" to act in accordance
directive "Please shut the door" for twenty continuous pages. The imperious boss and her
frightened subordinate keep showing up like old friends throughout the rest of the article. Id.
at 6-26.
188. Id.
189. As Wall Street Journal columnist Raymond Sokolov wryly noted in an article written
during the failed coup in the former Soviet Union, one of the differences between our superior
system and the Soviet's now defunct system is that "if I want to say I think that George Bush
is a rascal, only my employer can stop me." Raymond Sokolov, Shushing the Dead and Dying,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1991, at A10.
190. Greenawalt, supra note 144, at 18.
191. In this hypothetical, Greenawalt relies primarily on the shared convention of language
as it acts to constrain the possible number of interpretations. This conflates several things.
Greenawalt thinks that the fact that we can eliminate some possible interpretations means that
we can limit the possibilities to one. See id. at 32. It is a logical truism, though, that
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1
with the interpretation, not because he is convinced, but because he
acts from the fear of being fired if he either disagrees or disobeys.'
92
The criterion is not external, as in External Objectivity, nor is it truly
intersubjective, as in the Community or Argumentative Objectivity.
The criterion is the Individualistic and/or Idiosyncratic Subjective
interpretation of the boss. 193 When the boss exercises power, she is
the acting subject and her interpretation is, from her perspective,
Philosophically Subjective. She wields power against the employee,
whom she objectifies as her passive object.
194
The interpretation is arguably objective in two ways. It might be
Community Objective if we deem this a community which has as its
criterion of truth the Individualistic Subjective "will to power" of the
boss. On the other hand, it might be Philosophically Objective from
the employee's perspective in the sense that, from the employee's
point of view, the Philosophical Subjectivity of his boss robs him of
his personhood, making him into a Philosophical Object.
Let us now go back and try to reread Greenawalt's hypotheticals
more charitably. Consider that both the criterion of majority rule in
falsification can only prove what is not, not what is. In addition, it is possible to have limited,
yet infinite, possibilities. Perhaps the most apparent example comes from mathematics. Prime
numbers are a limited set (I can demonstrate that certain numbers, such as 4 or 6, are not
prime), yet there are an infinite number of prime numbers.
Greenawalt admits that there are many different ways to interpret the boss' order
depending on both the context in which the order is uttered and whose perspective is deemed
as controlling. Greenawalt's hypothetical is designed to demonstrate that in the specific fact
situation hypothesized, and in the particular hierarchial social situation (where the boss'
perspective generally controls), most people familiar with both the English language and the
organization of American business offices would probably agree on the appropriate
interpretation of the order. Greenawalt labels this interpretation as "objective." Once again,
this so-called objectivity does not evidence the generality usually associated with objectivity
but depends entirely on the idiosyncratic will of an individual and the context-specific aspects
of his hypothetical, concepts generally associated with subjectivity.
192. Greenawalt alludes to this possibility when he states that the employee's obligations
arise from his duty as a subordinate. Id. at 11-13.
193. This concept-the rule of law as the subjective intent of the boss-may be compared
with Thomas Hobbes' concept of the sovereign. As explicated by Boyle, Hobbes "finds
objectivity to be impossible, and instead plumps for a kind of privileged secular subjectivity.
The Sovereign becomes a 'transcendental' subject, but only in the sense that the sovereign's
decision on some issue of interpretation is on a different, higher level of validity." Boyle,
Subjectivity, supra note 8, at 510. In my terminology, Hobbes held that the Idiosyncratic or
Individualistic Subjectivity of the sovereign serves as the rule of law. Insofar as the people
agree to this as part of the social contract, recognition of the sovereign's will can be said to be a
Community Objective standard, but the acceptance of the sovereign's will is necessitated by
the fact that more conventional concepts of objectivity, such as External Objectivity, are not
possible.
194. Greenawalt specifically states that by becoming an employee, the subordinate "has lost
whatever power or responsibility he might otherwise have" to make decisions. Greenawalt,
supra note 144, at 11.
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the basketball case and the principle that "the boss is always right" in
the office case could be viewed as forms of Community Objectivity.
Even if one accepts that Community Objectivity is the only usable
definition of "objectivity," as many do, this definition raises, but does
not answer, the normative question. If one empathizes with the dissi-
dent, a Community Objective "right" answer by no means necessarily
provides the "right" answer in the sense of justice. One may conclude
that objectivity is merely a tool of oppression. To make the normative
point, one must have a theory as to why the community standard
itself is justified, such as through a political theory as to the legitimacy
of the procedure followed.
Obscured beneath Greenawalt's failed attempt to demonstrate
objectivity and determinacy in his basketball and door-closing
hypotheticals are three very important points. First, despite our rec-
ognition of indeterminacy and all the various ways words can be
interpreted, occasionally, and perhaps frequently, we reach a consen-
sus, and communication does occur. The teams decided how to
resolve their dispute about rules; the employee figured out what his
boss wanted. The fact that this occurs, despite what often seems like
theoretical impossibility, fuels our hopes of eventually achieving com-
munity and justice.
Second, most contemporary Americans reading Greenawalt's
hypotheticals probably would agree on an emotional or intuitive level
that not only were the results reached in those hypotheticals correct,
but the procedures used to reach them were appropriate. Without a
referee, majority rule is the best way to resolve a dispute concerning
the rules of a game. Employees should obey their employers' reason-
able requests. Greenawalt's use of the honorific "objective" seems to
have been intended to serve as a recognition of this shared sense of
fairness. However, the use of the honorific begs, rather than answers
the questions of political philosophy and jurisprudence: Why do we
consider majority rule legitimate or just in the one case and autocracy
legitimate or just in the other?
Finally, language, although a human convention, is not merely
(Individualistic, Idiosyncratic, or Psychological) Subjective, it is inter-
subjective, with a Community Objective aspect. 195 Moreover, lan-
guage seems to have an external object-like aspect that acts to
195. Unlike other forms of Community Objectivity I have discussed, such as Kuhn's,
language is not as easily discussed as a freely chosen standard. Rather, the community
imposes language upon us. The constraints of language may relate, consequently, more to
what Fish refers to as an interpretative community than what Fiss refers to as an interpretative
community. See infra discussion at notes 209, 220-22.
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construct and constrain our thoughts and actions in ways that we can-
not totally control and do not totally understand.1 96 To a scholar of
linguistics or philosophy, language might, therefore, seem to have an
External or Philosophical Objective aspect to it in this highly abstract
sense. But this form of abstract objectivity is hardly related to deter-
minacy. Greenawalt's insistence on the use of the term objectivity,
which tends to have a very different connotation when used in legal
discourse, leads him to confuse the fact that consensus and communi-
cation can and do occur with the conclusions that they always do and,
more importantly, must occur. 9 7 Greenawalt presumes the existence
of the community that we must seek to form. In doing so, all who
dissent are, by definition, not members of the community-their
speech is not speech.
B. Fish v. Fiss
If you prefer debate without dialogue, I recommend the cele-
brated Fiss-Fish debate of the 1980s. Owen Fiss works within the
classical liberal tradition. Stanley Fish works with critical theory.
What particularly interests me about the Fiss-Fish debate is that they
both ostensibly discuss the possibility of objective legal interpretation,
yet their shared use of the word "objectivity" disguises the fact that
they are discussing very different issues.
1. FISSION
In Objectivity and Interpretation,'"8 Fiss adopts the critical-the-
ory position that adjudication is an interpretative activity. Fiss, how-
ever, seeks to avoid the nihilism that he associates with post-modern
thought, a nihilism that questions the legitimacy of law as an
independent field of study and sees law as politics. 19 9 Nihilists, says
Fiss, believe that while the law aspires to objectivity, objectivity of the
law is impossible. 2°° According to the nihilist, judges seek objectively
196. Like Popper's world 3 of objective ideas. See supra note 40.
197. Habermas brilliantly accuses Hans-Georg Gadamer of making this mistake in his
hermeneutic theory. Quoting Albrecht Wellmer, Habermas reminds Gadamer that although
Gadamer might be correct in stating that "the context of tradition, as the locus of possible
truth and real accord," he then forgets that it is "at the same time the locus of real falsehood
and the persistent use of force." Jurgen Habermas, On Hermeneutics Claim to Universality, in
HERMENEUTICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 314. Our recognition of the possibility that free
communication might (and sometimes does) occur, and that this might lead us to true
consensus, should not blind us to the historical actuality of oppression resulting from
constrained and systematically distorted communication and forced consent.
198. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
199. Id. at 740.
200. Id. at 742.
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true answers to Constitutional issues as opposed to plausible ones (i.e.,
answers merely consistent with a number of permissible interpreta-
tions).2"1 The nihilist believes, however, that the language of the Con-
stitution is so general and so comprehensive that there are so many
interpretations as to preclude objectivity. At this point in the argu-
ment, Fiss assumes that these "nihilists" adopt a form of "External
Objectivity. ' 20 2  It should be obvious by this point that Fiss, a
defender of objectivity, is about to accuse the nihilists of erecting an
impossibly brittle definition of objectivity. He will counter with an
unworkably malleable definition.
Fiss proceeds as follows: While it may be impossible to consider
the Constitution as the law in the External Objectivity sense,20 3 the
Constitution might be objective in another sense. If this is so, then
the law is entitled to the honorific "objective."
Fiss' concern is constraint, sometimes colloquially known as the
"Hitler question." Fiss is worried that if the Constitution could be
interpreted in an infinite number of ways, there would be no way to
guarantee that the Constitution can prevent another Hitler. Fiss,
therefore, seeks a way of constraining the number of permissible inter-
pretations of the law so that future Hitlers will be defeated. 2'
In constructing a definition of objectivity, Fiss, on the one hand,
requires a standard of judgment other than one individual's subjective
experience 20 5 (i.e., in such a way as to suggest "impersonality").
2°6
On the other hand, because a subject must interpret, and because a
201. Id. Fiss presupposes that the idea of justice requires objectivity in this sense.
202. Of course, while the Constitution is a human creation, it is external because it exists
independently in a way that the text itself is not open to challenge based on any other standard
such as reason (except in the extraordinary circumstances of a Constitutional amendment). In
Popper's terminology, the Constitution exists in the social world of world 3. The use of the
term "objectivity," in regards to the Constitution, also has similarities to Standardized
Objectivity. Despite this, I have decided that it is more useful to characterize Fiss' description
of the nihilist view as "external" because the Constitution, in this view, has a special status as
"truth" which most Standardized Objective standards lack. In addition, this view emphasizes
an either/or approach to objectivity (something is either objective or it is not) rather than the
comparative meaning I associate with Standardized Objectivity.
203. Fiss implicitly recognizes that the nihilist definition of Constitutional objectivity is
intentionally designed to be indefensible; it has no purpose except to serve as a straw man to
the nihilist argument. In order to defend "objectivity," Fiss needs to develop another
definition of "objectivity" which is, by definition, defensible. Such a strategy, of course, is a
decision not to engage the nihilists on their own terms, but to restructure the argument.
204. Fiss ignores the "nihilist" (or, at least, the pragmatist) answer to this: we cannot rely
on the Constitution alone to protect us from Hitler (this example is particularly apt because
Hitler was elected pursuant to the German constitution of the time). See infra text
accompanying notes 211-17.
205. Fiss, supra note 198, at 744.
206. Id.
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text is not a pre-existing object but an object created by human sub-
jects, a usable definition of objectivity in interpretation must recognize
a role for the subject.2"7 Fiss reaches the usual conclusion: the dyad
that opposes solipsistic Individualistic Subjectivity to Community
Objectivity.2 °8
According to Fiss, the subjectivity of the interpreter can be con-
strained by the disciplinary rules of the interpretative community.2 9
This Community Objectivity does not insure correct answers.210
Instead, as a set of constraining rules or disciplinary standards, this
Community Objectivity limits the number of answers considered
acceptable. 21  At first blush, this sounds somewhat like the Popper-
ian-Kuhnian concept of objectivity in science, in which the criteria of
testing adopted by the scientific community justifies results.
But something very strange happens to Fiss' Community Objec-
tivity. Having identified objectivity with the agreement of the inter-
pretative community-disciplinary rules as intersubjective
creations-he then presents the rules of the legal community almost
as though they are pre-existing rules that he can positivistically dis-
cover and describe. Having ostensibly thrown out External Objectiv-
ity as unworkable, he smuggles it back in by treating his avowedly
Community Objective standard internally as though it were Exter-
nally Objective.
At this point, Fiss might object that my critique is inept. The
concept of normal discourse presupposes that within the paradigm of
normal discourse Community Objectivity should be functionally
equivalent to External Objectivity. It is possible, though, to criticize
Fiss' operation in at least four interrelated ways.
First, Fiss does not consider the legitimacy of the membership
207. Id.
208. Fiss specifically refers to Kuhn's concept of paradigms in developing this ideal. Id. at
746.
209. Id. Although Fiss uses the same "interpretative community" terminology as Fish,
Fiss' concept of community is very different from Fish's but similar to Kuhn's. This is
because, as a liberal, Fiss accepts a concept of the self as an autonomous subject. A
community can only, therefore, be made up of an aggregate of consenting subjects.
210. One may question the justification for following the disciplinary rules unless there is an
expectation that the results reached by their application will be correct (just) more frequently
than the expected results reached by alternate available methods, or that the disciplinary rules
themselves have some claim to justice (i.e., if one can conceive of justice in a formalist or
procedural way).
211. Fiss, supra note 198, at 744-45. Fiss' concept is distinguishable from External
Objectivity because it distinguishes objective answers from "correct" answers-room is left for
judicial error. Id. at 749. Fiss' concept is also distinguishable from Algorithmic Objectivity
because it does not require unanimous agreement among the interpretative community as to
the decision in any specific case. Id. at 752.
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standards of the community that sets these standards. Unlike Green-
awalt's "easy" case of law as basketball, the actual unanimous consent
of all persons affected by the law does not determine the standards of
interpretation. Fiss implicitly accepts the status quo of overwhelm-
ingly white male academicians and judges. Such acceptance ignores
one of the fundamental critiques made by critical race theorists and
feminists (and "nihilists" who are sympathetic to their positions) that
in the past (and, to a shocking extent, in the present) the community
has systematically excluded them on the very grounds that they did
not meet its standards. The community had defined them as not
members of the community by definition-not meaningfully human,
but merely barking dogs.
The feminist challenge is a claim to membership. Contemporary
feminists are not bargaining for the right to change themselves until
they meet the standards of the community. They instead demand that
the community expand its standards to include them. Unlike the first
generation of modem feminists who based their claim on the assertion
that woman could meet the community standards if prejudice were
eliminated,212 contemporary feminists now challenge the standards of
the community. They claim membership, not on the grounds that we
can become as good as men if given the opportunity, but because we
are now as good as women. An argument that we should interpret
the law in accordance with the standards of the very community
which standards we otherwise challenge is hardly persuasive from this
perspective. This response again serves to silence dissidents by not
hearing them.213
Second, Fiss manages to forget that, within Kuhnian theory,
even after one has identified a community, disciplinary rules are cre-
ations, not discoveries. Kuhn does not argue, as does Fiss, that com-
munities happen upon and enshrine the pre-existing practices of that
community. Rather, the community develops and accepts the criteria
of a Kuhnian paradigm for "good reasons." It may be true that as a
normal science degenerates, to use Lakatosian terminology, the com-
munity may cease to question its methodology. This is a sign of a
212. This viewpoint is frequently referred to as the sameness/difference approach to sexual
equality. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32 (1987).
213. I do not mean to imply that the standards of the status quo are necessarily illegitimate.
I am as much a child of the western civilization as Fiss, and probably would agree with his
standards more often than not. My point is that Fiss' assertions that standards exist, and his
positivistic description of these standards, do not work as a justification for these standards for
external critics. Like Greenawalt, Fiss' use of the term "objectivity" begs, rather than
answers, the very jurisprudential questions of legitimacy that he purports to be asking.
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degenerate paradigm.214 The concept of revolutionary science is that
occasionally the community agrees to change its methodology of
objectivity. The emphasis on the paradigmatic concept of objectivity
is that the community develops these techniques intersubjectively, and
intersubjectively tests, accepts, and rejects them.
In other words, Fiss' vision accepts a Kuhnian concept of "nor-
mal law," but does not accept its necessary corollary, "revolutionary
law." Nevertheless, by analogy to Kuhn's concept of normal science,
one does not, even in normal law, merely follow blindly the discipli-
nary rules just because these rules have been sanctified in the past.
One must critique and develop methods to further the goals the nor-
mal discourse identified. One must always be aware that new "revolu-
tionary" disciplinary rules may develop and overthrow the old rules.
Identifying the concept of the interpretative community does not
solve the nihilism question because doing so presupposes that the sta-
tus quo is normal law and that nihilism is an alternate, potentially
revolutionary, paradigmatic law. As such, Fiss' arguments, which are
based on the criteria of the status quo of normal law, by definition, are
not arguments against the revolutionary law he identifies as nihilism.
The third criticism is closely related to the second. The Kuhnian
concept of Community Objectivity insists that objectivity is a matter
of community choice. By merely identifying the standards of what he
sees as a pre-existing interpretative community, Fiss conceals, rather
than admits, the fact that he and other members of the interpretative
community create these rules.21 5 Ironically, Fiss set out to incorpo-
rate hermeneutics into mainstream interpretative community, but he
ultimately denies hermeneutics. To Fiss, the community interprets
but the constrained judge does not. For the judge, subjective thought
214. For a brief discussion of Lakatos's theory of degenerate and progressive paradigms, see
infra note 276; Schroeder, supra note 4, at 168-71.
215. This aspect of the so-called nihilist position has great force. The nihilists similarly fail
to engage the objectivist critique of nihilism. The problem of post-modernism is identifying
the source of morality for making a moral issue when one is denying foundations. To put it
another way, to say that Nazism is a moral issue and that there is such a thing as moral
responsibility is, of course, to presuppose that there is such a concept as morality.
Consequently, the most thoughtful post-modernists, such as Derrida, do not deny the concept
of justice even while insisting on our necessary inability to achieve justice. Jacques Derrida,
Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 (1990).
MacKinnon has an alternate approach. She does not try to critique masculinism or to
defend feminism on moral or ethical grounds. Instead, she presents feminism as purely a
political problem in the debased meaning of "politics" currently fashionable in legal writing.
She sees women on the bottom and she does not want to be there. Whether or not they
"deserve" to be there is totally irrelevant. Drucilla Cornell has accurately characterized
MacKinnon's unmodified feminism as an entirely negative program, the "politics of revenge."
Cornell, supra note 9, at 11.
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is transparent to legal reality. But I would argue that any judge who
behaves on this assumption falsely denies his own responsibility for
the legal regime. Every reading is a re-writing and a re-institution of
the objective legal regime. Responsibility cannot be denied. Fiss tries
to avoid all of this by naming his objectivity a "Community Objectiv-
ity" while treating it as the same old External Objectivity of the nihil-
ist critique.
By rejecting the nihilist definition of objectivity, which admit-
tedly is too fragile to work, Fiss has failed to respond to an important
moment in the nihilist critique. A primary point made by nihilists
such as Singer is that either embracing or critiquing positive law
(whether liberalism or Nazism) is necessarily a moral, ethical, and
political judgment. Attempts to reduce such important issues to the
so-called logic of the mechanistic application of legal doctrine can
only be vain denials of moral responsibility. One can no more duck
this responsibility by claiming that one was acting under the mandate
of the law than a concentration camp guard could claim that he was
merely following orders of his military superiors. Calling the mech-
anistic application of disciplinary rules of an interpretative commu-
nity (i.e., the status quo) objective is further window dressing. This is,
once again, the honorific use of Really, Really True Objectivity. At
one point, Fiss pretends to realize the existence of at least communal
choice (i.e., ethics, if not personal morality) involved in law, yet
quickly enshrines the past choices of the community as a constraint.
The fourth and final criticism is that a community standard like
Fiss' does not solve the Hitler problem, it exemplifies it.216 As argued
in the discussion of Greenawalt, Community Objectivity can serve as
a strategy for legitimizing the imposition of the will of the status quo
(calling itself the community) over the dissenter. The dissenter, who
is excluded from the community, can only defend herself within the
discourse established by the "community" and, therefore, has no
defense. She must make arguments within the very criteria which
excludes her. She can make no powerful argument because she is not
powerful-there is nothing more powerful than the political power to
define away the power of one's opponent. Blacks, Jews, Gypsies, and
other persons defined away as non-human by interpretative communi-
ties have no powerful opposing arguments to their murder within the
prevailing disciplinary rules. In feminism, the ethical force of MacK-
216. I do not suggest either that Fiss is a fascist or that he is acting cynically or in bad faith.
Rather, I am arguing that in his attempt to protect the individual freedoms and the rule of law
which he so clearly holds dear, he unintentionally risks replicating the very arguments which
threaten to undermine them.
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innon's dominance theory of equality and critique of objectivity is
based in large part on the recognition that the prevailing community
standards of masculinism serve to keep men in power over women by
defining the feminine as weak.21 7 In MacKinnon's opinion, pornogra-
phy defines a woman as a non-person: a woman's voice is not a differ-
ent voice, it is non-speech.218 Contrary to his intent, Fiss' pretense
that he is identifying, rather than choosing, the disciplinary rules of a
pre-existing, self-selected legitimate interpretative community, com-
bined with his failure to confront directly the ethical responsibility
involved in such choice, is precisely the type of justificatory strategy
suited to oppressive communities.
2. FISHING
Stanley Fish claims to confront Fiss directly. Indeed, his reply is
bluntly entitled Fish v. Fiss.2' 9 This claim is wrong, however, as Fish
speaks to concerns about which Fiss is indifferent.
Fiss' concept of Community Objectivity flows from his concern
about Individualistic Subjectivity, which could be dangerous if uncon-
strained. Fish, accordingly, attacks the concept of Individualistic
Subjectivity. His concept of subjectivity, however, is also a form of
Philosophical Subjectivity, in addition to the Individualistic Subjectiv-
ity which worries Fiss.
Fish replies to Fiss in a very strange way. Initially, he seems to
retain something like the concepts of Community Objectivity and
Philosophical Objectivity. Our community so constrains us that the
concept of unconstrained philosophical subjectivity is an illusion:
I stand with Fiss in his desire to defend adjudication in the face of
"nihilist" and "subjectivist" arguments, I do not believe that this
defense need take the form of asserting a set of external constraints
[Fiss's disciplinary rules of the interpretative community], because
the necessary constraints are always already in place.22°
That is, the constraints of our community are so internalized that
there is no such thing as Individualistic or Philosophical Subjectivity;
217. This is also achieved by making this definition literal by deforming women until they
conform to the feminine "ideal."
218. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Taming of the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt to
Mainstream Feminist Theory, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 127 (1992), for an exhaustive
explication of MacKinnon's pornography analysis.
219. Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984).
220. Id. at 1345.
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there is only constrained subjectivity.22
Ultimately, Fish does not respond to Fiss' concerns and fears.
Fiss' concern with unconstrained Individualistic/Philosophical Sub-
jectivity does not exist in a vacuum, it arises from classical liberal
political theory which adopts a theory of humanity as consisting of
substantially autonomous, freely acting individuals. Fish's idea of
constraint in legal interpretation is a rejection of the very basis of lib-
eral theory. Fiss' "interpretative community," like Kuhn's, is a com-
munity of autonomous individual subjects. This is why I insist that
Fiss identify the subjects who choose, and are chosen, to make up the
community. Fish, rejecting subjectivity, envisions the collective of the
"interpretative community" as a brute fact which imposes itself upon
us.222 Fiss cannot accept Fish in the area of adjudication without
rejecting liberalism. If Fiss continues to accept liberalism, Fish's idea
is an absurdity. The paradox that faces contemporary liberal juris-
prudence is that its search for objectivity is fueled precisely by its
insistence on preserving subjectivity.
221. Elsewhere, Fish celebrates the ability of law to deny its own origin and appear as an
external, uncreated reality.
The simplistic argument against the Fish concept is that Fish forgets that the community
has been created by subjects so that it can be changed by subjects.
For example, Robert Gordon asserts that Marxist inquiries into the objective
determinants of social reality are meaningless precisely because it is social reality,
that is, a reality structured by subjects, by us, and not by structures .... But if
there has been one dominant strain in recent philosophical thought, it is that the
"subject" is by no means as natural, as obvious or as basic a term as it appears.
The subject can appear merely to be the crossroads of time and culture.
Boyle, Politics of Reason, supra note 8, at 776-77. A potential Fishian answer to this should be
readily apparent. That society is a creation of human beings (i.e., it is Community Objective)
does not imply that any single individual subject has any philosophically subjective control
over the creation. As Popper describes his world 3 of objectivity, although our ideas (world 3)
are created by subjects (world 2), they have an autonomous and independent existence. Not
only are ideas not completely in our control, they often control us. See supra note 40. In the
political context, this is a variation on the obvious point that although society is an aggregate
of individuals, sometimes society constrains individuals. A rejoinder to the Fishian response is
that the powerlessness of the individual does not preclude the power of collective action.
Drucilla Cornell, following Popper, calls Fish's view the "myth of the framework." See supra
note 32. This debate is beyond the scope of this article, but it should seem obvious that this
ping pong game can continue for quite a long time with neither side needing to give in. Boyle
describes these two different points of view as the subjectivist, who emphasizes the individual
subject's creation of his social reality, and the structuralist, who emphasizes how individual
subjects are created by their community. Boyle, Politics of Reason, supra note 8, at 776-77.
222. Schlag argues powerfully that what constitutes Fish's interpretative community
without subjects is not all clear. Schlag characterizes the Fishian interpretative community as
a "theoretical unmentionable, which Fish not only does not, but according to his theory
cannot, talk about. Consequently, his concept of the interpretative community is substantively
empty and is, in fact, no constraint at all." Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the
Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37 (1987).
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Second, and more directly, Fish and Fiss speak at different levels
of generality. Fish does not answer Fiss' Hitler question. Whether or
not we are all constrained, "we" 223 experience ourselves as very close
to Individualistic/Philosophical Subjectivity. We also recognize that
many individuals in a society frequently violate the constraints (moral
and ethical values) consciously adopted by that society. Conse-
quently, Fiss accepts our individual psychological experiences of sub-
jectivity as "real" in the only meaningful sense. Fish, on the other
hand, believes that this experience is an illusion. Our constraints are
so internalized as to be unconscious much of the time.
Fiss has no reason to feel comforted by Fish's reassurance that
Hitler had no subjectivity as he raged through Europe-that he was
constrained by his society. Quite the contrary. If Fish offers Fiss any
solace, it stems from a judgment that as an empirical matter, the way
judges in American courts are currently constrained makes the type
of horrible behavior Fiss fears unlikely at this time in our country.
What interests me, however, is that Fiss and Fish both tailor
their very different conceptions of Community Objectivity to serve the
same function as External Objectivity, but for different reasons. Fiss
defends External Objectivity because he accepts subjectivity; Fish
defends External Objectivity because he rejects subjectivity. For Fiss,
there must be no dialogue because he is afraid of what people would
say; for Fish, there can be no dialogue because there are no people to
speak. Fish is the more audacious of the two because he states exactly
what he is doing. Fiss is perhaps the more insidious in that he con-
ceals, or more accurately, does not realize, what he is doing. But
Fish's claim of relativism has all the oppressive advantages of Exter-
nal Objectivity, with the additional advantage of removing the possi-
bility of this challenge-he admits that his claim does not claim to be
true, so showings of falsity are irrelevant.224
Fiss' concept of the interpretative community serves to exclude
certain voices. Fish is known for disavowing the concept of universal,
external restraints (objectivity) in interpretation.225  The so-called
223. Or, at least, professional, white, male (and maybe female), able-bodied, heterosexual
Americans.
224. Schlag calls Fish's ethical legerdemain the "relatively autonomous self." By ostensibly
doing away with the subject simultaneous with presupposing the substantively empty
constraints of an under-described and unexplained interpretative community, he leaves us with
the best of all possible worlds-"one that enshrines the self as the ultimate adjudicator of the
nature of reality and one which reprieves it of responsibility for the choice." Schlag, supra
note 222, at 48.
225. Fish, as a good post-modernist, understands that subjectivity and objectivity, as
negatives, are mutually constituted. If the defining concept of subjectivity is not meaningful,
neither is its negative, objectivity.
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internal constraints of the framework, however, might as well be
external constraints. There is little practical difference in saying that
these constraints are universal and that these constraints govern the
universe (the framework) in which the individual is constrained. The
possibility that other constraints exist in other universes (frameworks,
communities) becomes merely a theoretical curiosity. The myth of
the framework-expressly adopted by Fish (and covertly adopted by
Fiss)-is, if anything, more conservative than External Objectivity.
As Robin West has argued, such thoroughgoing relativism has a great
risk of quietism.226 If, within a framework, one can only argue justifi-
cations adopted by the framework, and one has no recourse to more
universal standards, there is little room for real change. The argu-
ments that blacks can make within racism, Jews can make within
anti-Semitism, and, according to MacKinnon, the speech women can
have in pornography, come to mind. The response of intolerant com-
munities to the excluded gives tragic meaning to Ring Lardner's
comic response, "[s]hut up he explained. ' ' 2 7  Lardner at least
assumed the possibility of speech, a possibility which must be actively
thwarted. If the prevailing standards are racism, anti-Semitism, or
pornography, then blacks, Jews and women have no speech. What
they say is not merely irrelevant, it is, by definition, not speech.
Fiss and Fish have learned a trick from Circe: they turn articu-
late humans into inarticulate beasts.
C. Singer
I have chosen to address Joseph Singer's work 228 for several rea-
sons. First, like Greenawalt, Singer attempts to identify several possi-
ble definitions of objectivity. Second, despite these definitions, Singer
does not recognize the definitions of objectivity adopted by the theo-
rists he purports to criticize. Third, despite this criticism, some
aspects of his so-called nihilist critique 229 have great power-in par-
ticular its insistence on the importance of ethics in law and its concern
as to how objectivity can be a tool for the community's oppression of
226. West, supra note 10, at 1497-99.
227. RING LARDNER, The Young Immigrunts, in FIRST AND LAST 17, 42 (C. Seldes ed.,
1934).
228. See Singer, supra note 177.
229. As indicated in his footnotes, Singer recognizes that the term "nihilism" has been
given various technical and philosophical meanings, as well as loose pejorative meanings. Id.
at 3 n.5; 4 nn.6-7. Singer is probably not a nihilist in these senses. Nevertheless, Singer
willingly adopts the terminology "nihilist" because it is the name imposed on crits by the
defenders of legal liberalism such as Fiss.
Singer uses the word "pragmatic" because he claims to be heavily influenced by Richard
Rorty and to be applying Rorty's theory to legal scholarship. For the purposes of this article, I
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the individual. Nevertheless, Singer's self-proclaimed nihilism and his
rejection of "objectivity" entail a disparagement of community and a
privileging of an extreme individualism. In the name of a critique of
liberalism, he is more liberal than the contemporary liberal legalists
he critiques! Even worse, Singer's individualistic nihilism, though
intended to be a critical, conversational, and edifying discourse,
degenerates into External neo-Objectivity. Paradoxically, in his effort
to free the individual subject from objectivity, he disqualifies a whole
range of arguments based on intersubjectivity and community. By
disparaging certain forms of discourse, he does not join in edifying
conversation, but silences certain unprivileged voices.
1. DEFINITIONS
Singer describes the "project of objectivity" as "creating stan-
dards by which we can judge the legitimacy of our political institu-
tions and our legal rules. Not just any standards will do; they must be
correct and founded on reason. ' 230  This search assumes that "a
moral view is not just someone's considered opinion or even the opin-
ion of everyone, but that it is right and true, an accurate representa-
tion of the good."' 231 Singer characterizes this approach as viewing
morality as a matter of knowledge rather than conviction.232 Singer
uses the word "objective" in conjunction with such words as "apoliti-
cal, '233 "rational, "234 "neutral, "235 and "determinate, ' 236 thereby
indicating that he sees a close, and perhaps necessary, connection
among these concepts.
In particular, he identifies determinacy and objectivity as closely
related questions.237 "If it is true that legal reasoning is indeterminate
will generally accept Singer's own terminology because my analysis of how Singer consistently
misinterprets Rorty's theories is beyond this article's scope.
In addition, I can hardly improve on John Stick's analysis of Singer's misreading of
Rorty. See Stick, supra note 9. In his article, Stick makes the more general point that Singer's
arguments are often misplaced, in that Singer adopts a very limited algorithmic concept of
rationality which cannot be maintained. Singer then makes the error of assuming that the
liberal legalists he critiques adopt the same definition. While I agree with a large part of
Stick's analysis, the purpose of my article is not to chastise Singer for making a common error.
Liberals similarly mischaracterize critical theorists. I am trying to aid writers on both sides to
avoid these non-disputes in the future and to concentrate on their actual disagreements.
230. Singer, supra note 177, at 25.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 5, 8.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 6, 8.
236. Id. at 8. His occasional identification of indeterminacy with a denial of objectivity also
indicates the implied identification of objection and determinacy.
237. Id. at 26.
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or otherwise incoherent [and] its claims to objectivity are false," he
writes, "then we face two problems.
'2 38
Before moving to Singer's attempted identificaiton of specific
uses of objectivity by liberal legalists, I need to stop and analyze
Singer's vocabulary within my defintional schema. Singer speaks
about objectivity as the setting of standards. This could relate to
Standardized Objectivity, which Greenawalt relates to determinacy.
Singer's concepts are more complex, however. He states that objec-
tive standards must be based on rationality-i.e., Argumentative
Objectivity. By linking objectivity with rationality and determinacy,
he limits Argumentative Objectivity to its subset, Algorithmic Objec-
tivity.2 39 When he states that objectivity is not merely unanimous
opinion (i.e., he rejects Community Objectivity standing alone) but is
right, true, and good, he assumes the equivalence of Algorithmic and
External Objectivity. His statement that the assumptions behind
claims to objectivity are the principles whereby "legal rules should
have some kind of inherent validity independent of our individual
beliefs"2 4° shows this. In the next sentence, Singer relates this to
"rational foundations" 24 ' of law. That is, he assumes that Externally
Objective reality must be reachable by means that are rational in the
most narrow sense. Thus, Irrational and Idiosyncratic Subjective
methods of gaining knowledge are inconsistent with objective truth.
Finally, Singer relates objectivity to neutrality and legitimacy-i.e.,
Fairness Objectivity.
The structure of Singer's argument reflects an old assumption
that if he shows that Algorithmic Objective methodologies are inade-
quate, he will show that law must be indeterminate. By showing that
law is indeterminate, he thinks he proves not merely that External
Objective reality and truth are unknowable, but that they are mean-
ingless concepts. He assumes that if he can show that there can be no
External Objectivity, then he has defeated objectivity altogether.
Finally, since he has also identified "objectivity" with Fairness Objec-
tivity, he claims to have demonstrated that our legal system, standing
alone, cannot be legitimate, and that the law must appeal to other
sources for legitimacy (e.g., "conviction" or "politics"). These steps
in the argument are non sequiturs unless there are links among the
238. Id. at 6-7. Singer's distinguishes between determinacy and objectivity in that the
former relates to whether institutions determine results, while the latter relates to whether the
institutions which produce the results are legitimate. Id. at 26.
239. Singer's conflation of rationality with strict syllogistic logic, which algorthimically
compels answers, is one of Stick's primary critiques.
240. Singer, supra note 177, at 26.
241. Id.
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various atomic definitions of objectivity, and between objectivity and
determinacy.
Like Greenawalt, Singer merely assumes that the links he identi-
fies exist, and he makes no attempt to explain their interrelation-
ship.2 42 By linking objectivity and determinacy, Singer reveals the
unsupported assumption that rules must be determinate in order to be
objective, and that objectivity will result in determinate rules. He
does not even consider the possibilities of determinate subjectivity and
objective indeterminacy.
In making his specific critique, Singer distinguishes between
"substantive" and "procedural" objectivity. As the titles indicate, the
first concentrates on the results reached and the second on the meth-
ods used to reach these results.
2. SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVITY
Singer identifies substantive objectivity with an assumption that
law is a matter of knowledge, not judgment. He identifies the positiv-
ism of H.L.A. Hart as well as the rights theories of Ronald Dworkin
and John Rawls with this view. Singer characterizes positivism as the
identification of law with what the sovereign commands. He further
characterizes rights theorists as those seeking to base law on pre-
existing rights-that is, natural law.243 In both cases, Singer com-
plains that by identifying law with truth (i.e., External Objectivity),
these schools confuse the normative with the descriptive. As an anti-
foundationalist, Singer believes that the attempt of positivists and
rights theorists to base law on External Objectivity is preordained to
failure. Positive claims are delusional, or even lies. In short, Singer
believes that liberalism exploits false universals of the Really, Really
True variety.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that Singer, and not these liberal
theorists, relies on externalist claims. As Stick argued, Singer so loves
Rorty's mirror of nature metaphor for epistemology that he confuses
any attempted description with epistemological mirroring. 244 By his
242. Insofar as Singer attempts to critique liberals such as Greenawalt, Singer's acceptance
(at least for argument's sake) of this liberal assumption is more defensible than Greenawalt's.
243. Singer, supra note 177, at 28.
244. Stick, supra note 9, at 374-76. Singer conflates Rorty's critique of the attempt to
mirror nature with something close to Jacques Derrida's critique of logocentrism. Rorty
critiques the western philosophical tradition of describing a pre-existing external reality.
Rorty tries to develop an edifying philosophy which avoids this error. Derrida critiques the
assumption that unity between the signifier and the signified is possible, that some speech is
"authentic" while other speech (frequently associated with writing) is somehow inauthentic,
metaphoric, or rhetorical. Yet not even Derrida thinks that logocentrism can be completely
avoided. One can, at most, be critically aware of one's own logocentrism. "Like all the
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own reasoning, by attempting to express himself, Singer would him-
self engage in mirroring.
Even if we accept, for argument's sake, Singer's description of
Hart's theories, by describing what the sovereign has done, Hart does
not necessarily rely on universalist, foundational External Objectivity.
Rather, Hart relies on a form of Standardized Objectivity combined
with the normative judgment that the result also constitutes Fairness
Objectivity. Unlike Greenawalt, who posits the legitimacy of such a
normative judgment, Hart's positivist theory locates legitimacy in
political theory, not in the objectivity of law. Or to reverse it, positiv-
ism insists upon a limited form of Standardized Objectivity in the law,
but the legitimacy of the law does not come merely from this fact, the
legitimacy comes from the way the standard is chosen. To use
Singer's terminology, Hartian legitimacy is a matter of judgment
rather than knowledge. But the sovereign legislature, not the judici-
ary, must make the judgment for it to be legitimate. Powerful argu-
ments, legal and political, against positivism might exist, but Singer's
account of its false universals (i.e., failed External Objectivity) is not
one of them.245
Similarly, if Rawls and Dworkin describe rights, it does not fol-
low that they are necessarily attempting to mirror nature. Neither
Rawls nor Dworkin pretend to derive and describe pre-existing and
independent rights through rigid logic. They consult intuition for
attractive concepts and use very broad concepts of rationality, includ-
ing practical reasoning and coherence theories of knowledge, to
develop and test their intuitive ideas. 246 Far from mirroring an Exter-
nal Objectivity, 247 Rawls and Dworkin are conscious of their roles in
notions I use here, [experience] belongs to the history of metaphysics and we can use it only
under erasure." JACQUES DERRIDA, ON GRAMMATOLOGY 60 (Gayatri Spivak trans., 1974)
[hereinafter DERRIDA, ON GRAMMATOLOGY]. "But sincefinite silence is also the medium of
violence, language can only definitely tend toward justice of knowledge and practicing the
violence within it. Violence against violence. Economy of violence." JACQUES DERRIDA,
WRITING AND DIFFERENCE Ill (Alan Bass trans., 1978) [hereinafter DERRIDA, WRITING
AND DIFFERENCE].
245. For example, Hart's positivism might be critiqued for its uncritical logocentrism. Like
Greenawalt, Hart assumes that language is transparent. Once the legislature has spoken,
application of the law is a simple mechanical process which requires no interpretation.
Positivism conceals the fact that every interpretation, every reading, of a text (or a law) is a
rewriting. Singer may, therefore, be correct in his intuition that one of the problems with
positivism is that it assumes that knowledge does not always involve judgment. But the
knowledge claimed by positivism is not, as Singer implies, one of external reality, but of the
meaning of a text. Despite some resemblances, logocentrism does not mean same thing as
essentialism, which Rorty critiques as the mirror of nature. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Nested
Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1693-95 (1990) (book review).
246. Once again, Stick makes a very similar critique.
247. Singer, supra note 177, at 30.
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creating reality. This does not imply that Rawls and Dworkin cannot
be critiqued. I personally find Rawls fundamentally uninteresting
because I find his initial intuition unattractive. But it is precisely his
intellectual honesty about his project which enables me to make this




Singer's second category of objectivity is "procedural" objectiv-
ity. As its name implies, procedural objectivity concentrates on
method. This matches my identification of certain definitions of
objectivity as relating primarily to methodological and/or epistemo-
logical concerns. Procedural Objectivity is the concept that the right
"objective" method yields the right rule.249 He identifies the source of
the procedural objectivity concept as a dichotomy between:
subjective, personal preference, and objective, impersonal validity.
The subjective/objective dichotomy assumes that a basic distinc-
tion exists between opinions that are merely a matter of personal
preference about which we do not expect agreement, and opinions
that are intersubjectively valid and about which, as a result, we do
expect intelligent persons of good will to be able to agree. Moral
views are intersubjectively valid if they are views that everyone
who thought about moral issues from a legitimate common per-
spective ... would accept.25°
Singer's definition seems to be a molecular definition consisting of at
least two atomic definitions. First, the definition invokes the Commu-
nity Objectivity/Individualistic Subjectivity dyad. Objectivity is what
is intersubjectively valid, as opposed to an Individualistically Subjec-
tive opinion. Second, there is Algorithmic Objectivity which rejects
personal intuition as unprincipled. Finally, the result of this method
is Factual Objective, not mere Opinion Subjective.
Having identified this concept of objectivity as procedural, Singer
then attributes Fairness Objectivity-in the sense of a claim to neu-
trality of the law-to this concept. He states that claims to proce-
dural objectivity are only "false appeals to neutrality. ' 251  Thus, he
ignores the fact that, while some users of Standardized Objectivity
248. Singer might, for example, attempt a critique similar to mine of Fish and Fiss. Despite
their ostensible attempt to disclaim an External Objectivist approach, Dworkin and Rawls
might set up standards which function as External Objectivity. Because both are very careful
writers, it is doubtful whether even this critique would be effective.
249. Singer, supra note 177, at 30.
250. Id. 30-31.
251. Id. at 32.
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and External Objectivity speak in terms of neutrality, many theorists
of Community Objectivity insist on its necessary value-ladenness. 25 2
Singer argues further that procedural objectivity only gives the
"appearance of objectivity" 253 (implying that there is one true objec-
tivity compared to which this appearance is false). Thus, rather than
identify the different definitions of objectivity actually used by theo-
rists, Singer critiques legal legalists for not adopting his unsupportable
definition of objectivity.
From here, Singer tries to identify two possible definitions of pro-
cedural objectivity: i) commensuration and normal discourse; and
ii) rational consensus. Normal discourse and rational consensus are
synonyms in the Kuhn-Rorty analysis, and this article treats them
similarly. However, Singer's concepts of both commensuration and
normal discourse indicate a misunderstanding of the Kuhn-Rorty
concepts of paradigms. Indeed, although Singer presents himself as
heavily influenced by Rorty and, hence, by Kuhn, he replicates, in his
discussion of commensuration, the very arguments which Popper
made to show why Kuhn's theory was unusable!
a. Rational Consensus
I believe it is useful to approach Singer's definitions in reverse
order. "Rational consensus" is Singer's attempt to capture what I
have called Community Objectivity. However, Singer once again
insists that rational consensus does not only rely on the defacto agree-
ment of a community, but on the assumption that because this would
make objectivity "an empty compliment, we confer on principles with
which we agree. The compliment is empty because it is circular. '254
Consequently, he believes not only (correctly) that consensus theory
requires more than agreement, but also (incorrectly) that it requires
algorithms, the belief that:
it is possible for intelligent people to agree on important moral and
political issues if people think carefully about them; it assumes that
rational agreement is the ultimate source of those values or is the
foundation on which they rest.
255
Singer identifies this necessary algorithm with a belief "that human
beings possess an overarching and antecedently existing rational
252. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45. Dworkin's concept of law as integrity
requires one concept of neutrality: consistent application of a rule to similar situations for the
sake of consistency. He does not pretend, however, that the standaro, itself, is ethically
neutral.
253. Singer, supra note 177, at 31.
254. Id. at 35.
255. Id.
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method" (emphasis added).2 6 This is an impossibility because "we
have no antecedently existing rational method."
'211
Once again, Singer tries to shoe-horn this concept into Rorty's
mirroring critique. "The possibility of accurately describing our soci-
ety's rational consensus provides a foundation for legal theory and
allows us to believe in the objectivity of legal reason. "258 Once again,
Singer condemns rational consensus theory as only apparently objec-
tive.259 And, once again, Singer attacks a definition of objectivity
which combines External Objectivity and Algorithmic Objectivity
and does not criticize liberal legalists on their own ground.
Unfortunately, Singer misses the entire point of Community
Objectivity theory, which replaces epistemology and ontology (pre-
cisely what Singer finds objectionable) with methodology. According
to Popper, Kuhn, and Rorty, the consensus that a community reaches
(which, consensus theorists believe, is the only meaningful meaning of
objectivity) is not so much the theories themselves, but the criteria to
be used in testing theories. The criterion for testing is not, as Singer
states, a belief in a "antecedently existing" rational method. Rather,
the criteria, the definition of rationality, is the creation of the commu-
nity. In fact, one could argue that it is the agreement as to criteria
that constitutes a group of people as a community. Indeed, if the
criteria consisted of an antecedently existing definition of rationality,
there would be no need to specify a community to agree to the
result-all humans would automatically eventually come to the same
conclusion.
Singer seems to assume that Kuhn and Rorty's discussions of
Community Objectivity within normal science/discourse are intended
as criticisms. Far from it. It was Popper who condemned normal
science as defined by Kuhn.2 ° Kuhn insisted on the validity of nor-
mal science.26 1 He did not argue that the criteria chosen within a
paradigm are "merely" agreement. Rather, communities agree to cri-
teria for "good reasons," or for what Rorty would call "practical rea-
sons." 262 The fact that the community agrees is not empty if one
believes there is value in community.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 36.
259. Id.
260. POPPER, supra note 35, at 53.
261. See, e.g., Kuhn, supra note 49, at 241-49.
262. Kuhn's non-exclusive list of possible good reasons includes "accuracy, scope,




Singer preceded his discussion of rational consensus with the dis-
cussion of commensuration as an alternate concept of procedural
objectivity. He describes this as the belief in an "innate, antecedently
existing thinking process common to all people or, at the very least, to
everyone in our culture. The commonality of this thinking process is
what makes it objective rather than subjective. ' 263 This is a combina-
tion of External Objectivity, the belief in a universal human nature,
and Argumentative (or Algorithmic) rationality. Singer then declares
(but does not argue) that commensurability is not possible in dis-
course about law.2 4 Singer correctly describes the Kuhn-Rorty posi-
tion as stating that commensurability between paradigms is not
possible. But this is precisely because a paradigm (i.e., a normal dis-
course) is itself a consensus definition of rationality. If two apparently
different paradigms adopt identical criteria of rationality, i.e., if they
are commensurable, then they are, by definition, not different para-
digms but one and the same paradigm.265
Kuhn's analogy to languages is very useful in understanding his
concept. That two languages can never be perfectly translated into
each other is almost axiomatic-something is always lost. However,
we do translate between languages, albeit imperfectly. Translation
may be more successful between some languages that share similar
grammatical structure, etymologies, and cultures than between other
languages. It is probably easier to translate French into Italian,
because they are both Romance languages, than to translate English
into Hungarian or Chinese, which are not both Indo-European lan-
guages. Even so, we often communicate relatively successfully, if not
perfectly.
In Kuhn's terminology, two languages are incommensurable. If
perfect translation were possible, the languages would be one, not
two, languages. It is precisely the incommensurability of languages
that makes translation necessary. As Drucilla Cornell has re-inter-
preted Jacques Derrida, translation is necessary because it is impossi-
263. Singer, supra note 177, at 33. Steven Winter points out that there is much empirical
evidence suggesting that there is some truth in the idea of a shared rational structure among
humans which seems to be anatomically based. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note
8, at 1136-59. At an obvious level, one tends to forget, among post-modem discussion as to
incommensurability and logocentrism (which suggests the impossibility of perfect
communication), that a good deal of communication takes place between humans. This is not
to say, as Greenawalt incorrectly concludes, that communication inevitably occurs.
264. Singer, supra note 177, at 34.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
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ble.266 Correspondingly, despite the incommensurability of scientific
paradigms, or rather, because of the incommensurability of para-
digms, the inhabitants of different paradigms must try to communi-
cate with each other. They have an ethical obligation to argue in
support of their position:
When we refuse to give reasons, when we refuse to respond as if
the other could still understand us, we no longer treat him or her
as a subject we can talk to. By doing so we deny the other the
status of an ethical subject, we treat the other no longer as an end,
but as a means in the power struggle. The danger of irrationalism
is that it can all too easily help to promote the conditions of its
truth, conditions in which rational debate is not longer possible.267
Kuhn's point is that such arguments between paradigms are neces-
sary, even if they cannot, in any meaningful way, be described as
"objective."
By incommensurability, Kuhn and Rorty argue that one cannot
make an algorithmic argument that mechanically compels a person or
community to shift paradigms because the two paradigms will accept
different algorithms. One may, however, translate so that rational
argument takes place and parties make rational, pragmatic decisions.
Translating between normal discourses is precisely what Rorty identi-
fies as the goal of edifying philosophy. Edifying discourse can thus be
seen as parasitic on normal discourse.268 Or, as Kuhn would say, nor-
mal science is a necessarily corollary of revolutionary science.26 9
By using his rigid definitions of commensurability, rationality,
and objectivity, Singer misses Kuhn's insistence that science is pro-
gressive-that scientists move from one paradigm to another (i.e.,
adopting new criteria) pursuant to good reasons. This movement,
therefore, is rational, in a broad pragmatic sense, but not in an
algorithmic or "objective" sense. Singer, like Popper, perhaps Kuhn's
270strongest adversary, assumes that paradigms must be mutually
exclusive, and that there is either perfect translation between para-
digms or no translation.
Singer's parable about his continuing political arguments with a
college friend demonstrates this. Singer relates how for years he
266. If translation was "possible" and communication transparent, the difficult and
intentional act of translation would not be necessary. Because such transparency is impossible,
we are ethically required to attempt to translate in the hope and the knowledge that the
theoretically impossible possibility of communication does occasionally occur. Cornell, supra
note 1, at 148.
267. Id. at 182.
268. Stick makes a similar point. Stick, supra note 9, at 388-89.
269. Kuhn, supra note 49, at 233.
270. Because there is so much overlap between Kuhn and Popper's theories, perhaps.
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engaged in political argument with his friend on the assumption that
someday Singer would be able to convince his friend of the rightness
of Singer's views. Singer was unsuccessful and had to reject some of
his assumptions. Singer states that he continues to believe that his
friend is intelligent and in good faith, albeit they have different values.
Consequently, Singer finally gave up the "belief that if we talked long
enough we would eventually agree." '271 It is difficult to think of an
idea further from Rorty and Kuhn's concept of paradigms, although
this is precisely Popper's critique of them.
4. COME THE REVOLUTION
An important point that Singer implicitly makes is that legal
writers may be naively assuming that American law is currently one
normal discourse. For example, Fiss ostensibly starts from a Kuh-
nian consensus analysis, but he merely attempts to identify what crite-
ria are used in legal interpretation, as though there was one and only
one existing paradigm in place. 272  Similarly, Stick, in critiquing
Singer, argues that contemporary law is an example of normal
discourse.2 7 3
I would argue that if one uses the Kuhn-Rorty model, one may
conclude that we are not living in a period of normal discourse in the
law. We may be located in a time when the existing discourse is in
crisis and ripe for replacement by revolutionary discourse.274
Consensus theory as a legitimizing theory requires exactly what
its name implies: consensus among a relevant community. For argu-
ment's sake, I will state that liberal legalism may have been the nor-
mal discourse of American law in the recent past. Throughout the
1980s, the consensus has been breaking down. Other alternate crite-
ria for legal decisionmaking have been offered: law and economics,
critical theory, feminism. Or, at least, proponents of these theories
271. Singer, supra note 177, at 39.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 209-11, 214-15.
273. Stick, supra note 9, at 380.
274. Winter has also argued that it is more useful to view contemporary legal discourse as a
crisis period. Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639
(1990).
From the other side of the political spectrum, Bork has argued that the proliferation of
legal theories in the 1980s does not represent a flowering of creativity, but shows that
contemporary legal theory is in its decadence. "[T]he rising flood of innovative theories
signifies not the health of scholarship and constitutionalism but rather a deep-seated malaise
and, quite possibly, a state of approaching decadence." BORK, supra note 63, at 133. Bork
may be right, but I cannot agree with his conclusion that the appropriate (or possible) response
to decadence is to will ourselves back to innocence.
In Lakatos' terminology, the normal discourse of liberal theory is a degenerate research
program ripe to be overthrown by a progressive research program.
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have begun to critique the criteria of the predominant discourse,
although they are still in the early stage of promulgating a full com-
plement of new criteria.
Imre Lakatos, who tried to reconcile the theories of Kuhn and
Popper, argued that this incompleteness is, almost by definition, typi-
cal of revolutionary discourses. Because they are younger, they can
be expected to be less developed than normal discourses which have
for years encapsulated themselves by a protective belt of auxiliary the-
ories.27 This does not diminish the theories' potential power and
value.
In Lakatosian terms, Fiss and Greenawalt, by trying to further
refine the criteria of liberal legalism's existing normal discourse, are
merely developing a "protective belt" designed to protect the core
ideas of the paradigm. In Lakatos's theory, this is initially a useful
enterprise. Insofar as liberal legalists continue to formulate their
arguments within the language of their own discourse, they do not try
to develop their reasons why the liberal paradigm should be consid-
ered more attractive (such as Rawl's argument that his view of rights
is intuitively attractive). However, they are not responding to the
arguments of the proponents of the new competing paradigms.276
275. Lakatos, supra note 35, at 134-38; see also Schroeder, supra note 4, at 169-70.
276. Lakatos tried to develop an "objective" way of choosing between two competing,
incommensurable paradigms (which he called "Research Programmes"), and, thus, sought to
reconcile the theories of Popper and Kuhn. Originally, the development of the "protective
belt" is a worthwhile enterprise within a paradigm. Eventually, however, the core ideas
become so encrusted by the protective belt that the paradigm begins to degenerate until the
core ideas begin to explain less. An example is the ptolemaic model of the universe, which
originally held that the planets moved in circular orbits around the earth. As scientists further
observed planetary movement, they had to surround this core idea with the protective belt of
epicycles. Eventually, epi-epicycles and epi-epi-epicycles were added until the concept of
circular movement lost explanatory power.
But one does not abandon a paradigm merely because it seems to be degenerating. Our
ideas are tenacious. One abandons a paradigm by creating a new paradigm which seems to be
superior to the old. Lakatos thought that the "objective" criterion for paradigm shifts was
empirical content. If the new paradigm has excess empirical content (it explains everything
the old paradigm explained and then some), it should be chosen over the old. For example, the
Copernican model of the universe explained the planetary movements better than the
ptolemaic model, so it superseded the ptolemaic model. In turn, the Keplerian model
explained everything the Copernican model explained, and more. This replacement can
continue onward ad infinitum.
Paul Feyerabend persuasively argued that Lakatos' concept fails for empirical and
theoretical reasons. Empirically, the concept does not explain all paradigm shifts-new
scientific paradigms have not always explained more than their predecessors--sometimes they
explained less, but in a way that was perceived as being better. Theoretically, although excess
empirical content may be one good reason for a paradigm shift, Lakatos fails to demonstrate
why it is the only good reason. Historically, scientists have found other reasons to be more
persuasive. Simplicity, for instance, frequently provides the deciding factor. Lakatos cannot
demonstrate a reason, except consensus, for privileging excess empirical content over other
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Furthering this debate between discourses is, in Rortian terms, a job
for edifying jurisprudence.
In this light, edifying jurisprudence can serve a useful, but para-
sitic, function. Singer at one point recognizes this,27 7 yet loses sight of
it in his radically libertarian individualism (i.e., Philosophical Subjec-
tivity). One of the most disturbing aspects of Community Objectivity
is that it can easily degenerate into a justification of not merely the
status quo but of oppression by the majority over the dissenting sub-
ject. As Singer states, the community can agree as to slavery, 278 and,
as I have said, the community can consist of Nazis. This raises at
least two issues, neither of which renders Community Objectivity a
meaningless, circular concept.
The first issue concerns the meaning of "community." An intol-
erant community can constitute itself by exclusion-by accepting the
criteria of racism, anti-Semitism, or misogyny, for example. The
community may not have to respond to the claims of minorities, Jews,
or women if they can be defined away as non-humans by the criteria
of the community. As Kuhn argues, scientific communities have an
advantage because they can be small, esoteric, isolated, and largely
self-contained "congeries of specialists. ' 279 He contrasts this with
other disciplines, such as philosophy or history, which he believes, by
necessity, must have broader membership in their communities. 80
As one of the primary structures of our society, law cries out for
broad membership in its defining community. Historically, the com-
munity of legal academia and practice has been an exclusive and intol-
erant community. One of the factors precipitating the emerging crisis
may be that members of this community are beginning to question the
very exclusions which constituted the community. Women and peo-
ple of color, who have only recently entered the academic community,
question the criteria which, in the past, excluded them precisely on
the grounds that they failed to meet these criteria. The academic
criteria. Under Lakatos' own theory, the consensus choice of criteria is itself a paradigm, and
cannot serve as the only criteria for choosing between paradigms (i.e., objectivity is only a
useful idea within a normal science). Consequently, it is only one of many "good" and
practical reasons for a paradigm shift. For a brief discussion of Lakatos' theory of
sophisticated falsification and its similarity to MacKinnesque consciousness raising, see
Schroeder, supra note 4, at 172-74.
277. "Criticism is initially reactive and destructive, rather than constructive." Singer, supra
note 177, at 58.
278. Singer, supra note 177, at 37.
279. Kuhn, supra note 49, at 253.
280. Id. at 253-54. Weber also noted that one of the unique things about law is the
universality of its power within a society. This is one reason why he thought that analysis of
law based on analogies to games was incomplete. See supra note 154.
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community, while starting to accept diversity, must listen to the ques-
tioning of the new members, as well as to persons still seeking mem-
bership in the community.
Yet questioning within a community begs the question. If there
is dissent, is there consensus? Is there a community? If one person
dissents? Ten percent? This is what is meant by a crisis in the para-
digm. The consensus is breaking down, and society needs to form a
new consensus and a new community.
By saying that we may be in a time of crisis in jurisprudential
discourse, I do not mean to suggest that consensual theories are value-
less. However, in a time of crisis, consensus theorists cannot, as Fiss
and Greenawalt do, merely argue that a consensual criteria could the-
oretically be developed, or merely identify the criteria formerly
accepted by the community. They must argue why the community
should prefer this criteria over proposed alternatives."'
This raises a second interrelated point. If rival jurisprudences
are not currently working to develop the protective belt within one
jurisprudential discourse, but are proposing other possible paradig-
matic discourses, then the arguments are unlikely to be successful if
they are limited to the criteria of the existing jurisprudence. There-
fore, Singer calls for "practical" or "passionate" arguments-argu-
ments not necessarily limited to the specific rationality standards of
any one paradigm, but open to the possibility of competing standards
of rationality. Mere consensus itself is not the justification for the
consensus. Rather, consensus results from the community's adoption
of certain justifications. As Singer states, citing Richard Bernstein,
"consensus must be made, not found. ' 28 2
This does not mean, however, that community is bad. Singer
seems to assume that the community is valueless because claims to
community can be used for oppression of the minority. He seems to
281. "We must prove that our moral principle is not just a reflection of the prejudices of the
adult white well-educated, western male of today." Juirgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical
Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 38, 40
(1989). "What moral theory can do and should be trusted to do is clarify the universal core of
our moral intuitions, thereby refuting value skepticism." Id. at 53. In so far as Habermas can
be described as an objectivist, his point of view may not interest Singer. But Cornell, another
jurisprude influenced by post-modern theory, also argues for the ethical necessity of
"universal" standards, at least in the limited sense of standards that are intersubjectively true
in local context. Otherwise, one risks degenerating into "decisionism"-the radical,
relativistic position that any opinion is as good as any other, that ethics is a matter of
individual choice. Drucilla Cornell, Towards a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 300, 312 (1985). In one of his most famous quotes, Rorty derided
such a free wheeling form of relativism as promoted only by the "occasional cooperative
freshman." RORTY, supra note 39, at 166.
282. Singer, supra note 177, at 64.
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presume that because there are no universally shared standards of
rationality and because consensus is not itself the justificatory princi-
ple adopted by the consensus, that community itself lacks value and
each individual must decide for his or herself.
283
One can argue, though, that community is itself valuable. We
are created by communities and live in communities. It may make a
profound difference to us that we belong to a community. Law is, to a
large part, the structure on which communities are based. Commu-
nity, as well as individualistic, views of legal standards may be neces-
sary. Indeed, as Singer rightfully points out, liberalism, despite its
acceptance of an individualistic model of human nature, requires a
broad consensus as to what aspects of individual behavior can and
should be subject to community control.28 4 Standardized Objectivity
and Community Objectivity are practical creations and not epistemo-
logical concepts, knowledge, or mirroring. Like languages, they
require a broad consensus that certain standards should be followed
in some cases in order to be workable. They do not require determi-
nacy, only a level of predictability which the consensus accepts as
appropriate.
One aspect of the so-called "different voice" or "cultural" femi-
nist critique of liberal legalism is that, reflecting masculine psychol-
ogy, liberalism gives undue weight to individuality and deprivileges
communitarianism, and relationalism which these feminists associate
with feminine psychology.28 5 In this theory, Singer's deprivileging of
community (Philosophical Objectivity) and privileging of individual
judgments (Philosophical Subjectivity); like liberal legalism, serve to
exclude women. Women's "different voice" is defined away as no
voice.
Other feminists question whether women in our society can
achieve the type of subjectivity which Singer celebrates. MacKinnon
maintains that "[i]f the reality of this damage (i.e., the damage done
283. This is the inverse of Greenawalt's error. Greenawalt assumed that the possibility of
consensus and communication was equivalent to the actuality of consensus and
communication.
284. Singer, supra note 177, at 46.
285. I am very skeptical of different-voice feminism's equation of relationality,
communitarianism, and feminine thought as being a universalization of a contemporary
American, white, upper-middle class, Christian stereotype of femininity as the negative of a
corresponding American, white, upper-middle class, Christian stereotype of masculinity. See
Schroeder, supra note 91, at 1141; Schroeder, supra note 4, at 124. I do, however, agree with
the different voice feminist analysis that these values are given insufficient weight in the law,
that this is related to the devalorization of the feminine, and that sexual equality requires, in
contra-distinction to MacKinnon's identification of the feminine with negativity, affirmation of
the feminine.
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to women by growing up in a male-dominated society) is accepted,
women are not full people in the sense that men are allowed to
become." '286 MacKinnon bases her disagreement with different voice
feminists' subjectivist interpretation of consciousness-raising on the
critique that these feminists assume that women have already
achieved the type of (philosophical) subjectivity which is the goal of
feminism.287 Feminists influenced by continental psycho-linguistic
theory hypothesize that in masculinist society, any concept of the sub-
ject is inevitably associated with the masculine, and objectivity and
"lack" with femininity.2 8 Once again, by emphasizing individualistic
subjectivity while not analyzing the psychic, linguistic, and social
position of the subject (all of which imply intersubjective, or even
objective elements), Singer unintentionally excludes consideration of
the feminine. If only subjects may speak, then women's speech is not
speech.289
Finally, Singer makes the common error of presuming that sub-
jectivity is unproblematic. He forgets that, by attacking various con-
cepts of objectivity, he also necessarily puts into question the validity
of the corresponding concepts of subjectivity that can only be defined
in terms of the negative of objectivity. If Singer believes that objectiv-
ity is meaningless because it is historically situated, societally con-
strained, and void of valid claims to universality or rationality, how
can the subjectivity of the individuals historically situated in the soci-
ety be valid?
290
Therefore, despite his critique of liberalism, Singer's critique of
determinacy often degenerates into radical individualism and Philo-
sophical Subjectivity. He argues that, because determinacy is not pos-
sible, judges do not make decisions on legal principles and should be
honest in stating their reasons.29  This is a non sequitur.
286. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 103; see also discussion infra text accompanying notes
329-35.
287. Schroeder, supra note 4, at 51, 116.
288. See id.; CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION, supra note 137, at 50-52; GROSZ,
supra note 137, at 140-46.
289. Lacanian feminists argue that the subject is a psycho-linguistic position which can only
be identified with the masculine, at least under current conditions. Consequently, when a
woman says "I," she is never really speaking "her" voice, but is adopting the masculine voice.
GROSZ, supra note 137, at 71-72.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93. See generally Boyle, Subjectivity, supra note
8.
291. "Judges rationalize their decisions as the results of reasoned elaboration of principles
inherent in the legal system. Instead of choosing among available descriptions, theories,
vocabularies, and courses of action, the official who feels 'bound' reasons from nonexistent




The indeterminacy argument, at most, states that legal doctrine
does not algorithmically mandate judicial decisions. It does not imply
that legal doctrine does not have a role, even an important role, in
many judicial decisions. That the concept of causality is problematic
should be familiar territory to any lawyer who has taken first-year
torts. The questions "what is the cause of an action or decision?"' and
"what is the reason for a decision?" can have many different meanings
and many different answers.292 If a judge states that she decided a
case within the structures of liberal legalism, who is Singer to contra-
dict her? He has no right to criticize even if the judge recognizes the
proposition that legal doctrine does not compel one determinate
answer. The existence of competing values in a legal system does not
necessarily make the system incoherent despite Singer's claim to the
contrary. Rather, it might make the system flexible and practical.
Such a system might support a coherence concept of fit. Charles
Yablon argues that the indeterminacy critique, which states that legal
reasoning does not compel a judicial decision, does not lead to the
inevitable decision that judges are either liars or fools. Rather, the
reasoning given by judges in legal decisions should be seen as a form
of practical argument or explanation of precisely the type Singer calls
for.
293
At one level, Singer recognizes this when he argues that in
rejecting foundations, not all people will immediately become immor-
ally selfish, nor all judges become outlaws. However, this raises the
Hitler question. Tyranny does not need the majority in order to be
selfish. The selfish tyrant is better served by a populace which unself-
ishly subordinates their interests to his.
Singer speaks of the creation of consensus, yet he derides any
attempt to develop a consensus of rationality criteria that does not
meet his unattainable criteria of algorithmic logic and External Objec-
tivity. Consequently, he is not left with any consensus, or even the
possibility of creating a meaningful consensus. Rather, he is left with
the type of oppressive and circular consensus which he has tried to
condemn-the empirical fact of agreement among autonomous indi-
292. See Charles M. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the
Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 917 (1985); Nagel, supra note 45, at 15-28,
503-46.
293. Charles M. Yablon, Are Judges Liars? A Wittgensteinian Critique of Law's Empire,
CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE, July 1990, at 123, 138. Of course, I am not implying that
judges are always sensitive to their own prejudices and motives or that there cannot be
unstated (or unconscious) explanations for judicial decisions in addition to those expressed in
opinions.
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viduals, rather than the intersubjectivity of community and respect
for the Philosophical Objectivity of the other.
Singer ends his article with a remarkable attempt at a will to
power. He creates his own individual solipsistic (Psychologically Sub-
jective) standards which will serve the function of the good and the
true. This is an act which is no less Nietzschean because his stan-
dards are "niceness. 29 4 Singer's standards serve the External Objec-
tivity function of religious dogma while denying their objective status.
As with Fish's relativism, Singer's pseudo-pragmatism has an
advantage which express External Objectivity lacks, and is, therefore,
even more irretrievably Externally Objective in function, if not in
rhetoric. Claims to External Objectivity can always be accused of fal-
sity. Such an accusation of lying goes to External Objectivity's very
heart-the reason for killing the heretic is because the words of the
heretic are a threat to the life of the religion. The religious External
Objectivist must deny the claim of falsehood or give up her beliefs.
Singer, on the other hand, is immune from this charge. He can
declare an accusation of falsehood meaningless and continue with
business as usual.
Singer would argue that this is not so because he, the edifier, has
the obligation of persuasion in order to reach a consensus. However,
he has consistently disparaged any means of argument except passion
and algorithmic logic (the former he thinks achievable and the latter
he thinks unworkable in the real world). Singer has disparaged any
communal, as opposed to individual, attempt to identify criteria,
thereby silencing much of the feminist call to be heard. He is left with
faith, the most Externally Objective of all objectivities, because faith is
so Philosophically Subjective as to be unassailable.
D. MacKinnon
In Towards a Feminist Theory of the State,295 Catharine MacKin-
non denounces "objectivity" as the "holy grail"29 6 of masculinism.2 97
294. Singer argues that we should prevent cruelty, alleviate misery, democratize illegitimate
hierarchies, and alter the social conditions that create loneliness. Singer, supra note 177, at 66-
70. I am, of course, using the familiar caricature of Nietzsche's concept of will to power that I
critique supra note 133.
295. MACKINNON, supra note 1.
296. Id. at 107.
297. Or at least that branch of masculinism which she identifies as the Western political and
philosophical tradition currently embodied primarily in liberalism, although much of
MacKinnon's critique is intended also to encompass Marxism. She states that "[o]bjectivity is
liberal legalism's conception of itself," and that "[o]bjectivist epistemology is the rule of law."
Id. at 162, 163. "The rule form, which unites scientific knowledge with state control in its
conception of what law is, institutionalizes the objective stance as jurisprudence." Id. at 163.
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I have chosen to examine MacKinnon's work partly because the
author is probably the most well known feminist legalist who has cho-
sen to critique "objectivity." More important, I believe that her fail-
ure to recognize how the theorists she criticizes purport to define
objectivity substantially weakens her argument as to how liberal legal-
ism silences women by classifying their claims for equality as non-
legal speech. As usual, MacKinnon's critique is frustrating because it
is simultaneously both powerful and flawed.
On the one hand, I will argue that even though MacKinnon gives
a convincing account of one function of the term "objectivity" in lib-
eralism, her failure to recognize how contemporary liberal theorists
actually define and use the term "objectivity" leaves her analysis vul-
nerable to easy dismissal by liberals who can retreat to arguments on
semantics. On the other hand, MacKinnon's ostensible critique of
objectivity inadvertently serves as a powerful example as to how the
objectivity/subjectivity/relativity debate in jurisprudence is not work-
ing and currently serves to protect the status quo.
1. DEFINITIONS
MacKinnon gives several definitions of "objectivity" in political
and legal theory. Actually, she veers back and forth between conflict-
ing connotations of the word, often in succeeding sentences and even
in the same sentence:
MacKinnon identifies objective method as one which is
considered:
authority ... [as producing] an account of knowledge which is
certain, which ends speculation and precludes skepticism, which
has power that no one else can as powerfully contest . . . an
approach to the real on which to base arguments and conclusions
that will make ones's point of view unquestionable and unanswer-
able, immortal and definitive and the last word, regardless of time,
place, or person. Its thrust has been to end diversity of viewpoint,
so that there can be no valid disagreement over what knowing is
right knowing.29
Elsewhere, she defines objectivity as:
[T]he nonsituated, universal standpoint, whether claimed or
aspired to-[which] is a denial of the existence or potency of sex
inequality that tacitly participates in constructing reality from the
dominant point of view. Objectivity, as the epistemological stance
of which objectification is the social process, creates the reality it
The Marxian concept of materialism claims to be scientific, that is, like liberalism, "an
objective-that is, a nonsocially perspectival--content." Id. at 83.
298. Id. at 107 (citation omitted).
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apprehends by defining as knowledge the reality it creates through
its way of apprehending it.
299
And as "the ostensibly noninvolved stance, the view from a distance
and from no particular perspective, apparently transparent to its
reality.''a300
These descriptions have characteristics of External Objectivity.
Truth is not situated or perspectival because it is universal, and it is
not limited to any individual. The first of the formulations quoted
above also invokes Algorithmic Objectivity, in that MacKinnon refers
to arguments that are unquestionable and definitive. Moreover, she
expressly identifies the liberal concept of objectivity with- scientific
method (or, perhaps more accurately, science is seen as a branch of
liberalism).30 1 In this context she states:
Objectivity as a stance toward the world erects two tests to which
its method [i.e., scientific method] must conform: distance and
aperspectivity. To perceive reality accurately, one must be distant
from what one is looking at and view it from no place and at no
time in particular, hence from all places and times at once. This
stance defines the relevant world as that which can be objectively
known, as that which can be known in this way. An epistemology
decisively controls not only the form of knowing but also its con-
tent by defining how to proceed, the process of knowing, and by
confining what is worth knowing to that which can be known in
this way .... For science, the tests of reality are replicability and
measurability, the test of true meaning is intersubjective communi-
cability, the test of rationality if formal (axiomatic) logical consis-
tency, and the test of usefulness, as in technology, is whether it can
be done.3 °2
MacKinnon further identifies this approach as an attempt to see
knowledge as a mirroring of the external world-like Singer, she
equates scientific methodology with epistemology.30 3
299. Id. at 114.
300. Id. at 121-22.
301. Id. at 97.
302. Id.
303. Id. MacKinnon does not cite Rorty who, of course, is associated with this criticism,
although she does cite the Mirror of Nature elsewhere in the book. Nor does she cite Iragaray
for her analysis of the importance of sight and mirroring in male psychology-with women as
the mirror of man. The title of Iragaray's most familiar work, which MacKinnon cites
elsewhere in Theory of the State, is translated into English as Speculum of the Other Woman.
"Speculum" is, of course, Latin for "mirror," as well as the English term for the instrument
used by gynecologists in pelvic examinations. The hand mirror of Venus is still used by
doctors as the symbol of woman, by astronomers as the symbol of the planet Venus, and by
feminists as the symbol of feminism. Once again, although MacKinnon does cite Speculum
elsewhere, she scrupulously avoids citing Iragaray for any number of insights associated with
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This particular passage, however, goes beyond a mixed concept
of External and Algorithmic Objectivity. The reference to intersub-
jective communication as a test of meaning invokes Community
Objectivity, a concept which can be inconsistent with External Objec-
tivity. MacKinnon's reference to a criterion of usefulness also does
not cohere with Algorithmic Objectivity, but to some other test of
validity, such as the "good reasons" of pragmatists. This might be
considered Argumentative Objectivity, or even some form of Irra-
tional Subjectivity.
Moreover, MacKinnon frequently uses "objectivity" in connec-
tion with "neutrality," 3" implying that liberalism sees these two con-
cepts as interrelated, or at least connected. This, of course, reflects
the judgment of Fairness Objectivity. But MacKinnon argues that
according to liberalism, Fairness Objectivity is determined in accord-
ance with external truth and algorithmic logic (and perhaps other
forms of rational, or irrational, behavior). It is Factual Objectivity,
not opinion, and it has a special claim to be taken seriously. It is
Really, Really True Objectivity.
External Objectivity has relativity as its polar opposite. MacKin-
non, however, calls objectivity's "polar opposite ... subjectivity."3 5
Let us, therefore, turn to how she identities this type of subjectivity in
order to better understand how she believes objectivity is viewed.
MacKinnon identifies "subjective" ideas with "individual"
ideas3 06-- in this case specifically in contrast to feminist consciousness
as collective social being. This kind of subjectivity I have called Indi-
vidualistic, Idiosyncratic, and/or Psychological Subjectivity. In say-
ing that subjectivity is the polar opposite of objectivity, MacKinnon
adds that "[s]ocially, men are considered objective, women subjec-
tive." 30 7 This identification may not seem to add much to the defini-
tion except to make clear that in MacKinnon's view, liberalism deems
objectivity to be the privileged pole, so that it will be identified with
masculinity. I will return to this point.
Almost immediately after this, however, in her discussion of
social science methodology, MacKinnon states that:
social science attacks the problem of its own knowing largely in
terms of the limitations on the 'in here' of the knower, with con-
cern for how these limits can be overcome, exorcised or contained.
her work which are mirrored in MacKinnon's writings, such as Iragaray's evocative
reinterpretation of Plato's myth of the cave.
304. See, e.g., id. at 232.
305. Id. at 97.
306. Id. at 83.
307. Id. at 97.
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Its model of knowledge posits a mind needing to overstep its deter-
minants in order to get outside itself in order to get at the facts.
Otherwise, it is thought, the mind will only propagate and project
its delusions, its determinants, the limitations of its experiences,
onto social reality, remaining forever trapped within itself.3°"
Thus, scientific methodology is objective, its opposite is subjectivity,
and the legitimate internal process is contrasted with science's exter-
nal method. Consequently, I take this internal process to be within
MacKinnon's definition of subjective method. As such, this seems to
be close to my Observation Objective/Psychological Subjective dyad.
Insofar as MacKinnon also refers to "subjectivist retreat" in parallel
with "solipsistic circle" as common pejorative dismissals of feminism,
her definition of subjectivity also seems to include Idiosyncratic
Subjectivity. 3°9
But this is not harmless Idiosyncratic Subjectivity in the sense of
taste. By noting the identification of subjectivity with women, MacK-
innon sees the terminology as being profoundly pejorative. As I have
stated, MacKinnon argues that liberalism identifies neutrality and
fairness in law and jurisprudence with objectivity. The woman's point
of view, the subjective as the idiosyncratic by definition, is then
explained away as the unfair, the irrelevant, and the not worthy of
consideration in a court of law by definition.310
2. THE FLIGHT FROM OBJECTIVrrY
MacKinnon claims that objectivity is masculine and that the
objectification of women is its inevitable result. She insists that sex is
socially constructed by men. Does this argue for the adoption of a
relativist view of reality as some feminists have suggested? I will
argue that it does not. Despite the abuse she heaps upon objectivity,
MacKinnon herself is neither a relativist nor an anti-objectivist. 31,
But first I will analyze MacKinnon's critique of objectivity in
liberalism. I will argue that her critique combines and conflates many
308. Id. at 98. This may not be an accurate characterization of all social science theory, in
that some schools of social science emphasize Psychological Subjective methodology in lieu of,
or in conjunction with, Observation Objective methodology. See supra text accompanying
notes 81-98.
309. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 102.
310. MacKinnon will also occasionally switch to philosophical definitions of subjectivity
and objectivity without indicating the very different way in which these terms are used.
311. Despite her use of post-modem social constructivist rhetoric, MacKinnon's theory
reflects liberal theories of the autonomous self, as well as pre-modem Christian theories of the
body. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 193-200; Schroeder, supra note 91, at 1190-213. Her
theory of pornography serves to link these two very different dimensions. See Schroeder, supra
note 218, at 166-83.
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inconsistent concepts of objectivity and fails to consider how mascu-
linist theorists actually claim to define their terms. Nevertheless, I
will partially defend MacKinnon as accurately describing how honor-
ific claims of objectivity function in the law. MacKinnon's critique is,
in large part (although not entirely), the traditional charge that the
status quo is attempting to justify itself through claims to false univer-
sals, despite its claim to the contrary. By failing to identify her argu-
ment as a false universals complaint, MacKinnon endangers her
argument, compromising its intelligibility to the very persons against
which it is made.31 2 Moreover, her condemnation of "objectivity" has
the danger of suggesting an embrace of certain concepts of subjectiv-
ity and relativity, which MacKinnon herself would probably reject.
To repeat, MacKinnon identifies liberal "objectivity" with a
molecular External/ Algorithmic/ Observation/ Factual/ Fairness/
Really, Really True form of Objectivity. Subjectivity is deprivileged
and, therefore, identified with the feminine. This feminine subjectiv-
ity is a molecular Idiosyncratic/Psychological/Opinion form of sub-
jectivity and relativity.
However, as I have already argued, contemporary liberal think-
ers are not as unaware of the post-modern world as MacKinnon sup-
poses. Neither Fiss, nor even Greenawalt, identifies objectivity with
External Objectivity or truth. Dworkin tries to avoid the terminology
of objectivity entirely. "Everyone" has read Kuhn, with greater or
less understanding and agrees, at some level, that all perception and
knowledge is perspectival, situated, and value laden.3 13 Consequently,
modern liberals such as Fiss have learned to rely on Community
Objectivity. Dworkin relies on holistic or coherence theories of
knowledge, which also have similarities to what I call Community
Objectivity. Greenawalt's definitions are more confused, but his main
concern is with Standardized Objectivity-that there are clear stan-
dards-which he identifies with Reasonable Person/Fairness concepts
and Community and Algorithmic Objectivity, rather than any criteria
of external truth or justice. Remember, Rawls named his theory "jus-
tice as fairness" to make clear that it was not based on a transcendent
notion of the good, but on a situated concept of the right-how peo-
ple should treat each other within a specific society in order for each
312. Sometimes MacKinnon states that she is neither trying to argue her case to liberals nor
trying to persuade, but is preaching to the converted. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 116.
However, the force and passion of her writing, as well as her political activities, belie these
statements.
313. Cornell similarly criticized MacKinnon's description of liberalism as being out of date.
Cornell, supra note 9, at 2258-61.
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individual to seek his own good. 14
Accordingly, it should be easy for liberal critics to dismiss
MacKinnon on the grounds that she does not know what she is talk-
ing about. They can claim that she has not read contemporary liber-
als who have tried to respond to the post-modem critique and,
therefore, she is attacking, not masculinism, but straw men. She is,
they can argue, preaching lessons which they have learned long ago.
MacKinnon is reinventing the wheel. If these are valid criticisms,
how, then, can I find validity in her argument?
This is how. Despite recent claims by liberals that they have
incorporated the post-modem lesson, their recital of post-modem
community standards is strictly by rote. And like most rote learning,
the lesson is forgotten almost immediately. Fiss states that he recog-
nizes Community Objectivity as the only form of objectivity, and
Dworkin says we should not even talk about objectivity. Yet they
then positivistically identify the standards used by the community in
order to make their application more consistent. Nor do the liberals
recognize (or admit that they recognize) that normal legal discourse
might be in a stage of classic Kuhnian crisis. They do not, therefore,
investigate whether the criteria and theory of their normal discourse
is superior or inferior to alternative criteria and theories proposed by
potentially revolutionary discourse. Rather, in Lakatos' terminology,
they merely seek to thicken the protective belt protecting the para-
digm. Lakatos identifies this as the sign of a "degenerate" paradigm,
ripe for overthrow.315
Consequently, their use of Community Objectivity degenerates
into External Objectivity. The standards of objectivity become func-
tionally universal because they are the only standards considered valid
within the relevant universe of this community. If other potential
communities exist, they are not considered relevant possibilities. The
Community Objective standard becomes functionally aperspectival
because it is the only perspective seriously considered. The criteria of
314. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Similarly, the criteria which
contemporary liberals propose for making judgments are expressly presented not as
Algorithmic/External Objectivity and universal logic, but as the rules adopted by an
interpretative community or, in the case of positivists (which might include Greenawalt,
although he does not use that term), the application of standards promulgated by a sovereign
deemed authoritative on political grounds. Rawls' famous "veil of ignorance" argument is not
presented as algorithmic proof of an externally objective notion of human nature, but as a way
of testing (i.e., perhaps an argumentative objective methodology) the plausibility and
consistency of his intuitions. Id. at 136-42. Even Dworkin, who claims that there are "right
answers" to the law even in "hard cases," does not pretend to rely on algorithmic logic.
315. See supra note 276.
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judgment takes on the function of universal logic because they are the
only criteria acceptable within the relevant community-universe.
This neo-External Objectivity even has an advantage over old-
fashioned external objectivity in that it does not claim to be "true," it
only acts as though it were true. Cries of falsehood or injustice by the
oppressed, by definition, are not considered valid unless they are
expressed within the normal discourse and in accordance with the cri-
teria of the paradigm. Claims of untruth are laughed off as unsophis-
ticated. Insofar as the Enlightenment rationality of classical
liberalism was a reaction to the traditional irrationality of Christian
faith, the liberal response to post-modernism might be seen as the
resurgence of Christian concepts of irrationality in reaction against
the now traditional rationality of the Enlightenment. They believe
because it is impossible.
3. THE RETURN TO OBJECTIVITY
MacKinnon's choice to associate legal liberalism with External
Objectivism springs, I suggest, from an objectivist turn in her own
theory. A central concept of MacKinnon's theory is that sexuality is
socially constructed-constructed by men to subordinate women.316
No doubt there is a strong relativist aspect to this approach which
suggests this corollary: If society were organized differently, the char-
acteristics that we associate with the social constructions we call men
and women may or may not be true of biologically male and female
persons. Consequently, a feminist agenda is possible.
To call this approach "relativist," however, can be misinter-
preted as suggesting that the structures and dichotomies of mascu-
linist society are illusory, and that feminism is a matter of merely
changing one's point of view. For example, Robin West tries to mod-
ify the radical feminist position by arguing that it is not heterosexual-
ity that is oppressive, but its compulsory nature. 317 Heterosexuality,
316. Schroeder, supra note 4, at 193-96; Schroeder, supra note 218, at 129, 166-83. Despite
MacKinnon's use of ostensibly Foucaultian vocabulary, her theory is an attempt to
superimpose a post-modern theory of society (i.e., sexuality is socially constructed) over a
modern liberal theory of the self (i.e., freedom consists of unconstrained will of atomistic
individuals), and a premodern Christian concept of the body (i.e., the involuntary nature of
sexuality robs us of our subjectivity). She unsuccessfully tries to fuse these three incompatible
world views through her theory of pornography. That is, through pornography, men, who are
free standing individuals, freely impose their will (i.e., liberalism) by constructing sexuality
(i.e., post-modernism) and imposing it on women who are thereby objectified (i.e.,
Christianity).
317. West, supra note 4, at 46. In this article West tries, unsuccessfully, to reconcile
cultural and radical feminists by arguing that they both arise from the inherent, anatomically
connectedness of women. Cultural feminists embrace their connectedness and fear separation,
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
freely and consciously chosen, need not be oppressive. Different voice
feminists such as West interpret the harm of pornography as dis-
torting the true relational sexuality of women a.3 " Leslie Bender
describes the public/private dichotomy of liberalism as "false.
3 1
Indeed, MacKinnon's own account of the knowledge achieved by
consciousness-raising has substantial similarities to the relativistic
concepts of Community Objectivity posited by the Popper/Kuhn/
Lakatos philosophy of science.
MacKinnon has a strong objectivist streak in her writings as
well. Her critique is not merely that liberalism falsely tries to set up
masculinist community standards as universals. Men have the power
to make their standards into the true universals within society. That
is, the Community Objectivity of liberalism does not merely function
as External Objectivity in our society. Because human beings create
their reality, masculinism/liberalism has created our selves and our
society such that the Community Objectivity standards of liberalism
are Externally Objectively true within the relevant universe of our
society. It makes its lies into the truth.
Pornography is not merely a grotesque distortion of Westian
relational femininity. Pornography, says MacKinnon, defines the
feminine. To be a woman socially is to be rapable, to be a non-person
just as pornography demands.3 20 The public/private dichotomy is not
while radical feminists see their connectedness as oppressive and seek individuation. This
theoretical difference of opinion can be better explained as both arising, not from a concept of
the feminine, but from acceptance of the masculine stereotype of the masculine, and of the
feminine as its negativity. The cultural feminists embrace the feminine stereotype while the
radical reject it in favor of the masculine stereotype. Both are incipiently conservative in that
they both preserve the masculine stereotype, which is the bulwark of the status quo.
318. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wls. WOMAN'S L.J. 81 (1987). Sunstein argues that the
cultural feminist view, which sees pornography as a distortion of true, healthy sexuality, is
similar to the traditional American Christian moralist view. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 21.
Whether or not the view that sex is naturally clean and healthy, in contrast to the filth of
pornography, has become mainstream in the United States, it hardly seems to be the
"traditional" Christian approach which has emphasized the inherent sinfulness and corruption
of sexuality. The traditional Christian believed, like MacKinnon, that the pornographic vision
is the true vision of sexuality, not its distortion. See Schroeder, supra note 91, at 1155-56.
319. Bender, supra note 1, at 864, 868.
320. For MacKinnon, sex and gender are both sexually constructed. One of the
mechanisms which masculinism uses to construct the sex "woman" is pornography. "Deeper
than the personhood question or the violence question is the question of the mechanism of
social causation by which pornography constructs women and sex, defines what 'woman'
means and what sexuality is, in terms of each other." MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 161.
"For example, men say all women are whores. We say men have the power to make this our
fundamental condition .... Men define women as sexual beings; feminism comprehends that
femininity is 'sexual.'" Id. at 59.
Along with the rape and prostitution in which it participates, pornography
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false, if this implies illusory or deniable. It is only "false" in the sense
that it is, in theory, not necessary in every society imaginable (it is not
true in all universes) or that it is not consistently applied in our legal
system. This dichotomy is, however, very, very real in fact and in law
in our society. It is the structure of men's domination of women in
liberal society-the universe we live in. It is, therefore, an Externally
Objective truth for our universe, even though we might fantasize
alternate universes. 321 The public/private distinction, which forbids
law and the state from entering the private world of the home and the
family where women, traditionally, have been confined, has insured
that while men can figuratively be said to be governed by "laws and
not men,''322 women have literally been governed by men and not
laws. MacKinnon repeatedly insists that she has no interest in dis-
cussing anything but our society from within our society-the only
universe we can know. 323 The (Externally) Objective truth is oppres-
sion. One of the (Externally) Objectively true and existing legal
mechanisms of that oppression is the very real public/private distinc-
tion.3 24  Rape happens; it is neither a feminine fantasy nor a false
charge.325
According to MacKinnon, liberalism needs the concept of Exter-
nal Objectivity. Because liberal legalists often conflate objectivity
with legal determinacy, MacKinnon, who believes that masculinism
has created its own reality, must also agree that the law is determi-
nate.32 6 Her choice of the word "objective" as shorthand for this cri-
institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy . . . . Gender is sexual.
Pornography constitutes the meaning of that sexuality. Men treat women as who
they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men's power
over women means that the way men see women defines who women can be.
Pornography is that way.
Id. at 18. "Pornography is not imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It
is not a distortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation or symbol, either.
It is sexual reality." MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 198. "Pornography can invent women
because it has the power to make its vision into reality, which then passes, objectively, for
truth." Id. at 205.
321. Consequently, MacKinnon resists speaking about what society would be like if sexual
equality was achieved. To do so would be to engage in fantasies, imagining what does not exist
as though one could change reality by wishing. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 243-45.
322. Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
323. See MACKINNON, supra note 212, at 221; MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 83-84, 98-99.
324. It is, of course, not the only legal mechanism. The sameness/difference approach to
sexual equality is another.
325. MacKinnon insists that the oppression of women is a physical reality. "[Feminist
theory] is deeply of the world: raw with women's blood, ragged with women's pain, shrill with
women's screams.... It participates in reality: the reality of a fist in the face, not the concept
of a fist in the face." Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE L.J 1281, 1285 (1991).
326. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 137. In calling this "determinate," MacKinnon
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tique unfortunately obfuscates, rather than clarifies, its genuine
insights because it ignores the various way the word is used in liberal
writings. Liberals (and others) who read her work are likely to get
lost in semantic confusion.
Despite the power of this argument, MacKinnon's neo-External
Objectivist approach does not give an adequate account for the actual,
rather than theoretical, possibility of a feminist agenda. She argues
that through consciousness raising women can achieve feminist con-
sciousness. They can recognize the structure of oppression from
within oppression. If we are sexually constructed by masculinist soci-
ety, and if women have been objectified and do not have subjectivity
in such a society,327 how do women achieve the subjectivity, or inter-
subjectivity, of such a revolutionary consciousness?
To use a masculinist sports metaphor, she punts. MacKinnon
repeatedly states that she can not give an account of how feminist
consciousness arises-how women achieve the initial consciousness
which enables them to undergo consciousness raising to achieve femi-
nist consciousness.32' As I have argued elsewhere,3 29 this throws her
back onto an essentialist concept of human nature. This essence is
strikingly similar to the concept of human nature, generally (which of
course means masculinity, specifically) adopted by liberal legalism-
the autonomous subject capable of abstracting herself from the con-
tingencies of history and recreating a different reality.
This suggests that masculinism has not, in fact, been entirely suc-
cessful in creating reality as MacKinnon has otherwise charged.
Women are not totally objectified but can achieve at least a limited
subjectivity. However, this is subjectivity in the philosophical sense.
MacKinnon is accurate when she states that her account of the
knowledge of consciousness is not subjective in the senses of Idiosyn-
cratic or Individualistic.
This aspect of MacKinnon's argument reveals that liberal "objec-
makes the common error of confusing predictability and determination with the concept of
theoretical determinacy.
327. Id. at 116.
328. Id. at 85-86.
329. Schroeder, supra note 4, at 193-96. Liberalism is not the only possible political
philosophy which emphasizes individual autonomy (Psychological Subjectivity). Nevertheless,
it is a fundamental characteristic of liberalism to emphasize autonomy to the exclusion of other
values. Other philosophies, such as neo-Hegelian theory, emphasize that Psychological
Subjectivity, although necessary, is not sufficient for the achievement of self-actualization. The
problem with MacKinnon is that by insisting on only analyzing the existing social structure,
and refusing to consider the possible, she must emphasize only the negative aspect of
freedom-lack of choice of women. Consequently, her theory, like liberalism, only expressly
considers the value of autonomy.
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tivity" is not only Community Objectivity, but also a form of Com-
munity Objectivity which is at odds with the External Objectivity of
true human nature. That is, the Community Objective truth of
women established by liberalism is Externally Objectively false. Why
is it false? It is because the true essence of women is the essence of
human nature established by liberalism. The error of liberalism is
that although it accurately identifies the Externally Objective truth of
human nature with respect to men, it is Externally Objectively wrong
by not fully recognizing this truth with respect to women. Liberalism
not only does not recognize its error, it sets up structures, laws, and
vocabularies which serve to deform women until they Factually
Objectively conform to the Externally Objectively incorrect vision of
their Externally Objectively true selves.
To summarize, although MacKinnon frames her theory in the
form of a denial of the concept of (External) Objectivity, it is not all
that clear that her theory in fact denies External Objectivity, let alone
other forms of objectivity. Her continued use of the terminology of
objectivity confuses her own analysis, and thereby blunts her attack.
Her argument would seem to result in a paradox. Masculinism is
Externally Objective, in the sense that it remakes us and our world
until we actually conform to its Community Objective vision. False
universals are made into true local universals. Yet simultaneously,
masculinism is not Externally Objective because its Community
Objective vision does not conform to our true Externally Objective
reality, which can be glimpsed through consciousness raising. We are
socially constructed; we are not totally socially constructed.
4. THE RETURN TO SUBJECTIVITY
Moreover, as I have already alluded to, MacKinnon also uses
another conception of subjectivity/objectivity, one that relates more
to the post-modern philosophical concepts of the subject-object dis-
tinction than with modern liberal concepts of objectivity. MacKin-
non states that although liberalism defines the feminine as
subjectivity, women cannot celebrate subjectivity 330 because this
requires a knowing, and free, subject. In masculinism, women are
oppressed and cannot be subjects.3 31 Only men are subjects. The con-
cept of objectivity which MacKinnon thinks masculinism adopts-
i.e., external reality-views that which is to be known as the external
object. "The objectively knowable is object. Woman through male
eyes is sex object, that by which man knows himself at once as man
330. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 121.
331. Id. at 116.
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and as subject. ' 332 Objectivism as masculinism results in the objectifi-
cation of women.
MacKinnon comes to a similar insight of Lacanian psychology,
which holds that psychically both male and female can only compre-
hend the concept of the subject-the acting self-as the masculine.33
The phallus is the name of the object of desire. The feminine is the
lack of self, the object of desire as the Phallic Mother from whom we
have been forever psychically castrated, and with whom we can never
again achieve union. Fhe Woman does not exist. But whereas
Lacanians see this as psychic lying (myths in the negative sense),
MacKinnon takes them literally. Lacanians think males deceive
themselves by imagining that having physical penises means they have
the psychic phallus, thereby making them subjects.33 4 MacKinnon's
theory is purely instrumental and leaves no room for the unconscious.
Because men are, in fact, dominant and women subordinate, and
because males have real political power, MacKinnon's feminism holds
that men do have the phallus-men do construct sexuality and sexual-
ity is that which masculinity constructs.
To put it another way, MacKinnon's vision of selfhood is similar
to the autonomous individuality of classical liberalism. Consequently,
she assumes that the post-modem concept that human nature and
society are socially constructed means that someone-some active
subject-must be doing the constructing.335 This instrumental view
of psychology implies that whoever is advantaged by society must be
constructing society. 3 6
By choosing not to distinguish between very different concepts of
objectivity (i.e., External, Algorithmic, Community and Philosophical
332. Id. at 122.
333. See Schroeder, supra note 218; GROSZ, supra note 137, at 71-72.
334. However, fantasy does not have potency-in Lacanian theory it is the origin of the
symbolic (language) and the gender hierarchy. Cornell, supra note 9, at 2269.
335. "Post-Lacan, actually post-Foucault, it has been customary to affirm that sexuality is
socially constructed. Seldom specified is what, socially, it is constructed of, far less who does
the constructing, or how when or where." MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 131.
Note, that despite her ostensible adoption of seemingly post-modern rhetoric, MacKinnon
in fact rejects Michel Foucault's theory of the social construction of sexuality. Foucault's
theory states that there is no subject to construct sexuality, and there is no authentic sexuality
out of which sexuality is constructed. Schroeder, supra note 218.
336. This is not to suggest that MacKinnon comes to the ridiculous conclusion that because
men are more empowered then women, men, unlike, women, are not themselves socially
constructed. See Cain, supra note 4, at 807-08; Abrams, supra note 4, at 795. Unfortunately,
some feminists have interpreted MacKinnon's feminist theory this way. MacKinnon,
however, does state on several occasions that men do achieve a substantial degree of
subjectivity and choice. "[W]omen are in fact not full people in the sense men are allowed to
become." MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 103.
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Objectivity), MacKinnon risks confusing her arguments, let alone her
readers. This is because the gender identification of the polar oppo-
sites is reversed in different dyads. According to MacKinnon, mascu-
linism posits External Objectivity and associates Idiosyncratic
Subjectivity and relativity with women. But women are deprived of
Philosophical Subjectivity and are Philosophical objects. Social
knowledge is revealed as male Philosophical Subjectivity. Conse-
quently, MacKinnon states that masculinism is both objective and
subjective, and the feminine has been made both subjective and objec-
tive without distinguishing between these two very different concepts.
This leads to the paradoxes just discussed. MacKinnon states
that the knowledge that comes with feminist consciousness is neither
objective nor subjective. 337 But MacKinnon's concept, or feminist
consciousness, can be characterized as a form of Community Objec-
tivity similar to that proposed by Kuhn/Rorty and post-modern liber-
als-i.e., intersubjective consensus.338 Yet how can there be
intersubjective consensus among objects? MacKinnon argues that
masculinism objectifies women so that they are not subjects. She fur-
ther argues that it is wishful thinking for women to believe that, by
declaration, they can become subjects in the current social struc-
ture.339 On these premises, how can there by feminist consciousness?
It would seem that, contrary to MacKinnon's claims, there must
be some residue of Philosophical Subjectivity left within women (or at
least in feminists who, because they grasp the material reality of the
social construction of sexuality, are perhaps not socially "women" in
MacKinnon's sense, but are what I have called viragos).3 4° Or does
some form of External Objective truth exist which even Philosophical
Objectified women can perceive, possibly through Individualistic or
Idiosyncratic Subjective methods-here used in the affirmative sense
of correct intuitive, mystical, or other "non-rational" ways of know-
ing? Once again, although we are socially constructed; we are not
totally socially constructed. 41
337. By this she means it is neither Externally Objective nor Philosophically Subjective.
These two are not polar-opposites and she does not successfully achieve her goal of abandoning
subjectivity-objectivity as a useful dichotomy of social criticism. She retains Idiosyncratic
Subjectivity and relativity, Community Objectivity (consciousness raising), and Philosophical
Objectivity as valid categories for her account of the feminine in masculinist society.
338. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 172-74.
339. See supra note 336.
340. See Schroeder, supra note 91, at 1141, 1208, for a discussion of the archaic honorific
use of the term "virago" for a woman who has achieved masculine excellence.
341. Despite her otherwise helpful reinterpretation of MacKinnon's theories, Frances Olsen
tries to declaw MacKinnon's radicalism, while explaining away her apparent internal
contradictions, by supposing that MacKinnon is making a strategic choice of emphasizing
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5. DOMINANCE THEORY
MacKinnon attacks another concept of objectivity in liberal
legalism very successfully. Once again, she does not clearly distin-
guish her definitions and seems to deny objectivity's notorious
polysemy. Her apparent conflation can be defended on the grounds
that the liberals she criticizes also frequently conflate these issues. In
this case, MacKinnon's choice of language may reflect an attempt to
join the debate with liberals in a condominium of conflation.342
The objectivity that MacKinnon critiques is a form of Standard-
ized/Fairness/ Factual Objectivity frequently met in sexual equality
discourse. I reinterpret MacKinnon's critique of the liberal same-
ness/difference test of equality within this article's vocabulary as fol-
lows: the sameness/difference approach to sex equality derives from
setting a Standardized Objective test based on whether women are
like or dislike "similarly situated" men. This is seen as a matter of
Factual Objective facts that are Observation Objective. Equality is
expressed as treating like cases alike.343 But because the standards of
desert in liberalism is a masculine standard (i.e., characteristics asso-
ciated with masculinity are deemed deserving of the privileges which
society has given to men), treating like as alike is interpreted as saying
that individual women can have male privileges if they can prove that
they are empirically masculine. Masculinity becomes the justification
for its own dominant status, and equality is reduced to a fairness test
based on the empirical observation of "equality of opportunity."
MacKinnon condemns this concept of equality because it ignores
that the concept of equality is a political or ethical mandate. Liberal
legalists tend to forget that the phrase "all men are created equal" in
that great liberal document, the Declaration of Independence, cannot
be read as stating that all male human beings are empirically simi-
some aspects of her theory over others. Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1175-76 (1989) (book review). Without denying that all writing
necessarily requires inclusion and exclusion, emphasis and de-emphasis, MacKinnon is entitled
to be taken seriously on her own terms and saved from "defenders" who try to suggest
otherwise.
342. In a recent article, MacKinnon further develops her dominance concept of sexual
equality but generally avoids wording it in terms of objectivity/subjectivity. I believe her
analysis and her argument has been greatly strengthened by this decision. MacKinnon, supra
note 325.
343. Treating like alike is not the only theory of equality under the law propounded by
liberal political philosophers and jurisprudes. ROSENFELD, supra note 2, at 13-42. At least
one feminist has suggested that women abandon equality analysis entirely. Cain, supra note 4,
at 806-07. Cain's suggestion might be appropriate if we wrote on a clean slate. Unfortunately,
insofar as gender issues are considered under the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution, we are stuck with wording at least part of our analysis within equality discourse.
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lar.3" Rather, it is a statement of what it means to be members of a
political society despite empirical inequality. The sameness/difference
approach to sex equality, which emphasizes membership based on
empirical similarity, actually denies the concept of political equality,
which is supposed to be one of the central tenets of liberalism.
One of the forms of objectivity which Greenawalt tries to defend
is precisely such a Standardized/ Factual/ Observation/ Fairness
standard of objectivity-i.e., objectivity in "the sense that a legal cate-
gory is not arbitrary or unfair. ' 345 One problem with such a concept
of objectivity is that Standardized Objectivity does not have norma-
tive implications that would justify honorific labels such as Factual
and Fairness Objectivity. Observation Objectivity has normativity
only insofar as it is deemed an "accurate" way of perceiving reality.
However, even if an accurate description of reality might help one
construct a standard, it does not alone give one guidance as to what
judgments are to be made pursuant to that standard. An accurate
description of gender difference does not, standing alone, tell us which
gender, or neither, should be privileged. An external theory is needed
to legitimate these normative judgments. The use of the normative,
honorific word "objectivity" conceals, or begs, the very question
which needs to be asked.
Greenawalt not only substantially misunderstands the MacKin-
nonesque domination critique, he conflates it with a different critique
made by different voice feminists. Greenawalt states that objections
that the law is arbitrary (Biased Subjective), are usually not, in reality,
objections to classification of individuals by groups.346 This is because
all classification (by definition) consists of abstractions of individuals
to common essential characteristics. So far, I agree. He believes that
classification is unacceptably arbitrary only when "the law's unfavor-
able treatment of a group has no significant relation to a proper pur-
pose of the classification. ' 347 His particular concern is whether
certain classifications of individuals by race and gender can be
344. Indeed, Robin West actually adopts this interpretation of the liberal concept of
equality and identifies it as uniquely male. She argues that because women are not physically
equal to their husbands and children, equality is not a feminine value. West, supra note 10, at
12; see also Schroeder, supra note 91, at 1148 n.25.
Rosenfeld accurately explains that in liberalism, equality is a counterfactual-it does not
pretend to be a positive description of reality but is prescriptive. "'All men are created equal'
is not a declarative sentence; it is an imperative. It is not a statement but an exhortation. It is
not an affirmation or description. It is a command. Whatever its form, its function is
directive." ROSENFELD, supra note 2, at 21.
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defended, and whether laws that make such classifications should be
condemned because of their differential effect.34
Greenawalt then relates this discussion of classification to a con-
sideration of the "generality" of the law. He presents this as address-
ing the feminist critique of objectivity in the law. He discusses
whether the law should be "principled," which he identifies with the
"masculine" (and which I would classify as more Standardized Objec-
tive or related to Reasonable Person Objectivity), or whether it can be
more relational, which he identifies with the "feminine" (which I
would classify as less Standardized Objective and either Mental State,
Idiosyncratic, Irrational or Psychological Subjective).349 Based on his
reading of the work of Carol Gilligan, Greenawalt characterizes the
feminist critique of "objectivity" in law as arguing that the legal sys-
tem is permeated with a masculine point of view, which he identifies
with "principles." Consequently, for the male psychology, principled
law is, per se, the standard of fairness. 350 Greenawalt claims to accept
the different voice theory by saying that the feminine voice, which he
associates with subjectivity, is, in fact, morally superior and should be
integrated into societal organization. 351 He is unable, however, to fit
the "unprincipled" concepts of femininity into most areas of law,
which he sees as necessarily principled (and masculine) for fairness
reasons.3 52 Law is not morality.
For Greenawalt, women's different voice is expressly not a legal
voice. It may be spoken elsewhere in society, but it is mere barking in
a court room.353
348. Id.
349. Id. at 155. Greenawalt compares the principled ("Standardized Objective") approach
to law with marking exams. Id. at 31-32.
350. I have satirized Greenawalt's attempt to engage the different voice feminist critique
elsewhere. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 142-44.
351. GREENAWALT, supra note 108, at 156.
352. Id. at 157. Greenawalt does recognize a limited role for relational ideas in law.
"Resolutions based more on caring concern might be an advance not only in divorce and
custody cases but also for some contractual disputes, claims in tort, and other issues.
Conciliation and mediation could play a much larger part .... [S]ome substantive standards
could attend more to texture and relation." Id. Greenawalt specifically sees the different-voice
relational concept as arguing against the use of Reasonable Person Objective standards, or
perhaps against the use of any and all Standardized Objectivity. "Reasoning to decision by
general abstractions is seen as alienating and less richly human than an alternative apprroach."
Id. at 159. To Greenawalt, relationality means deciding each case separately without regard to
precedent and consistency in any form.
353. Greenawalt's reading of different voice feminism, although simplistic, provides a valid
interpretation of much of the work, to date, which contains an implicit conservatism.
Greenawalt ignores a more sophisticated argument which could be developed from different-
voice theory. One should not conclude that principled standards are justice to men and
relational concepts are justice to women, as though we were two totally alien life forms which
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Greenawalt accepts concepts of Standardized Objectivity (a
"principled" and expressly masculine approach) in the law as fairness
for him as a man. He feels the need to go on,354 to defend the particu-
lar uses of particular standards from the critique of feminists and per-
sons of color. He interprets this critique as being primarily one of
"disparate" effect. But disparate effect only sees harm when like is
treated unlike (or, more precisely, when the effect of the treatment on
two different likes is unlike). This is the very concept challenged by
MacKinnon! Greenawalt is mainly concerned that a seemingly neu-
tral standard may have a disparately negative effect on one or another
sub-group in society.355 He also partially defends disparate effects in
some circumstances on the ground that these effects do not always
represent "bias" but empirically observable facts.356 He can only see
deviation from such neutral standards for compensatory, affirmative-
action type purposes.357
Greenawalt's analysis downplays the fact that the dominance
approach (and the different voice approach) questions first and fore-
most the standards determined, rather than the application of stan-
dards. A recognition of the existence of observable empirical
differences and similarities cannot, alone, serve as a justification for
the use of empirical similarities and differences to justify the status
quo. Neither radical nor different voice feminists argue that there are
no empirically observable differences between men and women. The
recognition of difference in the material reality of masculinity and
femininity is one of the base insights of almost all contemporary femi-
just happen to live on the same planet. Empirical psychology is not jurisprudence. Rather,
different-voice theory suggests that, as an empirical matter, a substantial percentage (perhaps a
majority) or American men might be psychologically predisposed to be more likely to think
first in terms of standards, while a substantial percentage of American women might be
psychologically predisposed to be more likely to think first in terms of relations. These
empirical observations should not be misconstrued into a reification of the observations into
essentialist definitions of masculinity and femininity. Human psychology contains the
unconscious, the conscious, and innumerable contradictions. Rather, the masculinist
jurisprude should realize that he should self-critically re-examine his theories and his
conceptions of personhood to determine whether they are based on unexamined assumptions
derived from his own idiosyncratic psychological makeup. Moreover, he should self-critically
re-examine alternate feminist theories which might not initially occur to him, but yet be valid
and reflect a different, and perhaps more appealing, conception of the self. Ideally, this will
result in a fuller conception of the self which does not submerge gender into the sameness of
masculinity.
354. Actually, he discusses this issue before he discusses the different voice critique of
categories. By defending the specific use of specific categories before defending the use of
categories, Greenawalt gives away the fact that he does not really consider the feminist critique
to be serious.
355. GREENAWALT, supra note 108, at 136.
356. Id. at 123-29, 136-39.
357. Id. at 130-33.
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nism.a33 Contemporary feminists do not argue that gender differences
are illusory and that women would be "just as good as men" if they
would be given a fair chance. Women are as good as women and,
nevertheless, demand that men recognize them.
Greenwalt argues that a traditional legal standard may be defen-
sible even if it is "based largely on male experience and disadvantages
women" if it turns "out to be the rule that seems best from the per-
spective of women and disadvantages women. At the least, saying
that the rule is based on male experience and disadvantages women is
not sufficient to condemn the rule. '3 59 MacKinnon is denying the
validity of the standard chosen, even as a starting point for discussion.
This is because she believes that she has shown how this standard is
systematically used as an instrument of domination. Greenwalt
argues that "innocently motivated standards" that have differential
effects should not be condemned as "discriminatory. ' '3 1 In MacKin-
non's radical analysis, the Psychological or Philosophical Subjective
"innocence" of the standard drafters is irrelevant to the conclusion
that the political effect is discriminatory. 61 Changing standards or
applying different standards for the oppressed may initially sound
similar to Greenawalt's affirmative-action approach, but the similarity
is only on the surface. Greenawalt recommends a form of affirmative
action, a concept borrowed from the law of racial equality, as a short-
term strategy to enable the oppressed eventually to reach the stan-
dards of the dominant. Affirmative action serves as a crutch for
women who are seen as social cripples. Greenawalt equates feminin-
ity with effeminacy; women with incomplete men; as eunuchs. This
form of affirmative action, therefore, reaffirms, rather than rejects the
standards set by the status quo. The radical critique attempts to bring
358. Greenawalt does acknowledge that at least one aspect of feminist critiques of law is
based on a recognition that the origin of some facially netural rules lie in male perspectives.
Id. at 136. He also recognizes that such rules may disadvantage women. Id. He, however,
rejects the argument that these two conditions make the rule unacceptable on the ground that
the rule may nevertheless be the "best" when viewed from both the female, as well as male,
perspective. Id. at 136-39. This conclusion is logically correct, of course, if one rejects the
radical feminist proposition that rules which are based on the male perspective and which
sytematically disadvantage women can never be the "best" when viewed from the female
perspective.
359. Id. at 138.
360. Id. at 138-39.
361. Greenawalt may be indirectly making a good point as to the pragmatic, political
wisdom of using the term "discrimination" in discussions of gender justice. Insofar as the
word does connote intentionality, men and women can honestly insist that society is not
misogynist because they do not consciously (i.e. Psychological and Philosophical Subjectively)
experience themselves as hating women. And yet, society may be misogynist in the sense that




the standards, themselves, into question.162
Greenawalt's liberal approach silences this question. By
accepting the standards, which set forth the definition of equality, the
criteria for determining who deserves rights and what counts as a
legal claim of discrimination, Greenawalt defines away the cultural
feminist's different voice as non-legal voice, and defines away the
claims of radical feminists as non-speech. Women's demands are ren-
dered no more meaningful than the barking of dogs. Feminists
become whining bitches.
362. "Attempts" because I am not convinced that feminists have been successful in doing
so. I believe that both MacKinnon's radical feminism and cultural (i.e., different-voice)
feminism actually accept the gender stereotypes of the status quo. MacKinnon also sees
women as incomplete men. See supra note 336.
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